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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 




When a story about a public issue appears in the news media, politicians, 
laypersons, and academic researchers naturally wonder whether and what kind of 
influence the story may have on the opinions of its audience.  How the public feels about 
an issue or a political figure matters greatly in a democratic political system (Hume, 1963, 
Habermas, 1989). Its influence on issue support and electoral results are well documented 
by research (e.g. Iyengar & Simon, 1993, Burstein, 2003, Mishler, 1993 & Lavine, 2001). 
The importance to understand and predict the formation and change of public opinion 
with exposure to media contents has thus made research in this line one of the key areas 
in political science and mass communication studies.  
The news media have been regarded as playing a unique role in bringing 
information to citizens that is beyond their immediate reach (Lippmann, 1922). It is 
commonly assumed that the news stories influence the perceptions, attitudes, and 
opinions of their audience. The subtractive logic (Mutz, 1998) as well as incidental or 
anecdotal experience such as the panic effect from shows like Attack by the Mar
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certainly supports this notion. 
 The scientific evidence with regard to media effects has gone through quite 
dramatic shifts---from magic bullet to minimal effects and back to powerful effects 
(Bryant & Zillmann, 1994). Nowadays, the news media is considered to have some 
influence, but not under all circumstances. Nor is such influence all powerful on different 
individuals. These paradigm changes clearly indicate that media effects are simply 
complicated. It also represents a progression from a simplistic view to a more 
sophisticated understanding of media effects on public opinion. 
The question then becomes when and how the messages communicated through 
the media would have an effect. Some research argues that the difference in the 
magnitude of media effects is due to individual differences, such as differences in 
political knowledge (Zaller, 1992, Neuman, 1986). Some research argues that the 
difference is also on the issue level, as some issues are more close to the lives of the 
general public, some are a bit distant from it (Gambson, 1992).  
It seems, though, that the differences that have been conceptualized and tested in 
these various studies have something in common. Then it may be possible to unify the 
theories in these studies by using a single construct, if that construct can capture the 
underlying differences among individuals and among issues.  
 
Overarching Goals of the Dissertation 
Drawing from the theory of asymmetric information in the field of economics and 
from previous public opinion research about specific information (e.g. Akerlof, 1970, 
Zaller, 1992, and Iyengar, 1986), this dissertation proposes a unifying theoretical model 
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for explaining the circumstances under which the news media would have a stronger 
effect on issue opinions. The research question that this dissertation addresses is whether 
the construct of information may explain the magnitude of media effects, either in place 
of or as an addition to constructs that have been tested by previous research (e.g. Zaller, 
1992, Mutz, 1998, Gambson, 1992 and Zucker, 1978).  
Empirically, three experiments are conducted to test whether having more specific 
information about an issue in the news would mitigate the effect from exposing to the 
news. That is, whether those who have more information about the issue would 
demonstrate less agreement with the issue position in the respective news stories shown 
to them. The three public issues in these three experiments are the North Korean nuclear 
threat, health care reform, and alternative energy research. By choosing these three issues 
that represent both foreign and domestic affairs of either a political or economic nature, 
this dissertation tries to choose public issues that may represent a wide spectrum of issues. 
Experiments are conducted to allow the testing of media effects and its interaction with 
specific information with control of media exposure and information reception. With 
these experiments, it is not only possible to examine the short term effects right after 
receiving issue specific information, but also the longer term effects from information 
that has been accumulated over time.  
 
The Organization of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I review previous research that examines the various moderators of 
media effects on public opinion. The review is mostly focused on studies that address this 
question directly. Then I provide a concept explication for information, the key construct 
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in the theory proposed in this dissertation. Information is then compared to other major 
constructs that have been proposed and tested to explain the magnitude of media effects 
with a focus on comparison to the explanatory and predictive power of political 
awareness.  
In Chapter 3, I present the theory proposed in this dissertation with specific 
hypothesis deduced from the theory for each of the three public issues. In the following 
two chapters, I describe the procedure (Chapter 4) and results (Chapter 5) from three 
experimental studies using the three public issues.  
The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) highlights the implications of major findings 
in the current research in light of existing media effects theories. It also discusses the 
limitations of the current study and direction for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Media effects research has shifted through three paradigms. Starting from the 
notion of all-powerful effects, early empirical research concluded that the media only 
have minimal effects (Klapper, 1960). The reversion to the powerful effects paradigm 
was marked by demonstrating that the media tend to have more influence on “what 
people think about” than on “what people think” (Cohen, 1962).  
In the process of these paradigm changes, evidence has accumulated that media 
messages do not have uniform impact under all circumstances or on all individuals 
(Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Tichenor, 
Donohue & Olien, 1970; Gerbner & Gross, 1976;). Additional research has tried to 
identify the limiting conditions (Simon, 1977) under which the mass media tend to have a 
greater or lesser impact (e.g. Zucker, 1978; Gamson, 1992; Mutz, 1998; Zaller, 1992).  
This dissertation proposes that information is the underlying construct common to a few 
factors that have been identified as the moderators of media effects. 
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Moderators of Media Effects 
Issue Obtrusiveness 
Zucker (1978) proposes that the impact of the news media is contingent upon two 
factors. One of them is the obtrusiveness of an issue. If people have less direct experience 
with an issue, it is less obtrusive. Media reports about such issues tend to have larger 
impact on the public than issues that are more obtrusive. For example, Zucker has 
demonstrated that public opinion about pollution is more prone to shifts from exposure to 
media coverage than opinion about the cost of living.  
 
Issue Proximity  
Gamson finds that proximity of issues or of issue frames to the daily life of the 
public has an impact on how much they rely on media messages when talking about 
politics (Gamson, 1992). For issues such as nuclear power and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the reliance on the mass media is greater compared to issues like the troubled American 
industry or affirmative action.  
Gamson’s idea of proximity is very similar to the concept of obtrusiveness 
proposed by Zucker (1978). Both categorize issues or issue frames into those close to 
people’s everyday life and those that are relatively distant. However, proximity is 
proposed only as an explanation for the public’s varying level of reliance on mass media 
while talking about the four issues (affirmative action, nuclear power, troubled industry, 
and Arab-Israeli conflict) in the study. How to measure proximity for other issues is not 
specified. Nor has the idea been tested further.  
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Impersonal Influence  
Mutz (1998) demonstrates that media messages tend to influence the perceptions 
of collective experience and opinions more strongly than personal ones. For example, 
personal opinions about low-income housing or unemployment are less prone to the 
effects of exposure to media coverage than perceptions on the collective level, such as 
community support for low-income housing.  
 
Information: The Underlying Construct 
These three research domains have empirically demonstrated the varying 
magnitude of media influence across issues or on opinions at the personal or collective 
level. However, the question remains as to what exactly the difference is between 
obtrusive and non-obtrusive issues, between issues that are close to our daily lives, and 
issues that are distant, and between personal and impersonal perceptions.  
This dissertation argues that information is the construct that underlies issue 
obtrusiveness, proximity, and impersonal influence. It is information that moderates mass 
media effects. A theory built upon information may provide a unifying theoretical 
explanation for these pieces of empirical evidence about mass media effects.  
 Although obtrusiveness, proximity, and personal- and collective- perceptions all 
seem to have high heuristic values, the concept of information has the following 
advantages. First of all, it is logical and testable to see whether the public has more 
information about obtrusive than non-obtrusive issues. So is the case with proximity and 
impersonal influence. In this sense, using information as a moderator of media effects can 
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provide a unifying explanation for these seemingly different pieces of empirical 
observation.  
Secondly, information can be measured and quantified with higher inter-
objectivity. The measures of issue obtrusiveness, proximity and opinion collectivity are 
not specified in previous research. Rather, intuition and common sense are applied to 
decide which issues are obtrusive or close to our lives or which opinions are personal or 
collective. Subjectivity arises as different researchers may have different opinions about 
these things. On the other hand, the measurement of information can be specified so that 
it is more objective across studies.  
Lastly, obtrusiveness, proximity, and impersonal influence have all been 
conceptualized with regard to issues or opinions. None of them discusses whether the 
mass media may have stronger or weaker impact on different individual audience 
members. The concept of information, however, makes it possible to explain the varying 
magnitude of media effects both on the issue level and on the individual level. The public 
may have more or less information about different issues or topics. Individual audience 
members may also have more or less specific information about what is discussed in a 
media message. In this sense, the concept of information has more explanatory power 
than the three concepts proposed in the previous studies.  
 
Political Awareness, an Alternative Explanation? 
 As for a unifying explanation of media effects on attitude change, the Reception, 
Acceptance and Sampling (RAS) model proposed by Zaller (1992) seems to be an 
existing alternative to the model proposed in this dissertation. In this section, I explain 
 9 
why they are different and how the concept of information can contribute to our 
understanding of the magnitude of media effects.  
 
The RAS Model  
Zaller (1992) proposes and tests the model suggesting that those who have a 
moderate level of political awareness tend to show the largest effects from media 
messages. Such effects tend to be smaller for those who are the least and the most aware 
(Figure 3).  
Figure 1. The Relationship between Political Awareness and Mass Media Impact in the 
RAS 
  








The logic behind the non-monotonic relationship between political awareness and 
the magnitude of media effects, or attitude change as Zaller put it, has two steps. First of 
all, the Acceptance Axiom argues that political awareness is positively related to the 
reception of media communication about a particular topic. Secondly, given exposure to 
the media coverage, the Acceptance Axiom argues that political awareness is negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of accepting the argument communicated in a media 














message (Figure 4). Based on these two steps, the non-monotonic model of political 
awareness and media effects is deduced.  
The theory proposed in this dissertation only concerns the relationship between 
information and the magnitude of media effects given exposure. It is thus an argument 
directly related to the Acceptance Axiom.  
Figure 2. The Relationship between Political Awareness and Mass Media Impact, Given 








Political awareness is conceptualized as the attention and ability to comprehend 
relevant information. Zaller (1992) argues that the battery of factual and general political 
knowledge questions, like the one used in the National Election Studies, provides a very 
good measure of this concept (Figure 5). The operationalized version of the Acceptance 
Axiom is that given exposure, the mass media show stronger impact on those with low 
levels of general political knowledge than on those with high levels of general political 
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Explanatory Power and Parsimony of Model Building 
Measured by general political knowledge, political awareness seems to explain 
why some individuals in the public are more prone to media communication and some 
are less prone. However, it does not explain why the mass media tend to have more 
effects on non-obtrusive issues or issues that are distant from people’s daily lives even for 
the same individual (Zucker, 1978; Gamson, 1992). The reason is that the level of 
political knowledge is a constant for each individual at a given point of time. Thus 
political awareness alone cannot explain why the mass media have stronger impact for 
some topics than others. Zaller has to add two more variables, media message intensity 
and familiarity, in his model in order to explain such differences.  
Using the concept of information, however, one can explain not only the variance 
among different individuals in the public but also differences for the same individual 
across different issues. The level of information about a particular issue may differ 
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involved. This makes it possible to model opinion formation and change more 
parsimoniously by using specific information rather than using political awareness.  
In addition, even though Zaller proposes message intensity and familiarity in his 
model of attitude change, these two concepts are not measured directly. Again, as in 
previous literature, they are estimated vaguely by comparing one issue with another. The 
relative intensity and familiarity are then judged rather subjectively, which makes it 
difficult to test their impact directly. On the other hand, as discussed above, information 
can be measured and quantified more objectively.  
Another aspect of explanatory power concerns the scope of phenomena that a 
theoretical model can explain. Although Zaller argues that his RAS model is a general 
model explaining opinion formation and change, it would be quite a stretch to use 
political awareness to explain media impacts that are beyond political communication, for 
example, from messages about fashion or entertainment. Using the concept of 
information, however, can provide us a general model that may explain and predict the 
impact of mass communication in a much wider scope that is not limited to messages 
about politics and public affairs.  
 
Logical and Empirical Problems of Political Awareness as a Moderator of Media Effects  
Even for explaining and predicting mass media effects for different individuals, 
information also has advantages over awareness. The term awareness and the way it is 
measured suggest that it is a theoretical construct about some stable and trait-like 
characteristic of an individual citizen, which usually does not vary across different 
situations.  
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Although the general political knowledge questions in the NES survey differ 
slightly from year to year, they mostly ask the respondents about the political offices held 
by a few political figures, the party in control of the Congress, or the ideological location 
of political parties or figures. Intuitively, it is not quite logical to argue that the ability to 
identify a political figure would explain why media communication about specific issues, 
whether or not related to politics, would have less impact on some people and more on 
others. So is the case with the ability to answer other general knowledge questions in the 
political awareness scale.  
Zaller establishes the logic for using political awareness to explain and predict 
effects from media communication through the level of specific information about an 
issue. Political awareness is positively correlated with the amount of specific information 
one has about a topic (the Reception Axiom, Figure 6).  
Figure 4. The Relationship between Political Awareness and Reception of Issue-specific 
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Topic-specific information is negatively correlated with the magnitude of media 
effects. Thus, political awareness is negatively correlated with media effects, given 
exposure (the Acceptance Axiom).  Figure 7 shows this logical process.  
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Figure 5. The Logic in the RAS Model regarding the Relationship between Political 
Awareness and the Magnitude of Media Effects 
 
 
However, this argument is not widely supported empirically. To the contrary, 
Iyengar (1986) found that the correlations among domain specific knowledge, such as on 
the defense, inflation, energy, and civil rights issues, are low. This finding contradicts the 
Acceptance Axiom that political awareness is positively correlated with issue-specific 
information. In addition, Iyengar (1986) finds the common factors that are universally 
predictive of domain specific information include education, gender, and political 
ideology but not general political knowledge. He suggests that selective attention to 
politics may lead to the specificity of political knowledge.  
The empirical evidence provided by Zaller (1992) with regard to the Reception 
Axiom could very well be some special cases. For example, both the Vietnam War and 
the Iran-contra issue received a large amount of media coverage and public attention. 
Those who were more attentive to media coverage may have become more informed 
about these issues. It could be that only in these cases, is political awareness related to the 
magnitude of media effects.  
For issues with comparatively lower levels of media coverage, general political 
knowledge and issue-specific information may not correlate with each other. If this can 
be shown empirically, the Reception Axiom would not hold. Political awareness would 
not be logically related to the likelihood of attitude change, given the exposure to relevant 
media messages. If that is the case empirically, political awareness would not be the real 
moderator of media effects.  
Political       Issue-specific   Media  
Awareness       Information   Effects 
Political       Media  
Awareness      Effects 
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In addition, Zaller’s dismissal of using specific information to explain and predict 
the impact of mass media in preference to general political knowledge is rather 
unsubstantiated. Price and Zaller (1993) provide the key piece of evidence for the 
argument that general political knowledge outperforms specific measures of information. 
They compare differential news reception and retention as predicted by general political 
knowledge and domain specific information. They conclude that general political 
knowledge is the strongest and most consistent predictor of current news story recall. The 
tendency of individuals to acquire news and information on a domain- or topic-specific 
basis fails to undermine the value of political knowledge as a general measure of 
propensity for news recall.  
However, their conclusions are considerably undermined if the bad measures of 
domain specific information in their article are taken into consideration. For example, the 
authors presuppose that the older respondents should know more about plans to repeal 
government health insurance. With that strong yet unsubstantiated assumption, they 
compare the recall of news stories between the old and the young. This is clearly not a 
measure of domain specific information, which could seriously invalidate their 
interpretation about domain specific measures. 
Overall, logically and intuitively, political awareness does not seem to be related 
to the effects of media messages about all kinds of topics covered by the media. Also, the 
existing empirical evidence does not provide consistent support for the argument that 
political awareness can explain and predict media effects better than the information 
specific to the topic covered by the media.  
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Theoretical Support for Using the Construct of Information  
In addition to its intuitive and logical relevance, information has another 
advantage over political awareness. It has been shown to be a useful theoretical construct 
for explaining general human behaviors in fields other than political communication. In 
economics, Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) analyzed 
and disentangled the impact of asymmetric information on a variety of markets. For 
example, in the market for used cars, the seller, presumably the owner, usually has more 
information about the particular car for sale than the buyer. Thus, an asymmetry arises in 
terms of the disparity between the levels of specific information each party has. This type 
of information asymmetry explains the phenomenon of adverse selection, i.e., low-quality 
cars drive out good cars on the market.  
Similarly, in the health insurance market, the policy purchaser has more 
information about his or her own health than the insurance company. This is why the 
insurance company has to screen the buyers through self-selection, i.e., by offering 
different policies such as lower premiums in exchange for higher deductibles.  
The informational disparity that explains these phenomena is not the general 
knowledge of autos or medicine. Used car buyers or insurance companies may have more 
or less such general knowledge. But what matters for adverse selection or screening is 
that some people have more information while others have less about the specific cars for 
sale or the health conditions of policy seekers.  
The information asymmetry theory provides some hints about the magnitude of 
media effects. If we can identify those audience members who have more information 
and those who have less about a specific topic covered in the media, we may be able to 
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predict the magnitude of media effects with greater precision than using general political 
awareness.  
 
Parsimony of Measurement  
 The most acclaimed advantage of political awareness, especially using general 
political knowledge as its measurement, is its simplicity. Some uniform scale can be 
constructed and used even if different topics of media messages are involved. If, on the 
other hand, specific information is used, it would seem quite daunting as we need to 
come up with new measures for different topics.  
 First of all, the parsimony of measurement should not be confused with the 
parsimony of theoretical models. Using specific information is in no way less 
parsimonious than the use of political awareness in terms of theory building. Rather, it 
may explain more phenomena about media effects by using fewer variables as discussed 
earlier.  
Secondly, even though the simplicity of measurement is an important concern, it 
should not be a reason to compromise for a less logical theory. Media effects are 
complicated. It may take more than just a single measure to ascertain how the level of 
knowledge or information moderates media effects. If information can be shown to 
explain more variance and predict with more precision than political awareness, it is 
necessary to have more complicated measures in order to have an improved 
understanding of media effects.  
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Information: Conceptualization & Operationalization  
 The term information is generally used in a very broad way both in everyday 
language and in research related to human communication. However, as Chaffee (1991) 
pointed out, whenever a theory is proposed, the building blocks of the theory, i.e. the key 
concepts, always need to be explicated carefully and clearly. Explication of concepts 
helps to improve the inter-objectivity among different studies of the same research topic.  
The process of explication involves conceptualization and operationalization of a 
concept. By conceptualizing a concept, we provide a definition for the concept, which 
specifies, on a theoretical level, what is and what is not meant by that concept. 
Operationalization of a concept involves giving a definition that can lead to the practical 
observation of the concept. 
This section discusses how information is defined theoretically and operationally 
in this dissertation.  It also touches upon the major concerns in measuring the concept. In 
order to define information, it is helpful to look at the characteristics of this concept as 
used in this dissertation.  
 
Characteristics of Information 
Specificity 
Information in this dissertation has a strong feature of specificity when compared 
with seemingly similar concepts such as awareness or knowledge. Such a difference has 
been proposed by Downs (1957) when he analyzes voting and abstention from a rational 
choice perspective. He argues that knowledge is the recognition and understanding of a 
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given field’s basics. Information, however, is the updates for the variables in knowledge. 
He also argues that lack of information is about particular events, not a general condition. 
As discussed in the literature review above, knowledge is not empirically tested to 
be positively correlated with information specific to a topic. Thus it is not quite logical to 
argue that general knowledge of a field can moderate the effects from the media 
communication about a specific topic.  
 
Obtainable through the media? 
 Information can certainly be obtained. However, that does not necessarily mean 
we can learn more when more information is available. Since the late 1980s, the mass 
media have gone through an explosive growth in terms of the amount of information 
provided to the audience. Nowadays, we have 24-hour cable news as a major supplement 
if not replacement of the three news networks. We also have numerous news websites on 
the Internet. According to a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 
February, 2007 on public knowledge of current affairs, these changes and the subsequent 
increase in the amount of information have influenced the way the American public 
obtains news. But the American public is not more informed about various national and 
international affairs. 
These findings suggest that more media coverage about an issue does not 
guarantee that the public obtains more information in the process. One potential 
explanation is that forgetting is a concurrent process with learning information. As one 
obtains information about a particular issue from the news media, not all that is received 
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can remain in one’s memory. That is why as the media coverage continues on, the 
amount of information one has about the issue may or may not accumulate.  
In some scenarios, we may even be able to observe a diminishing media effect as 
media coverage about an issue accumulates over time. For example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, 
and McPhee (1954) compared voters’ positions on a five-point scale ranging from strong 
Republican to strong Democrat in June with those in August, and the August positions 
with those in October using panel procedures. Between June and August, 66 percent of a 
panel of 760 respondents maintained their original party adherence. About 17 percent 
wavered between a given party and “neutral”, or vice versa. Only 8 percent of voters 
converted. During the second half of the campaign, from September to late October, the 
incidence of reinforcement was about the same, 68 percent. However, relatively fewer 
voters converted, only 3 percent, compared to the first phase of the campaign. There 
seems to be a trend that as the coverage amount increases, the public tend to be more 
informed. Thus, less change is found during the later part of a media coverage campaign.  
However, media effects from presidential election campaigns can be quite special. 
For one thing, the mobilization of election campaigns may bring the issue closer to 
people’s lives. For those issues distant from the public’s everyday life, one does not have 
information channels other than the news media. If what the media provide is not the full 
picture of the issue, even though the public may know more about what is reported in the 
media, they may still lack the advantage of getting the full picture. In this sense, the 
public, or some of them, are still not informed enough about the issue.  
For another, the major tone of election campaigns is either a promotion of one 
candidate or an attack of other candidates for the same position. This tone is usually 
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stable along the process of the campaign. For issues where the media change the major 
position, such as the Iraq war, we may observe that the public opinion still follows the 
media position change closely.  
In sum, the mass media are channels for the public to obtain information. 
However, forgetting and inadequacy of media reports in some cases imply that the link 
between more media coverage and more information obtained does not always hold. 
 
Multi-dimensional  
The previous discussion suggests that the concept of information as used in this 
dissertation is multi-dimensional. One aspect of the concept refers to the sheer amount 
that an individual knows about a particular issue. The other aspect concerns the 
informational advantages or channels to know more and fully about the issue. The second 
aspect may depend on factors such as age, education, career, family background, and 
personal experience, etc.  
All in all, when information is referred to in this dissertation, it does not simply 
mean a collection of facts an individual possesses about a topic or an issue. It also refers 
to whether one has advantages, naturally or socially, of obtaining facts about the topic or 
the issue.  
 
Operationalization of Information 
 As information is conceptualized as multi-dimensional, the measurement should 
certainly take that into consideration. Firstly, multiple questions can be asked about the 
particular topic about which the media effects are investigated. As Babbie suggested, 
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multiple items are more robust than a single question (2005). The battery of questions 
may be quite different when a variety of topics are involved. For each topic, specific 
questions need to be designed to evaluate the amount of information an individual has. 
For example, this dissertation proposes to test how the individual difference in 
information can impact the magnitude of media effects from reports of the North Korean 
nuclear threat. Instead of asking the general political knowledge question, more specific 
questions should be designed in order to differentiate who is more informed and who is 
less informed.  
 Secondly, measures should also be designed to ask whether an individual has 
advantages in getting to be informed about this issue. For example, questions can be 
asked about whether the public has other sources of information beside the mass media. 
Or it can be asked whether discussions among friends or family members about the issue 
are informative or not. Or it may also be asked whether their personal background makes 
them know more about the issue than what the media tell them.  
 
Mechanism of the Information Effect  
 It is important to note that issue specific information may moderate news media 
effects on public opinions through the following two-step mechanism. First of all, prior 
information tends to facilitate opinion and attitude formation (Fazio, 1995). For those 
who tend to know about an issue, it is more likely that they will have a view about the 
issue than those who do not know about the issue.  
Secondly, information may increase the centrality of the attitude formed 
(Converse, 1964, Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983, Barabas, 2004,). If the news media 
discuss the public issue and have an issue position that is in line with the opinion already 
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formed by the public, we should not be able to observe much change in opinion before 
and after news exposure, simply due to ceiling effects. If, on the other hand, the issue 
position in the news media is different from the opinion that an individual has already 
formed, the centrality of the existing attitude acts as a restraint on an issue position that is 
in the opposite direction (Strickland, Taber, & Lodge, 2011).  
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Chapter 3  
THEORY & HYPOTHESIS 
The theory proposed in this dissertation argues that the amount of information a 
person has about a particular issue can moderate the magnitude of media influence. The 
more one knows about the issue, the less likely it is that he or she will be influenced by 
the issue position in the relevant media messages. As this theory concerns the change of a 
person’s opinions pre and post exposure, it should hold true regardless of whether or not 
he or she has an existing opinion and whether the existing opinion is similar or opposite 
to the media’s position.  
If the theory is true, we should be able to observe that the effect of exposure to the 
mass media varies for different individuals depending upon the amount of information 
they have, even after controlling for the effects of political knowledge. For those who 
have more information, their agreement with the issue position in the media message is 
weaker compared to those who have less or no prior information.  
Thus, there are two general hypotheses tested in this dissertation. The first is 
about the news story effect by itself. The second is about the moderating role of 
information on news effects. The two hypotheses are,  
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Hypothesis 1 (H.1): Those who view a news story about a public issue are more likely to 
agree with the issue position in the story than those who do not view such a story. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H.2): The degree of agreement with the media’s issue position is stronger 
among those who have less prior information about the topic than for those who have 
more information. 
 
Hypotheses in the Context of Issues Used in the Experiments 
I conduct three lab experiments to test this theory in this dissertation. 
Experimental design can, firstly, provide the opportunity to manipulate the exposure to 
news stories on the issues used in this study. It is a design that generally has high internal 
validity, allowing us to conclude that if there are any changes in people’s opinions about 
an issue topic, it is due to exposure to relevant news stories. In addition, the moderator 
variable---the level of specific information---can also be manipulated. Thus, the internal 
validity for the moderating relationship, if any, is also high.  
Most survey data use very general media exposure measures, such as the number 
of days watching TV or reading newspapers in the past week. Usually, conclusions about 
opinion change made from survey studies only assume that the public was exposed to 
certain media messages. It may be a reasonable assumption to make in the real world. 
After all, the news media are the major source of information for the general public 
especially when issues out of their reach (Lippmann, 1965) are concerned. In addition, 
the ubiquity of news these days, due to the multiple news channels and repeated coverage 
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of the same topic, makes it harder for the public to “escape” from exposure to the major 
news stories.  
However, the increased level of external validity of survey studies comes at the 
cost of relatively lower internal validity compared to experimental designs. Assumptions 
are mere assumptions. With only survey designs, we have no guarantee that the causal 
link can be established between media exposure and opinion changes.     
What is more important, very few existing opinion surveys have measures of how 
much the public knows about specific issue topics (Gilens, 2001). An experimental 
design provides the opportunity to manipulate the level of such information by furnishing 
some background information to one group but not the other. Thus, we can examine the 
impact of specific information on the magnitude of media influence with high internal 
validity. 
The first issue used in the theory testing is the North Korean nuclear program, 
which has been covered in the news media for quite a while. With the global trend of 
peace preservation, any nuclear threat is of great concern. For the news effect in the 
context of this issue, if Hypothesis 1 is true, we should be able to observe that those who 
view the news story that North Korea poses a nuclear threat to other countries are more 
likely to think that North Korea poses a nuclear threat than those who do not view such a 
story, and those who view a story with an opposite issue position. We should also be able 
to observe that those who view a news story indicating that the North Korean nuclear 
issue has been resolved are less likely to think that North Korea poses a nuclear threat 
than those who do not view such a story, or those who view a story that North Korea is 
posing a nuclear threat.  
 27 
For the moderating impact of information, if Hypothesis 2 is true, the degree of 
agreement with the media’s issue position that North Korea poses a nuclear threat to 
other countries will be stronger among those who have less prior information about the 
topic than for those who have more information. Similarly, the degree of agreement with 
the media’s issue position that North Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat to other 
countries will stronger for those who have less prior information about the topic than for 
those who have more information. 
The second issue proposed to be used in the theory testing is Health Care Reform, 
another salient issue in the news coverage starting in the year of 2008. In the context of 
this issue, if Hypothesis 1 is true, we should be able to observe that those who view the 
news story that supports Health Care Reform are more likely to support the reform, while 
those who view the news story that is against universal health coverage are less likely to 
support the reform, than those who do not view such a story, and those who view a story 
with an opposite issue position.  
If Hypothesis 2 is true, the degree of agreement with the media’s issue position 
that there should be universal health coverage is stronger for those who have little prior 
information about the topic than for those who have more information. Similarly, the 
degree of agreement with the media’s issue position that the health care reform including 
universal health coverage is not beneficial to the public is stronger for those who have 
less prior information about the topic than for those who have more information. 
The third issue used in the theory testing is about alternative energy research. In 
this issue context, if Hypothesis 1 is true, we should be able to observe that those who 
view the news story that supports alternative energy research are more likely to think that 
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alternative energy is beneficial and that such research should be supported, while those 
who view the news story that does not seem to support alternative energy research are 
less likely to support the use of such energy and research about it than those who do not 
view such a story, and those who view a story with an opposite issue position. 
If Hypothesis 2 is true, the degree of agreement with the media’s issue position 
that alternative energy research is greatly necessary will be stronger for those who have 
less prior information about the topic than for those who have more information. The 
degree of agreement with the media’s issue position that alternative energy research has 
disadvantages and is not necessary will be stronger for those who have less prior 






















Chapter 4  
METHODS 
General Design of the Experiments 
 In each of the three experiments, both exposure to a news story about one of the 
three public issues (i.e. North Korean nuclear threat, the Health Care Reform, and the 
alternative energy research) and how much specific information the subjects have about 
these issues are manipulated. For the manipulation of news exposure, there are three 
conditions, no news story, a story in favor of the issue, and a story against the issue. As 
for the manipulation of specific information, there are two conditions, with information 
cards about the issue, or with information cards about a completely different topic (i.e. no 
information provided for the specific issue). Therefore, a 3 by 2 experimental design is 
used for each experiment.  
Literature in psychology and mass communication (e.g. Bartels, 1993; Price, 1989) 
has generally found that pre-existing attitudes and other relevant ideological views are 
important covariates of current opinions. That is why a pre and post design is used to 
obtain a baseline measure of opinions toward these three issues through pre-tests.  
However, as a pre-test may sensitize the subject about the issue of the North 
Korean nuclear threat, pre-tests are conducted three weeks before the post-tests. This way, 
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memory decay can greatly reduce the sensitization effect. The questionnaires are 
designed with a stated purpose of surveying opinions about various public affairs facing 
the U.S. In addition, opinion questions about these issues are asked among other 
questions about current world affairs to further reduce the potential sensitization effect. 
For the complete questionnaires used in these experiments, please see Appendix III.  
 
Study Procedure and Sampling of Subjects 
Subjects of the experiments are recruited by Zoomerang.com, an online opinion 
survey portal. For each subject recruited, it takes about one and a half hours to complete 
the full study, half an hour for filling out the pre-test questionnaire, about half an hour for 
the manipulation session, and another half an hour for the post-test.  
About four weeks before the pre-tests, the subjects receive an email with a link to 
a web-based questionnaire as the pre-test. They are required to complete the survey 
within a week. Each subject is randomly assigned into two groups to receive the pre-test 
survey questionnaire. One group receives the questionnaire with the information cards 
about the specific issue. These subjects are then randomly assigned into three of the six 
experimental groups which receive issue specific information for TV news manipulation 
and post tests. The other group receives the questionnaire with only the information cards 
about another topic that is irrelevant of the specific issue. These subjects are also then 
randomly assigned into the three experimental groups which do not receive issue specific 
information for manipulation of TV news stories and post tests. Please refer to Table 4-1 
through 4-3 for group assignments in the experiment. After they finish the post-test, they 
are debriefed.  
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Since a 3 by 2 design is used, a minimum of 180 subjects in total are recruited in 
each experiment. This way, each experimental group should have at least 30 subjects, 
which is good for making statistical inference based on the experimental data collected in 
the study.  
The number of subjects who participated in the pre-test for Experiments 1, 2 and 
3 is 196, 203 and 192 respectively. Among these participants, 91, 95 and 95 participated 
only in the pre-test portion of the three experiments as well. The remaining participants 
(101 in Experiment 1, 108 in Experiment 2 and 97 in Experiment 3) completed the post-
test portion of the studies. Thus the size of the panel groups for the three experiments is 
101, 108 and 97, respectively, or about 17 subjects in each of the six experimental 
conditions within each experiment.  
As the total numbers of panel subjects in each experiment are less than 180, i.e. 
30 subjects for each of the six experimental conditions, an additional sample of subjects 
were contacted by Zoomerang.com to participate in the manipulation and post-test only 
session for each experiment. This group of subjects provides a supplement sample so that 
we can have more power for testing the theory and detecting whether there is any effect 
from the news stories, the specific information provided and their interactions. The total 
number of participants for the post-test only sample in Experiment 1 through 3 is 420, 
423 and 424 respectively. For each experimental condition, there are 70 or more subjects 
in each of the three experiments.                
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Table 4-1. Assignment of groups in Experiment 1 on the North Korean nuclear threat 
 News Story that North 
Korea is a threat 
News Story that North 
Korea is not a threat 






Group 1:  
News Story that North 
Korea is a threat  
 
Information cards 
about North Korea 
Group 2: 
News Story that North 
Korea is not a threat  
 
Information cards about 
North Korea 
Group 3: 










News Story that North 





News Story that North 
Korea is not a threat  
 
Information cards about 
G8 
Group 6: 







Table 4-2. Assignment of groups in Experiment 2 on Heath Care Reform  
 News Story that 
supports Health Care 
Reform  
 
News Story that opposes 
Health Care Reform  
 
No Story about 







Group 1:  
News Story that 





about Health Care 
Reform 
Group 2: 
News Story that opposes 
Health Care Reform  
 
 
Information cards about 
Health Care Reform 
Group 3: 
No Story about 
Health Care Reform 
 
Information cards 




about G8  
Group 4: 
News Story that 







News Story that opposes 
Health Care Reform  
 
 
Information cards about 
G8 
Group 6: 
No Story about 






Table 4-3. Assignment of groups in Experiment 2 on alternative energy research 
 News Story that 
research in 
alternative energy is  
beneficial  
News Story that research 
in alternative energy is 
not beneficial  








Group 1:  
News Story that 
research in 






News Story that research 
in alternative energy is 
not beneficial  
 
Information cards about 
Energy 
Group 3: 









News Story that 
research in 






News Story that research 
in alternative energy is 
not beneficial  
 
Information cards about 
G8 
Group 6: 







Measurement of Key Variables 
 The independent variable in the first experiment, exposure to news stories about 
the North Korean nuclear threat, is operationalized in the following way. A news story 
that describes North Korea posing a nuclear threat is shown to two of six groups in the 
study, Group 1 and Group 4 (See Table 4-1). In order to mitigate the effect that the study 
participant would be able to guess the purpose of the study and thus their opinions may 
be distorted in some way, another story on a completely irrelevant topic follows this story. 
The second story acts as a control story and is about music, specifically pertaining to 
walkman and ipod (link to the detailed abstract of the first story).  
The news story about the North Korean nuclear threat was broadcasted on NBC 
evening news on October, 16, 2006 (link to the detailed abstract of the story and link to 
the news video). This news story is particularly selected because it occurred a week after 
North Korea announced a detonation of a nuclear device. It also occurred two days after 
the United Nations voted to implement a sanction against North Korea. The story is 3 
minutes and 20 seconds long.  
Group 2 and 5 (See Table 4-1) in the study view another news story with the 
opposite issue position and the same control story as what Group 1 and 4 watch. A news 
story from NBC Evening News for Thursday, June 26, 2008 (link to the detailed abstract 
of the story and link to the news video) on North Korean denuclearization is used. This 
story describes North Korea's disabling of a nuclear power plant and discusses this event 
as part of disarmament following negotiations and the next phase in which plutonium will 
be handed over in exchange for eventual normalization. The duration of the story is 2 
minutes. 
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Subjects in Group 3 and 6 (See Table 4-1) view a control news video in which 
there is no story about North Korea. Instead, stories irrelevant to any of the three issues in 
the experiments are shown to them as controls (link to the detailed abstract of the first 
story, link to the detailed abstract of the second story and link to the news video).  The 
first control story is the same story used in the experimental news videos. It is about 
music, namely, the walkman and ipod. The second control story is about Sears Tower in 
Chicago.  
 Similarly, Group 1 and 4 in Experiment 2 or Experiment 3 (see Table 4-2 and 4-3) 
are shown a news story that is in favor of Health Care Reform (link to the detailed 
abstract of the story and link to the news video) or alternative energy research (link to the 
detailed abstract of the story and link to the news video). Group 2 and 5 are shown a story 
that is against the reform (link to the detailed abstract of the story and link to the news 
video) or the research (link to the detailed abstract of the story and link to the news 
video). Please note that these stories are all followed by the control story on music to 
mitigate the potential effect of the study participants’ guessing the study purpose. Group 
3 and 6 view the same control news video as those in Experiment 1 (link to the detailed 
abstract of the first story, link to the detailed abstract of the second story and link to the 
news video).   
The dependent variable in the first experiment, agreement with the issue position 
in the media that North Korea is posing a nuclear threat to other countries, is measured 
using a series of six attitude questions in both the pre-test and the post-test (Question 3 
through Question 8). First of all, a feeling thermometer series asks the participants’ 
evaluation of how friendly the relationship is between the United States and a few other 
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countries including North Korea. Four additional questions are then asked with regard to 
the general or specific aspects of the North Korean nuclear threat. 
The dependent variable in the second experiment, support for the Health Care 
Reform, is measured by a battery of nine questions (Question 1 through 9) in both the 
pre- and the post-tests. These questions ask about general support for the reform, as well 
as for specific aspects of the reform, such as universal coverage, single payer system, and 
cutting back on Medicare, etc. Please refer to Appendix III for the question wording.  
The dependent variable in the third experiment, support for alternative energy 
research, is measured by seven opinion questions. These questions ask the participants 
whether they think the traditional energy will run out soon, whether they think alternative 
energy is a better source, about government incentives, and tax policy to support such 
research, etc. Please also refer to Appendix III for the question wording.    
The moderating variable in the first experiment, how much the subjects know 
specifically about the North Korean nuclear threat, is manipulated in the following way. 
Three information cards about North Korea and its relations with the other five countries 
are shown to three of the six experimental groups (Group 1, 2, and 3, see Table 4-1). 
Since the theory argues that “prior” information matters for media effects, Group 1, 2, 
and 3 receive the information cards during the pre-test and before the subjects view the 
news stories during the post-test. For Group 4, 5, and 6, such background information is 
not provided. Instead, information cards about G8 countries are provided as a control 
condition. In order for the subjects to remember as much as possible regarding the 
specific prior information provided, the information section is shown to the subjects 
twice. The first time is during the pre-test, in which the information cards are inserted at 
 38 
the beginning of the pre-test questionnaire. The second time is during the post-test and 
before they receive the TV news section.  
The information cards include a brief history of the relationship between North 
Korea and the other five countries in the talk, i.e. the U.S., Russia, China, South Korea, 
and Japan. In addition, a fact sheet comparing North Korea’s geographic size, population 
size, and military strength with those of the other five countries is also provided. 
Information about a nuclear program is not mentioned in the section as it may interfere 
with the effects from exposing participants to the news story on this topic. For the exact 
information cards provided to the subjects, please refer to Appendix II.  
The moderating variable in Experiment 2 and 3 is manipulated in a similar way as 
in Experiment 1. The information cards provided for the control groups (Group 4, 5, and 
6, see Table 4-2 and 4-3) are the same as those used in Experiment 1. Information cards 
about the Health Care Reform provided to Group 1, 2, and 3 in Experiment 2 mostly 
describe the health care industry and insurance status in the U.S., the main content of the 
reform, and the major arguments for or against the reform. Information cards about 
alternative energy crisis provided to Group 1, 2 and 3 in Experiment 3 give an overview 
of the world’s energy sources and their respective percentages in overall consumption. 
They also discuss sustainability of traditional energy resources, i.e., the advantage and the 
disadvantages of various energy sources.  
The information cards about the G8 countries act as the control condition for the 
manipulation of issue specific information in all of the three experiments. These cards 
introduced the G8 organization and some basic geographic, economic, and military 
 39 
information about its member countries. Please refer to Appendix II for the exact cards 
used in the three experiments.  
 
Data Analysis 
After the experiment is conducted, missing data from the study are first treated 
using mean imputation and logical recode. Please refer to Appendix III for detailed 
information about missing data treatment. After that, a univariate analysis of the variables 
in the study is conducted to provide a description of the distributions of these variables. 
Appendix IV provides a detailed summary of this analysis.  
For the panel data obtained through these three experiments, regression analysis is 
conducted by using the pre-test opinion measures as an offset or a covariate in the 
regressions. That way, the effects of existing opinions on these issues are accounted for in 
the analysis. Thus, it is possible to make conclusions about the effect of news exposure 
and information reception on the changes in the issue opinions.  
Since the sample size for the panel subjects in each of the three experiments is 
relatively small, the analysis of the supplement sample, i.e. subjects who only 
participated in the manipulation and post-test sessions, is conducted to improve the power 
for detecting any news or information effects. In this regard, the univariate effects from 
TV news exposure and information manipulation are first examined by conducting 
ANOVA analysis to test whether the mean differences in the dependent variable 
measures are due to manipulations. Regression analysis is then conducted to further 
investigate the effects from news exposure, information reception and their interactions 
after controlling for other important covariates for opinion formation and change.
 40 
Chapter 5  
RESULTS 
For each of the three experiments in this dissertation, I present the data analysis 
results in three sections in this chapter. Firstly, results from analysis using data collected 
from the panel subjects are presented to show if there is any change of opinions after 
exposure to the news story and information cards for the same respondent. We then test 
whether such changes can be attributed to these two factors and their interaction effects 
after controlling for relevant social and political factors. 
Secondly, results from analysis using data collected from subjects who 
participated in the manipulation and post-test sessions are presented. The results include 
two parts. One is the univariate effects from exposure to news stories, information cards 
and their interactions are reported. This part of the results allows us to examine, without 
controlling for other factors, whether viewing TV news about a public issue and having 
more information about it would influence an individual citizen’s issue position. The 
interaction effects between these two variables inform us whether issue-specific 
information would strengthen or weaken the news effects. After that, the effects of news 
exposure, information cards and their interaction are presented after controlling for 
factors that are relevant for public issue opinions, such as political predispositions, media 
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use habits and demographics. This facilitates our further understanding of the univariate 
effects presented above, if any, with social and political context of the participants in 
these studies.  
 
Results from Experiment 1: Opinions on the North Korean Nuclear Threat 
Results from the Panel Data 
As 101 participants participated both pre-test and post-test in the experiment, it is 
possible to conduct data analysis on this group of panel subjects. Multiple regressions are 
fitted for the differences in the dependent variables and scales between pre- and post-test 
scores using the independent variables and scales collected in the post-test. Modeling the 
differences in dependent variables enables us to examine the effect of news story and 
information cards on the changes in the opinions after exposing to these two stimuli. 
Complete coefficient estimates from the regression analysis are presented in Table A-11 
and A-12 in Appendix V.  
For the ease of interpretation, post-test scores for the dependent variables are 
presented as the dependent variables in the two tables, while pre-test scores for the 
dependent variables are presented as an offset variable together with other independent 
variables. An offset independent variable is just one predictor in the regression model 
with the coefficient of 1. By including the pre-test opinion as an offset variable in the 
regression model, the coefficients of other independent variables in the model indicate 
their effects on the post-test opinions after controlling for the corresponding pre-existing 
opinions. In addition, it is easier for interpreting the effects of the various independent 
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variables for the post-test opinions while controlling for the pre-existing opinions rather 
than explaining the effects on the difference between the two.  
 
Short-term News Exposure and Information Card Reception 
Short-term news exposure is only found to have a significant impact on the 
feeling thermometer toward North Korea (Question 3, β=-7.99, p=0.04), but has no 
significant impact on other dependent variables. Those who viewed a news story about 
North Korea posing a nuclear threat tend to feel that North Korea is less friendly than 
those who did not view any story on the country. Those who viewed a story that the 
nuclear threat is eased tend to have warmer feelings toward the country than those who 
did not view any story.  
Whether or not the subjects received information cards about North Korea does 
not have a significant impact on their opinions about the country or the issue after 
controlling for their pre-existing opinions and other relevant variables. Nor is there an 
interaction effect between the news story exposure and the information cards on any of 
the opinion questions.  
 
Long-term Information and General Political Knowledge Acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about North Korea as a country and its 
historical relations with other countries in the peace talk generally has an effect of 
making the country seemingly less friendly (Question 3, β=-19.51, p=0.07). It also makes 
the subjects think that this issue is less likely to be resolved by peace talks (Question 8, 
β=-0.65, p=0.05).   
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General political knowledge is found to have a significant impact on opinions 
about whether this issue can be resolved by peace talks (Question 8, β=0.60, p=0.07). 
Those who are more knowledgeable tend to think that this issue is more likely to be 
resolved by peace talks, an effect in the opposite direction as compared to that of specific 
information.  
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following, and Discussion 
Issue salience is not significantly related to the opinions about North Korea or the 
nuclear threat issue. However, general media exposure significantly influences whether 
the respondents feel that North Korea is posing a nuclear threat (Question 4, β=-0.21, 
p<0.07). Those who receive more news from the media tend to feel that the country is 
more of a threat.  
Those who said that they participated in some discussions about the North Korean 
nuclear threat are found to be more likely to say that the real intention of North Korea is 
to get financial aid rather than to pose a real threat (Question 6, β=0.51, p<0.07). Self-
reported follow-up of this issue in the news does not make any difference on a 
respondent’s opinions about it.  
 
General Concern about Future Terrorist Attacks 
General concern about future terrorist attacks is significantly related to the North 
Korean nuclear threat scale constructed based on Question 4, 5, and 7 (β=-0.34, p<0.04), 
as well as the question about whether this country is posing a nuclear threat (Question 4, 
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β=-0.43, p<0.0001). Those who are more worried about future terrorist attacks are more 
likely to feel that North Korea is posing a nuclear threat.  
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
Self-evaluation of whether the information cards are informative does not seem to 
matter for all the opinion questions in this study. Those who think the information cards 
are more relevant tend to be more likely to feel that North Korea is friendlier (Question 3, 
β=12.13, p<0.04).   
Self-evaluations of whether the news stories would influence one’s own opinion 
on a North Korean issue do not have a significant impact on the opinion questions except 
Question 8. Those who think that the news stories about North Korea have more of an 
effect on his or her own opinions find this issue more likely to be resolved by peace talks 
(β=0.41 and p=0.01). For those who think that the news stories about North Korea have 
more of an effect on other people’s opinions, they find this issue less likely to be resolved 
by peace talks (β=-0.41 and p<0.0001).  
 
Political Predispositions 
Party identification and political interest are not significantly related to any of the 
opinion questions or the nuclear threat scale, after controlling for the pre-existing 
opinions. Political ideology, however, is significantly related to how friendly the 
respondents feel about North Korea (Question 3, β=3.22, p<0.08). Those who are more 




Gender, race, age, and whether parents were born in the U.S. do not make a 
significant difference on any opinion questions or scale about the North Korean nuclear 
threat. As for North Korea’s real intention to use nuclear power (Question 6), respondents 
with higher education are more likely to think that the real intention is to get financial aid 
(β=0.23, p<0.06). However, those who earn more are more likely to think that the real 
intention is to pose a threat to the world rather than getting financial aid (β=-0.21, 
p<0.0001).  
 
Results from the Post-Test Sample 
Univariate Effects 
Viewing News Stories 
Table 5-1 presents the mean values for information, general political knowledge, 
and measures of the dependent variables by three different news story conditions in the 
North Korean nuclear threat study. The three news story conditions have a story about 
North Korea posing a threat, a story that nuclear threat from the country is eased, and no 
story about the country, respectively. If the news story conditions make a difference in 
the study participants’ information, knowledge, and their opinions toward this issue, we 
would be able to find such a difference by examining the mean differences in these 
variables across the news groups. 
As the TV news stories about North Korea have a limited amount of time to 
present this issue, neither story provided a great deal of reference to the basics of this 
country. Thus, viewing a story about this issue or not should not make a big difference in 
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the level of information the participants have about North Korea. Nor does the direction 
of the news story with regard to whether North Korea poses a threat matter for the level 
of information.  
As Table 5-1 shows, the mean values for the information scale for the three news 
viewing groups range from 0.45 to 0.50. No pairwise difference between any two of the 
three news groups reached the level of statistical significance.  
Similar scores for general political knowledge are expected and found for the 
participants who viewed three different versions of news stories, which range from 0.76 
to 0.80. The pairwise differences of the three scores are also not statistically significant.  
For the dependent variables and the North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale, it is 
hypothesized that viewing a news story about North Korea posing a nuclear threat would 
lead the respondents’ to feel that North Korea is less friendly, more likely to pose a 
nuclear threat, and that this issue is less likely to be resolved by peace talks. Overall, the 
results shown in Table 5-1 and 5-2 suggest that there are some significant differences in 
these measures of dependent variables. 
The feeling thermometer, a dependent variable that measures respondents’ 
feelings about the friendliness of North Korea, has a similar mean value for the three 
news groups. The values are 14.65, 19.91, and 16.71 out of 100 for those who viewed a 
story about North Korea posing a threat, North Korea no longer posing a threat, and those 
who did not view any story about North Korea. As lower scores on the scale means less 
friendly feelings, the participants generally feel that North Korea is not a very friendly 
country. The absolute value of the mean difference between the first two news story 
groups is 5.26 and is significant at the 0.10 level. This means that those who viewed a 
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story about North Korea posing a threat feel that the country is less friendly than those 
who viewed a story about the threat being eased (Table 5-2). This is in line with 
Hypothesis 1 that viewing a news story about North Korea posing a threat increases the 
hostile feelings toward this country.  
The average responses to Question 6 about the real intention of North Korea with 
regard to its nuclear capacity and to Question 8 about the likelihood of this issue being 
resolved by peace talks are very close among the three news groups.  
The mean values for the North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale tend to show some 
significant differences. Those who viewed the story about North Korea posing a threat 
have the lowest mean value on this scale (-0.16), indicating that they felt North Korea is 
more of a threat. Such a feeling is followed by those who viewed a story about North 
Korea’s threat eased (0.03). Those who did not view any story tend to have the highest 
mean on this scale (0.13). The absolute value of the mean difference between those who 
viewed a threat story about North Korea and those who did not view any story about 
North Korea is 0.29 and is significant at the 0.05 level. The absolute value of the mean 
difference between those who viewed a threat story about North Korea and those who 
viewed a threat being eased story about North Korea is 0.19, but it is not significant at a 
0.10 level. The difference between those who viewed a story about the threat being eased 
and those who did not view any North Korea story is 0.09 and not significant (Table 5-2).  
These differences suggest that the threat story has a significant impact on viewers’ 
opinions regarding how much of a threat North Korea poses. Those who viewed the 
threat story are more likely to feel North Korea poses a threat as compared to those who 
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did not view such a story. However, viewing a story about the nuclear threat being eased 
does not tend to decrease the likelihood of a threat from North Korea.  
This may be due to a few reasons. One possibility is that North Korea has been 
portrayed in the news media through repeated coverage as a country utilizing its nuclear 
capacity to threaten the world. A single story is not enough to mitigate such a cumulated 
effect. Another possibility is that the mention of a nuclear capability is inherently 
producing feelings of threat. That is why it is reasonable to find that viewing a story 
about a nuclear threat being eased still increased the level of threat felt about North Korea 
versus not viewing a story at all about this issue.  
As Question 4, 5, and 7 contribute to the construction of this scale, further 
comparisons of the means on these three questions separately indicate that Question 7, 
which asks about a North Korea nuclear threat due to a specific reason---involvement in 
nuclear arms dealership---contributes mostly to the mean differences on the Nuclear 
Threat Scale (Table 5-2). Those who viewed a North Korean nuclear story tend to feel 
more strongly about this country posing a threat than those who viewed no such story or 
those who viewed a story about the threat being eased. The absolute values of the mean 
differences are 0.29 (alpha<=0.05) and 0.20 (alpha <=0.10).  
Questions 4 and 5 only ask about the general opinions about North Korea posing a 
threat and the mean values do not differ from each other among the three news groups. 
One explanation for this pattern is that in the North Korean nuclear story, there is a 
specific mention of the possibility of the country getting involved in nuclear arms dealing. 
This specificity activates the feeling of threat more easily for the respondents.  
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 Overall all, those who viewed a story about North Korea posing a threat are more 
likely to feel that this country is posing a threat measured by the feeling thermometer, the 
threat scale, and Questions 4, 5, and 7, as compared to those who viewed a threat eased 
story and those who viewed no story about North Korea. This relationship is in line with 
Hypothesis 1.  
Those who viewed the eased- threat story tend to feel that this country is friendlier 
than those who did not view any story about North Korea. This is also in line with 
Hypothesis 1. However, when measured by the threat scale and Questions 4, 5, and 7, 
those who viewed the threat eased story are more likely to feel that North Korea is posing 
a threat as compared to those who did not view any story about North Korea. This is in 





Table 5-1. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and Knowledge by News Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different News Groups 
Those Who Viewed a 
Story about North Korea 
Posing a Nuclear Threat 
(N=140) 
Those Who Viewed a 
Story about North Korea’s 
Nuclear Threat Eased 
(N=140) 
Those Who did not 
View Any Story 
about North Korea 
(N=140) 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.46 0.45 0.50 
(0.30) (0.27) (0.27) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.83 0.76 0.78 
(0.29) (0.31) (0.29) 
North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale (-1.28 to 3.14) -0.16 0.03 0.13 
(0.98) (1.01) (1.00) 
Q3---Feeling Thermo toward North Korea (0-100) 14.65 19.91 16.71 
(17.12) (20.92) (20.12) 
Q.6-Recoded---NK Intention to use nuclear capacity?  
(1=pose threat 2=both 3=get financial aid 4=neither)  
2.37 2.30 2.43 
(0.76) (0.85) (0.85) 
Q.8-Recoded---NK nuclear issue resolved by peace 
talks? (1=No, 2=Hard to say, 3=Yes) 
1.71 1.76 1.82 
(0.59) (0.62) (0.63) 
Q.4---NK posing a nuclear threat  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 
1.86 1.97 2.05 
(0.83) (0.88) (0.83) 
Q.5---NK a danger to world peace  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 
1.86 1.98 2.03 
(0.88) (0.88) (0.85) 
Q.7---NK threat due to nuclear arms dealership 
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 
1.84 2.04 2.12 






Table 5-2. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Media News Stories  






Mean Difference between 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Threat Story and Those Who 
did not View Any Story about 
North Korea 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Threat Eased Story and 
Those Who did not View Any 
Story about North Korea 
Respondents Who 
Viewed a Threat Story 
and Those Who Viewed a 
Threat Eased Story 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.05 -0.05 0.001 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.02 -0.02 0.04 
North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale (-1.28 to 3.14) -0.29** -0.09 -0.19 
Q3---Feeling Thermo toward North Korea (0-100) -2.06 3.20 -5.26* 
Q.6-Recoded---NK Intention to use nuclear capacity?  
(1=pose threat 2=both 3=get financial aid 4=neither)  -0.06 -0.13 0.08 
Q.8-Recoded---NK nuclear issue resolved by peace 
talks? (1=No, 2=Hard to say, 3=Yes) -0.11 -0.06 0.05 
Q.4---NK posing a nuclear threat  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) -0.19 -0.08 -0.11 
Q.5---NK a danger to world peace  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) -0.17 -0.05 -0.12 
Q.7---NK threat due to nuclear arms dealership 
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) -0.29** -0.09 -0.20* 
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Viewing Information Cards 
The information cards providing some background information about North 
Korea and its historical relations with other countries in the six-party peace talks do not 
show much effect on the dependent variable questions or the North Korea Nuclear Threat 
Scale. The mean values for these variables and the scale are comparable for those who 
received cards and for those who did not (Table 5-3 and 5-4). This pattern suggests that 
the background information about the country does not directly influence specific 
opinions about its nuclear threat. Information cards also make no difference on the level 
of general political knowledge.  
The average score on the information scale constructed based on the five specific 
information questions is higher for those who received the information cards than for 
those who did not receive them (0.54 versus 0.4, difference significant at the 0.05 level, 
Table 5-3 and Table 5-4). This acts as a manipulation check evidencing that the 
respondents who received the information cards about North Korea did read them rather 
than skip them while completing the questionnaire.  
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Table 5-3. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and 
Knowledge by Information Card Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different 





Information Scale (0-1) 0.54 0.40 
(0.28) (0.26) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.78 0.78 
(0.29) (0.30) 
North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale (-1.28 to 3.14) 0.03 -0.03 
(0.99) (1.01) 
Q3---Feeling Thermo toward North Korea (0-100) 17.32 16.86 
(19.63) (19.48) 
Q.6-Recoded---NK Intention to use nuclear 
capacity?  




Q.8-Recoded---NK nuclear issue resolved by peace 
talks? (1=No, 2=Hard to say, 3=Yes) 
1.76 1.78 
(0.63) (0.60) 
Q.4---NK posing a nuclear threat  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 
2.00 1.92 
(0.82) (0.87) 
Q.5---NK a danger to world peace  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 
1.99 1.92 
(0.86) (0.88) 
Q.7---NK threat due to nuclear arms dealership 




Table 5-4. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Information Cards (Short 
Term Informational Effects)  
 **Significant at 0.05 level. 




Respondents Who Received 
Information Cards and 
Those Who didn’t 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.14** 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.003 
North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale (-1.28 to 3.14) 0.06 
Q3---Feeling Thermo toward North Korea (0-100) 0.46 
Q.6-Recoded---NK Intention to use nuclear capacity?  
(1=pose threat 2=both 3=get financial aid 4=neither) 0.06 
Q.8-Recoded---NK nuclear issue resolved by peace 
talks?  
(1=No, 2=Hard to say, 3=Yes) 0.02 
Q.4---NK posing a nuclear threat  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 0.08 
Q.5---NK a danger to world peace  
(1=Strongly agree, through 5=Strongly disagree) 0.07 
Q.7---NK threat due to nuclear arms dealership  




Interaction Effect from News Stories and Information Cards 
Since the experiment is a 3 by 2 factorial design, there are a total of six 
experimental groups in total in the North Korean nuclear threat study, 3 groups of media 
news story exposure for those who did or did not receive information cards. The sample 
size for each group is 70. In order to test whether the impact of viewing a North Korean 
nuclear threat story would be moderated by specific information, Table 5-5 lists the mean 
values and their standard deviations of information, knowledge, and dependent variable 
measures by the six experimental groups. In addition, the mean differences and the 
corresponding 90% confidence intervals in the dependent variables among the three news 
groups are also calculated for those who received or did not received the information 
cards separately (Table 5-6).  
The interaction effect between these two factors is examined by comparing the 
differences among viewing a threat story, viewing a threat eased story, and not viewing 













 column in Table 5-6). The magnitude of such 
differences is similar for all the dependent variables. The 90% confidence intervals for 
each pair of the differences overlap with each other (Table 5-6).  
As Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific information would weaken the effects from 
exposing to North Korean nuclear threat news, the univariate results in this study do not 
support these two hypotheses.  
However, there are three pairs of differences that suggest the tendency for those 
who received the information cards to show a relatively larger change of opinion after 
viewing a story about North Korea posing a nuclear threat. The three pairs of differences 
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are for the nuclear threat scale, Question 4 (North Korea posing a threat) and Question 5 
(whether North Korea is a danger to the world). More specifically, the difference on the 
North Korea nuclear threat scale for those who viewed a threat story and those who did 
not view any story is -0.38. This value is for those who received the information cards.  
However, for those who did not receive such cards, this difference is -0.19. For Question 
4, the values of the pair of differences are -0.30 and -0.09. For Question 5, the values are 
-0.26 and -0.09.  
This trend, even though not statistically significant, suggests that feelings about 
North Korea posing a threat tend to increase after viewing a story about this issue. Such 
an influence from the news story tends to be intensified by reading a few information 
cards about the country and its brief historical relation with other countries in the peace 
talk.  
Viewing a threat being eased story generally tends to make the respondents feel 
more threat posed by North Korea if they did not receive any information cards about 
North Korea. The only exception is Question 3, the feeling thermometer. If the 
respondents received the information cards, they tended to feel less threat posed by the 
country, the only exception being Question 6 about North Korea’s real intention. This 
trend suggests that those who received information cards are more likely to lean toward 
the issue position in the story about nuclear threat being eased.  
The differences between those who viewed a threat story and those who viewed a 
threat eased story indicate that respondents are more likely to feel North Korea is posing 




 columns in Table 5-6). The negative 
values indicate lower scores on the nuclear threat scale or the dependent variable 
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questions, which means feelings of more threat from North Korea. Comparing the 




 columns in Table 5-6) shows that, those 
with information cards tend to show larger opinion changes. This pattern is in line with 
the trend shown in the comparison between those who viewed a threat story and those 
who did not view any story about North Korea.  
These observed differences in the magnitude of news effects between those who 
received and did not receive information cards are only marginal as the 90% confidence 
intervals overlap. However, the trend is that reading the information cards make the 
influence from viewing a news story stronger by making those who received the cards 
lean more toward agreeing with the news story’s issue positions. As Hypothesis 2 
predicts that specific information would weaken the effects from exposing to relevant 
issue coverage in the news, this trend is thus in the opposite direction compared to what 










Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different Experimental Groups 
Information Cards No Information Cards 
Viewed a Story 
about North Korea 
Posing a Nuclear 
Threat  
(N=70) 









Viewed a Story 
about North Korea 
Posing a Nuclear 
Threat  
(N=70) 









Information Scale (0-1) 0.56 0.47 0.59 0.35 0.44 0.41 
(0.29) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.83 0.72 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.76 
(0.26) (0.32) (0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) 
North Korea Nuclear Threat Scale  
(-1.28 to 3.14) 
-0.24 0.20 0.13 -0.07 -0.13 0.12 
(0.95) (1.02) (0.96) (1.01) (0.98) (1.04) 
Q3---Feeling Thermo toward North 
Korea (0-100) 
14.10 21.20 16.66 15.21 18.62 16.76 
(17.16) (22.35) (18.62) (17.19) (19.47) (21.65) 
Q.6-Recoded---NK Intention to use 
nuclear capacity?  
(1=pose threat 2=both 3=get 
financial aid 4=neither)  
2.39 2.37 2.46 2.36 2.23 2.41 
(0.75) (0.87) (0.83) (0.77) (0.82) (0.87) 
Q.8-Recoded---NK nuclear issue 
resolved by peace talks? (1=No, 
2=Hard to say, 3=Yes) 
1.64 1.83 1.80 1.79 1.70 1.84 
(0.64) (0.59) (0.65) (0.54) (0.64) (0.61) 
Q.4---NK posing a nuclear threat  
(1=Strongly agree, through 
5=Strongly disagree) 
1.77 2.16 2.07 1.94 1.79 2.03 
(0.78) (0.88) (0.77) (0.87) (0.85) (0.88) 
Q.5---NK a danger to world peace  
(1=Strongly agree, through 
5=Strongly disagree) 
1.81 2.09 2.07 1.90 1.87 1.99 
(0.86) (0.86) (0.84) (0.90) (0.88) (0.86) 
Q.7---NK threat due to nuclear arms 
dealership (1=Strongly agree, 
through 5=Strongly disagree) 
1.77 2.11 2.07 1.90 1.96 2.17 






Table 5-6. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Interaction Effect of Information Cards and Media News Stories  




Mean Difference between  
Information Cards No Information Cards 
Threat Story vs. 
No Story about 
North Korea 
Threat Eased 
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Short-term News Exposure and Information Reception 
The analysis above for the effect of TV news exposure and information cards, as 
well as their interaction effect, suggests that viewing news stories about North Korea 
posing a nuclear threat tends to shift the study subjects opinions about this country right 
after viewing the story. It also provides some indication of the moderating effect of 
information cards, although not statistically significant, as the magnitude of changes in 
opinions tends to be larger among those who received the cards.  
These results have not taken into consideration variables that may be potentially 
relevant to the attitude of a North Korean nuclear issue, such as demographic variables, 
political predispositions, general opinions about terrorist attacks, media exposure habits, 
and political discussion on a regular basis. Thus, multiple regressions are used to examine 
the effects of short-term news and information exposure while controlling all these 
variables. Multiple regressions also allow the investigation of the effects of information 
and political knowledge already acquired in addition to the information learned in the 
particular setting of this experiment. 
Regression models were fitted on the dependent variable questions and the scale 
separately. The results are shown in Table A-13 and A-14. The coefficients for news 
groups and information cards are not significantly different from zero for all the 
dependent variables examined. This indicates that while controlling for other relevant 
variables to the opinions about a North Korean nuclear issue, the short-term main effects 
of the two experimental variables in this study are not significant. There are also no 
consistent directions of their effects.  
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The interaction effect from these two experimental variables is significant in the 
regression model for Question 4, general opinion about a North Korean nuclear threat, 
and Question 8, whether this issue can be resolved by peace talks. The βs are -0.14 and -
0.17 with both p-values being 0.05. Applying the coefficients of the interaction terms and 
the main effects of the two experimental variables, we find an effect from viewing TV 
news and reading information cards similar to the pattern identified in the univariate 
analysis. The effect of viewing a nuclear threat story tends to lead the participants’ views 
of North Korea in the direction of more threat. This tendency is stronger for those who 
received the information cards than for those who did not. Such a pattern is consistent for 
both Question 4 and Question 8 as the dependent variables.  
The pattern is also as consistent for these two dependent variables when the 
participants viewed a threat eased story. On Question 4 regarding general opinion about a 
North Korean nuclear threat, viewing a threat eased story led the participants to feel that 
North Korea is less of a threat, especially among those who received the information 
cards. As for Question 8, whether this issue can be resolved by peace talks, those who 
viewed a threat eased story still feel it is hard to say or it is possible that peace talks may 
be a solution. Those who received information cards are more likely to be led toward the 
direction that the nuclear threat is eased or that peace talks are a likely solution, as 
discussed in the news. In sum, when a threat eased story is viewed, the issue specific 
information also tends to strengthen the effect from viewing the news story, at least for 
two of the opinion questions. 
 For other opinion questions, such a significant interaction effect is not found, 
which indicates that the moderating effect of information cards still depends on the 
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specific opinion question, or how the question relates to the news story. Feelings about 
the nuclear threat and opinions about a potential solution may be quite different issues at 
hand for the respondents. For the Nuclear Threat scale, the feeling thermometer toward 
North Korea, the intention of using nuclear threat, threat to world peace, and threat due to 
nuclear arms dealership, such a moderating effect is not discovered.  
Thus, the findings from this experiment contradict Hypothesis 2 that having more 
specific information about North Korea would reduce the effect from viewing a news 
story about North Korea posing a threat. When a nuclear threat eased story is viewed, 
having more information leads to stronger news effects if general opinion about the North 
Korean nuclear threat is asked. Having more information also leads to stronger news 
effects if a question is asked about whether peace talks can be the solution to this issue.  
 
Long-term Information and General Political Knowledge Acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about North Korea as a country and its 
historical relations with other countries in the peace talks generally has an effect of 
making the country seemingly more of a threat in general. The negative coefficients for 
this variable in all of the regression models indicate that the more informed one is, the 
more of a threat North Korea seems. This pattern reaches statistical significance for the 
feeling thermometer model (β=-8.46, p=0.04) and is very close to statistical significance 
for Question 7, regarding a nuclear threat due to arms dealership (β=-0.24, p=0.13) and 
Question 8, the plausibility of peace talks in resolving this issue (β=-0.20, p=0.14).  
General political knowledge also has a relatively consistent and significant effect 
on the opinion questions in the study, except on Question 6 and Question 8. For all other 
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dependent variable questions and the nuclear threat scale, the more knowledge one has, 
the more likely he or she feels that North Korea is more of a threat. Question 6 on North 
Korea’s intention and Question 8 on the solution to this issue are probably different from 
other questions that are more directly concerned about opinions or feelings.  
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following and Discussion 
Issue salience, i.e. viewing this issue as important and relevant, has a positive 
coefficient in each of the regression models fitted except the model for Question 8 on 
peace talks as a resolution. This indicates that the more salient the North Korean nuclear 
threat seems, the more threat one feels about this country, as lower scores on issue 
salience indicates one feels the issue to be more salient.  
The amount of media exposure is not found to be significantly influencing 
respondents’ opinions about this issue. Nor does the extent of following news reporting 
for this specific issue or participation in discussion of this issue make any difference on 
the issue opinions.  
 
General Concern about Future Terrorist Attacks 
As expected, general concern about future terrorist attacks is significantly related 
to the opinions of the North Korean nuclear threat, except on the feeling thermometer, 
intention, and peace talks as resolution questions. Those who are more worried about 
future terrorist attacks are more likely to feel that North Korea is posing a nuclear threat.  
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
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Self-evaluations of whether the information cards are informative or relevant do 
not seem to matter for all the opinion questions in this study. Self-evaluations of whether 
the news stories would influence one’s own opinion on a North Korean issue do not have 
a significant impact on the opinion questions except for Question 5 and Question 8.  
Those who think that the news stories about North Korea tend to have more of an 
effect on his or her own opinions find this issue more likely to be solved by peace talks 
(β=0.08 and p=0.10). At the same time, they would also tend to be in more agreement 
with the statement that North Korea is a danger to world peace (β=-0.12 and p=0.04). 
For those who think that the news stories about North Korea tend to have more of 
an effect on other people’s opinions, they find this issue less likely to be solved by peace 
talks (β=-0.10 and p=0.03). At the same time, they tend to be in less agreement with the 
statement that North Korea is a danger to world peace (β=0.11 and p=0.05). 
 
Political Predispositions 
Party identification is not significant in any of the opinion questions or scale. This 
is reasonable, as the issue of North Korea is not a partisan issue. There are no diverging 
opinions of the two parties about this issue in the news media. Political ideology tends to 
have a consistently significant impact on the opinion questions, except for the feeling 
thermometer (Question 3) and the intention question (Question 6). Generally speaking, 




Those who are less interested in politics in general tend to feel that North Korea is 
more of a threat. Such an effect is statistically significant except for the threat due to arms 
dealership and the nuclear threat intention questions (Questions 7 and 8). 
 
Demographic Variables 
Race and whether parents were born in the U.S. do not make a significant 
difference on North Korean nuclear threat attitudes. Females only felt more threat when 
asked about the real intention of North Korea using its nuclear capacity (Question 6). 
They are more likely to feel that the real intention is to pose a threat than to get financial 
assistance (β=-0.15 and p=0.08). 
Higher education is associated with lower feelings of threat as the coefficients for 
this variable are positive and significant for all but Question 3, 6, and 7. Age is only 
associated with the feeling thermometer about North Korea. The older a respondent is, 
the less friendly he or she would feel about North Korea (β=-1.24 and p=0.05). Family 
income is significant for peace talks as a resolution question (Question 8). The wealthier 
a respondent is, the less likely that he or she feels that peace talks are a possible solution 
(β=-0.04 and p=0.05). 
 
Results from Reduced Regression Models 
Reducing the full regression model to exclude Questions 20, 21, 29, and 36, 
which do not have a statistically significant impact on any of the opinion questions or 
scale, reveals that the parameter estimates for most of the independent variables remain 
stable in terms of their magnitude, direction, and significance (See Table A-15 and A-16). 
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The only two occasions in which the independent variables become statistically 
significant is long-term information acquired in the model for Question 8, about peace 
talks as a resolution. The information scale still has a negative coefficient, indicating that 
the more information one has, the more feelings of threat one feels (β=-0.22 and p=0.10). 
In addition, age becomes significant in the model for Question 7, regarding the threat due 
to involvement of nuclear arms dealership (β=-0.04 and p=0.09), which means that older 





Results from Experiment 2: Opinions on Health Care Reform 
 
Results from the Panel Data 
There are 108 subjects in the experiment of health care reform who participated in 
both the pre-test and post-test. Results from the regression analysis using data collected 
from this group of panel subjects are presented in Table A-17 through A-20.  
 
Short-term News Exposure and Information Card Reception 
Short-term news exposure only has a significant impact on opinions of whether 
the reform would be beneficial or harmful to the economy (Question 9, β=-0.33, p=0.02), 
but has no significant impact on other dependent variables. Those who viewed a news 
story in support of the reform are more likely to say that the reform will be greatly 
beneficial or beneficial to the economy compared to those who did not view any story.  
Those who received information cards about the health care reform are more 
likely to strongly favor or favor a policy to require the employer to pay a fee if health 
care insurance is not provided for employees. (Question 5, β=-1.67, p=0.03). However, 
they are also more likely to oppose and strongly oppose increasing tax on upper income 
Americans (Question 7, β=2.63, p<0.0001). Whether or not the subjects received 
information cards about the reform does not have a significant impact on other opinion 
questions or scales. In addition, there is no an interaction effect between the news story 
exposure and the information cards found for any of the opinion questions.  
Long-term information and general political knowledge acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about the reform and general political 
knowledge do not have any impact on opinions related to health care reform. None of the 
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coefficients reached the statistical significance at 0.10 level. There seems to be a trend, 
though, that those who are more informed are more likely to oppose requiring employers 
to pay a fee if they don’t provide health insurance (Question 5, β=0.59, p=0.16). They are 
also more likely to favor saving money by cutting Medicare costs to finance the reform 
(Question 6, β=-0.84, p=0.11). Those who have more political knowledge, on the other 
hand, are more likely to oppose saving money by cutting Medicare costs to finance the 
reform (Question 6, β=0.66, p=0.19).   
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following and Discussion 
Issue salience is significantly related to several opinion questions or scales in the 
panel analysis. Those who find the issue of health care reform more salient are less likely 
to favor financing the reform by cutting Medicare costs (Favorability by cutting Medicare 
cost scale, β=-0.23, p=0.09). They are also more likely to favor a health care insurance 
system with both public and private options (Question 3, β=0.20, p=0.08). They are 
slightly more likely to think that the U.S. should follow European countries to have a 
single payer system (Question 4, β=0.08, p=0.06). In addition, they are more likely to 
think that the reform will be harmful to the economy (Question 9, β=-0.23, p=0.04). 
Media exposure is not significantly related to the opinions about the health care reform. 
Those who said that they participated in some discussions about the reform are 
more likely to favor a system with both public and private options of health care 
insurance (Question 3, β=-0.63, p=0.01). Self-reported follow-up of the reform in the 




Presidential Job Approval 
Those who approve of Obama’s job performance as the President are more likely 
to support financing the reform by cutting Medicare costs (favorability of cutting 
Medicare costs scale, β=0.34, p<0.0001, Question 6, β=0.22, p=0.07). They are also more 
likely to favor the reform in general (Question 1, β=0.14, p=0.06) and less likely to favor 
a system with both public and private insurance options (Question 3, β=-0.16, p=0.07). 
They are also more likely to favor requiring the employers pay a fee if they do not 
provide health insurance to their employees (Question 5, β=0.24, p=0.02). In addition, 
they are more likely to think that the reform will be beneficial to the economy (Question 
9, β=0.24, p=0.01).  
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
Those who think the information cards are informative are more likely to favor or 
strongly favor increasing tax on upper income Americans to finance the reform (Question 
7, β=-0.58, p=0.05). They are less likely to support cutting Medicare costs to finance the 
reform (Question 6, β=-0.69, p<0.04). At the same time, they are less likely to support 
universal coverage (Question 2, β=0.40, p<0.09).  
Those who think the information cards are relevant are less likely to support 
cutting Medicare costs to finance the reform (favorability of cutting Medicare costs scale, 
β=1.05, p<0.0001; Question 4, β=1.14, p<0.0001).   
Self-evaluations of whether the news stories influence one’s own opinion on the 
reform do not have a significant impact on the opinion questions. For those who think 
that the news stories about the reform have more of an effect on other people’s opinions, 
 
 69 
they are more likely to support cutting Medicare costs to finance the reform (Question 6, 
β=-0.30 and p<0.07).  
 
Political Predispositions 
Even though the health care reform is an issue on which the two political parties 
have different views, political predisposition variables are not found to have consistently 
significant impact on opinions about this issue in the panel analysis. As expected, 
Democrats are more likely to support a system with universal coverage (Question 2, 
β=0.21, p=0.02). Those who are more interested in politics are more likely to favor 
requiring the employers to pay a fee if they do not provide health insurance to their 
employees (Question 5, β=0.35, p=0.07). Political ideology, on the other hand, is not 
significantly related to any of the opinion questions or scales constructed.  
 
Demographic Variables 
Females are more likely to oppose a single payer system (Question 4, β=0.13, 
p=0.05) and think that the reform will be beneficial to the economy (Question 9, β=-0.30, 
p=0.10). Those who have higher education are more likely to favor a system with both 
public and private insurance options (Question 9, β=-0.18, p=0.07) and think that the 
reform will be beneficial to the economy (Question 9, β=-0.16, p=0.09). Race, age, and 






Results from the Post-Test Sample 
Univariate Effects 
Viewing News Stories 
Table 5-7 presents the mean values for information, general political knowledge, 
and dependent variables by the three news story conditions in this experiment of Health 
Care Reform. The three news story conditions have either a story in support of the reform, 
a story against the reform, or no story about the reform.  
Similar scores for specific information and general political knowledge are 
expected and found for the participants who viewed three different versions of news 
stories. The three information scores range from 0.43 to 0.45. The scores for political 
knowledge range from 0.71 to 0.78. No pairwise differences are found to be statistically 
significant among the information scores or among the political knowledge scores. These 
findings are comparable to the findings in the North Korean nuclear threat study.  
For the dependent variables and the factors extracted from these variables, it is 
hypothesized that viewing a news story portraying health care reform in a positive way 
would increase the favorability of the reform (Hypothesis 1). If a news story framing 
health care reform in a negative way is shown to the respondents, they would feel less 
favorable about the reform (Hypothesis 1).  
Data presented in Table 5-7 and 5-8 indicate that the responses to the dependent 
variable questions as well as the scales constructed based on these questions are 
extremely similar. Most of the responses do not significantly differ among the three news 
conditions. It is concluded that Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the univariate results in 
this experiment about health care reform.  
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The only significant mean difference found is between those who viewed a story 
in support of the reform (1.63 on a scale of 1 to 3) and those who viewed a story against 
the reform (1.49 on the same scale) with regard to their attitude about whether the U.S. 
should follow a few European countries to have a single payer system (Question 4). The 
difference is 0.14 and significant at the 0.05 level, which suggests that those who viewed 
the positive story are more likely to oppose a single payer system. This may seem to be in 
the opposite direction to what Hypothesis 1 predicts. However, given the fact that the 
reform proposed by the Obama administration is not intended to follow a single payer 
system, this significant difference does not suggest the support for the real proposed 






Table 5-7. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and Knowledge by News Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different News Groups 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Story in Support of Health 
Care Reform 
(N=141) 
Respondents Who Viewed 
a Story against Health 
Care Reform 
(N=140) 
Those Who did not View 
Any Story about Health 
Care Reform  
(N=142) 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.44 0.43 0.45 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.78 0.71 0.76 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.31) 
General Favorability of Health Care Reform  (-1.72 to 
2.10) 
0.02 -0.02 0.00 
(1.00) (0.97) (1.04) 
Favorability by Cutting Medicare Cost (-2.57 to 2.12) 0.05 -0.08 0.02 
(1.02) (1.00) (0.98) 
DV 1 factor(-1.67 to 3.81) 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
(1.01) (0.98) (1.01) 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally favor or oppose the Reform 
 (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 
2.09 2.04 2.03 
(0.90) (0.89) (0.91) 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or oppose universal coverage 
 (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 
1.70 1.72 1.70 
(0.88) (0.85) (0.88) 
Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or oppose a system that has both 
public and private health insurance (1=Favor, 2=No 
opinion and 3=Oppose) 
1.60 1.69 1.67 
(0.81) (0.80) (0.83) 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should follow to have a single payer 
system (1=Yes and 2=No) 
1.63 1.49 1.60 
(0.43) (0.44) (0.41) 
Q.5---Require employer to pay a fee if they do not provide 
insurance (1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) 
2.81 2.86 2.89 
(1.30) (1.27) (1.17) 
Q.6---Saving money by cutting back on Medicare cost  
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) 
3.36 3.27 3.37 
(1.33) (1.17) (1.25) 
Q.7---Increase income tax on upper income Americans  
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) 
2.53 2.5 2.55 
(1.30) (1.32) (1.26) 






American people (1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly 
Harmful) (1.52) (1.42) (1.52) 
Q.9--- Reform beneficial/harmful to the economy 
(1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly Harmful) 
3.21 3.17 3.18 







Table 5-8. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Media News Stories.  





Mean Difference between 
Respondents Who 
Viewed a Story in 
Support of Health Care 
Reform and Those Who 
did not View Any Story 
about Health Care 
Reform 
Respondents Who 
Viewed a Story 
against Health Care 
Reform and Those 
Who did not View 
Any Story about 
Health Care Reform 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Story in Support of Health 
Care Reform and Those 
Who Viewed a Story 
against the Reform 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.02 -0.05 0.07 
General Favorability (-1.72 to 2.10) 0.02 -0.02 0.03 
Favorability by Cutting Medicare Cost (-2.57 to 2.12) 0.03 -0.10 0.13 
DV 1 factor(-1.67 to 3.81) 0.02 -0.04 0.06 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally favor or oppose the Health Care 
Reform (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 0.06 0.01 0.05 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or oppose universal coverage (1=Favor, 
2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 0.002 0.02 -0.02 
Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or oppose a system that has both public 
and private health insurance (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 
3=Oppose) -0.07 0.02 -0.09 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should follow to have a single payer 
system (1=Yes and 2=No) 0.03 -0.11 0.14** 
Q.5---Require employer to pay a fee if they do not provide 
insurance (1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 
Q.6---Saving money by cutting back on Medicare cost 
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) -0.005 -0.09 0.09 
Q.7---Increase income tax on upper income Americans 
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) -0.02 -0.11 0.03 
Q.8---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful to American 
people (1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly Harmful) 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Q.9---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful to the economy 
(1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly Harmful) 0.03 -0.005 0.03 
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Viewing Information Cards 
The univariate effect of information cards in the study of health care reform is 
found to be similar to that in the study of the North Korean nuclear threat. That is, 
information cards do not have impact on the specific opinions about the reform (Table 5-
9 and 5-10). They are only found to have effects on specific information measures. The 
average score on the information scale constructed, based on the five specific information 
questions is higher for those who received the information cards than for those who did 
not receive them (0.47 versus 0.40, difference significant at the 0.05 level).  
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Table 5-9. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and 
Knowledge by Information Card Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different 
Information Card Groups 
Information Cards 
(N=212) 
No Information Cards 
(N=211) 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.47 0.40 
(0.28) (0.25) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.73 0.77 
(0.33) (0.28) 
General Favorability (-1.72 to 2.10) 0.00 0.00 
(0.99) (1.02) 




DV 1 factor(-1.70 to 1.92) 0.00 0.00 
(0.98) (1.02 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally favor or oppose the 




Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or oppose universal 




Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or oppose a system that 
has both public and private health insurance 
(1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 
1.67 1.64 
(0.81) (0.82) 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should follow to have a 
single payer system (1=Yes and 2=No) 
1.57 1.58 
(0.43) (0.43) 
Q.5---Require employer to pay a fee if they do 
not provide insurance (1=Strongly favor 
through 5=Strongly oppose 
2.86 2.84 
(1.25) (1.24) 
Q.8---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful 
to American people (1=Greatly beneficial 
through 5=Greatly Harmful) 
3.32 3.35 
(1.20) (1.29) 
Q.7---Increase income tax on upper income 




Q.8---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful 
to American people (1=Greatly beneficial 
through 5=Greatly Harmful) 
2.92 2.92 
(1.48) (1.49) 
Q.9---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful 








Table 5-10. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Information Cards 
(Short Term Informational Effects)  
    **Significant at 0.05 level 
 
Interaction Effect from News Stories and Information Cards 
Using the same method to test the univariate interaction effect from news stories 
and information cards as in the first experiment found that the magnitude of the mean 
differences between any two of the three news groups is similar for all the dependent 
variables for those who received and did not receive information cards about the reform 
(Table 5-11 and Table 5-12). This pattern is indicated by the fact that the 90% confidence 




Mean Difference between 
Respondents Who Received 
Information Cards and 
Those Who didn’t 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.07** 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.05 
General Favorability (-1.72 to 2.10) -0.0003 
Favorability by Cutting Medicare Cost (-2.57 to 2.12) -0.03 
DV 1 factor(-1.70 to 1.92) -0.006 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally favor or oppose the Health Care 
Reform (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) 0.01 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or oppose universal coverage (1=Favor, 
2=No opinion and 3=Oppose) -0.02 
Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or oppose a system that has both public 
and private health insurance (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 
3=Oppose) 0.02 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should follow to have a single payer 
system (1=Yes and 2=No) -0.02 
Q.5---Require employer to pay a fee if they do not provide 
insurance (1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose 0.02 
Q.6---Saving money by cutting back on Medicare cost 
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) -0.03 
Q.7---Increase income tax on upper income Americans 
(1=Strongly favor through 5=Strongly oppose) -0.02 
Q.8---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful to American 
people (1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly Harmful) -0.004 
Q.9---Health Care Reform beneficial/harmful to the economy 
(1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly Harmful) -0.001 
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As Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific information would weaken the effects from 
exposing to health care reform, the univariate results about the interaction effect in this 
study do not support these two hypotheses.  
However, there seem to be a pattern, even though not statistically significant, that 
those who viewed a story in support of the reform and who also received the information 
cards lean toward opposing the reform. That is, they are less likely to follow the 
perspective of the news story to support the reform as compared to those who viewed the 
same story yet did not receive the information cards. Such a pattern can be seen for the 
general favorability scale, Question 1, 2, 3, and Question 7 through 9. Such a pattern is 
not visible on the favorability by cutting Medicare cost, or Question 4, 5, or 6. These 
questions relate to either cutting Medicare cost, requiring employers to pay a fee or 
pursuing a single payer system.  
Among those who viewed a story against the reform, those who received the 
information cards are less likely to oppose the reform than those who did not receive the 
cards on some dependent variable questions, such as the general favorability, Question 2 
through 5 and Question 8. General favorability question (Question 1), favorability of the 
reform by cutting Medicare cost (Question 6), and the scale as well as Question 7 and 9 
do not conform to this patter, as predicted by the hypothesis.  
When looking at the difference between those who viewed a story in support of 
the reform and those who viewed a story against it, those who received the specific 
information cards tend to be less favorable of the reform, or more opposing to the reform 
compared to those who did not receive the cards. This is in line with the hypothesis 
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regarding the moderating role of specific information. One exception is the question and 
scale constructed for the favorability of the reform by cutting Medicare cost. 
Overall, these observed trends in the magnitude of news effects between those 
received and did not receive information cards are only marginal as the 90% confidence 
intervals overlap with each other. However, it seems that reading the information cards 
are weakening the influence from viewing a news story about health care reform by 
making those who received the cards show less support for the news story’s issue 
position. Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific information would weaken the effects from 
exposing to relevant issue coverage in the news. These trends provide some marginal 
support for the interaction effects that Hypothesis 2 predict. Such support is certainly not 






Table 5-11. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information and Knowledge by Experimental Groups 
 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different Experimental Groups 
Information Cards No Information Cards 
Viewed a Story  in 
Support of Health 
Care Reform 
(N=70) 





about  Health 
Care Reform   
(N=71) 
Viewed a Story  in 
Support of Health 
Care Reform 
(N=71) 





about  Health 
Care Reform   
(N=71) 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.47 0.44 0.51 0.41 0.41 0.39 
(0.3) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21) (0.29) (0.25) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.77 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.23) (0.32) (0.29) 
General Favorability (-1.72 to 2.10) 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.02 
(0.91) (0.94) (1.10) (1.08) (1.00) (0.98) 
Favorability by Cutting Medicare Cost (-
2.57 to 2.12) 
-0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.16 0.06 
(0.92) (0.92) (1.01) (1.12) (1.07) (0.97) 
DV 1 factor(-1.70 to 1.92) 
0.11 -0.1 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.03 
(0.93) (0.94) (1.08) (1.08) (1.02) (0.95) 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally favor or oppose 
the Health Care Reform (1=Favor, 2=No 
opinion and 3=Oppose) 
2.19 2.01 1.99 2.00 2.07 2.07 
(0.87) (0.88) (0.93) (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or oppose universal 
coverage (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 
3=Oppose) 
1.79 1.57 1.74 1.62 1.87 1.67 
(0.87) (0.77) (0.92) (0.88) (0.90) (0.85) 
Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or oppose a system 
that has both public and private health 
insurance (1=Favor, 2=No opinion and 
3=Oppose) 
1.66 1.64 1.69 1.55 1.74 1.64 
(0.80 (0.78) (0.85) (0.82) (0.83) (0.82) 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should follow to have 
a single payer system  
(1=Yes and 2=No) 
1.64 1.46 1.6 1.62 1.53 1.6 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41) 
Q.5---Require employer to pay a fee if they 
do not provide insurance (1=Strongly 
favor through 5=Strongly oppose 
2.83 2.84 2.92 2.79 2.87 2.86 







Q.6---Saving money by cutting back on 
Medicare cost (1=Strongly favor through 
5=Strongly oppose) 
3.27 3.33 3.35 3.45 3.21 3.39 
(1.15) (1.13) (1.33) (1.48) (1.21) (1.16) 
Q.7---Increase income tax on upper 
income Americans (1=Strongly favor 
through 5=Strongly oppose) 
2.56 2.51 2.49 2.51 2.49 2.61 
(1.33) (1.30) (1.35) (1.27) (1.34) (1.17) 
Q.8---Health Care Reform 
beneficial/harmful to American people 
(1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly 
Harmful) 
3.14 2.8 2.82 2.82 3.04 2.91 
(1.48) (1.34) (1.61) (1.55) (1.50) (1.43) 
Q.9---Health Care Reform 
beneficial/harmful to the economy 
(1=Greatly beneficial through 5=Greatly 
Harmful) 
3.31 3.14 3.10 3.10 3.2 3.26 










Mean Difference between  






















Reform Story vs. 
























































Favorability by Cutting 













(-0.16,  0.74) 













Q.1 Recoded ---Generally 
favor or oppose the Health 
Care Reform (1=Favor, 











( -0.66, 0.55) 
-0.10 
(-0.70, 0.50) 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor or 
oppose universal coverage 














Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or 
oppose a system that has 
both public and private 
health insurance (1=Favor, 


















*Significant at 0.10 level.  
Note: 90% Confidence interval in parenthesis. 
3=Oppose) 
Q.4---Whether U.S. should 
follow to have a single 
payer system  












(-0.10,  0.28) 
Q.5---Require employer to 
pay a fee if they do not 
provide insurance 






(-0.6203  0.4727) 
-0.01 
(-0.5646  0.5361) 
-0.07 
(-0.6168  0.4800) 
0.01 
(-0.5361  0.5646) 
-0.08 
(-0.6311  0.4657) 
Q.6---Saving money by 
cutting back on Medicare 
cost (1=Strongly favor 













Q.7---Increase income tax 
on upper income Americans 
































Q.9---Health Care Reform 



















Short-term News Exposure and Information Card Reception 
Multiple regression results are shown in Table A-21 through A-24 in Appendix V. 
The coefficients for news groups are negative for all of the dependent variables or scales 
except for Question 4 (favorability of single payer system), 6 (favorability of the reform 
by cutting Medicare cost), and 7 (favorability of the reform by tax increase). This 
indicates that on most of the dependent questions, viewing a story in support of the 
reform tends to make the subjects feel more favorable about the reform (indicated by 
lower scores). Such an effect reaches statistical significance at the 0.10 level for the 
dependent variable question about favoring universal coverage (β=-0.11 and p-
value=0.07). 
Subjects who viewed the information cards demonstrate consistent, although not 
always significant, lower favorability of the reform. Such an effect is significant on the 
general favorability scale (β=0.49 and p-value=0.04), favorability of both public and 
private insurance option (Question 3, β=0.61 and p-value=0.05), and of increasing tax on 
higher income individuals to finance the reform (Question 7, β=0.85 and p-value=0.05).  
A significant interaction effect of the news story and information cards is only 
found for the favorability of universal coverage (Question 2, β=0.15 and p-value=0.09) 
but not for all of the other opinion questions. The positive sign of the coefficient suggests 
that among those who viewed the positive news about the reform, those who read the 
information cards show less favorable feeling toward the reform compared to those who 
did not read the cards. Similarly, among those who viewed the negative news about the 
reform, those who read the information cards tend to oppose the reform less than those 
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who did not read the information cards. This effect confirms Hypothesis 2 that specific 
information tends to mitigate the effect of the news story. Those who have more specific 
information tend to show weaker effect from media communication.  
However, this effect is not significant across different opinion questions, which 
may indicate that the moderating effect of information cards still depends on the specific 
attitude being asked and how it is asked. This finding is also similar to the findings in the 
study of North Korean nuclear threat.  
 
Long-term Information and General Political Knowledge Acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about the health care reform is found to lead to 
more favorability of the reform in general (Question 1, β=-0.26 and p-value=0.06) and 
more likely to think that the reform would be beneficial to the American people 
(Question 8, β=-0.38 and p-value=0.04). Acquired information also leads to less 
favorability for having a single payer system (Question 4, β=0.15 and p-value=0.06) and 
taxing on upper income Americans (Question 7, β=0.59 and p-value=0.01).   
General political knowledge also has different impact on opinions about the 
health care reform, depending on what aspect of the opinion the respondent is asked. 
Those who are more knowledgeable are more likely than those who are less 
knowledgeable to favor the reform in general (general favorability scale, β=-0.23 and p-
value=0.06), favor a system that has both public and private insurance options (Question 
3, β=-0.43 and p-value=0.01), and favor the reform by increasing tax on upper income 
Americans (Question 7, β=-0.38 and p-value=0.08). With regard to financing the reform 
by cutting back on Medicare cost, those who are more knowledgeable tend to show less 
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favorability (Question 6, β=0.42 and p-value=0.07; and the factor that extracted mostly 
through Question 6, β=0.52 and p-value=0.01). 
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following and Discussion 
Issue salience, i.e. viewing this issue as important and relevant, has a positive 
coefficient in the regression models fitted for the general favorability scale, indicating 
that those who view this issue as more important are more likely to oppose the reform 
than those who view it as less important (β=0.10 and p-value < 0.0001). This pattern is 
also found for Question 1 (generally favor or oppose, β=0.14 and p-value < 0.0001), 2 
(favorability of universal coverage, β=0.15 and p-value < 0.0001), 8 (beneficial to the 
American people, β=0.12 and p-value = 0.01), and 9 (beneficial to the American people, 
β=0.13 and p-value = 0.01).  
General media exposure does not significantly influence respondents’ opinions on 
this issue, which is similar to the finding in the North Korean nuclear threat study. Nor 
does the extent of participation in discussion of this issue make any difference on the 
issue opinions.  
However, self-evaluation of how closely one follows this issue has a significant 
influence on quite a few questions regarding health care reform opinions, such as the 
general favorability (scale and Question 1, β=-0.11 and p-value = 0.03; β=-0.16 and p-
value < 0.0001), 2 (favorability of universal coverage, β=-0.10 and p-value = 0.10), 4 
(having a single payer system, β=-0.05 and p-value = 0.07), and 8 (beneficial to the 
American people, β=-0.14 and p-value = 0.04). The negative sign of the coefficients 
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indicates that the more closely one feels that he or she follows this issue in the news, the 
less favorable one would feel about the reform. 
 
Presidential Job Approval 
As expected, presidential job approval is a significant and consistent predictor of 
opinions about the reform. Those who approve of the President’s job performance are 
more likely to think favorably of the reform, no matter how the opinion questions are 
framed (β=0.45 and p<0.0001 for general favorability scale, see Table A-21 through A-
24 for coefficients fitted for other dependent variables).  
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
Those who think that the information cards are relevant to the issue of health care 
reform are more likely to favor the reform in general (general favorability scale, β=-0.12 
and p=0.09) and a health care insurance system with both public and private options 
(Question 3, β=-0.18 and p=0.06). 
Self-evaluation of whether the news story about the health care reform affects 
one’s own opinion only has significant impact on the favorable attitudes toward 
increasing tax on higher income Americans to finance the reform (Question 7, β=-0.16 
and p=0.03). The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that those who think the news 
story is having more effect on their own opinions tend to favor the reform more. Whether 
or not the participants think that the story would affect other people’s opinions about the 





Expectedly, political party identification is significantly related to the views of 
participants for the reform. Democrats are more likely to favor the reform as reflected by 
the positive coefficients in the multiple regressions fitted for general favorability (the 
scale, β=0.05 and p=0.10; and Question 1, β=0.06 and p=0.07) and support for the 
proposal that a fee is assessed to the employers who do not provide health insurance 
(Question 5, β=0.12 and p=0.02).   
Political ideology tends to have a relatively consistent and significant impact on 
the opinion questions. The more liberal a respondent is, the more favorable he or she 
feels about the reform (general favorability scale, β=0.12 and p<0.0001; Question 3, 
β=0.07 and p=0.05; Question 4, β=0.04 and p=0.01; Question 5, β=0.08 and p=0.06; 
Question 7, β=0.23 and p<0.0001; Question 8, β=0.15 and p<0.0001 and Question 9, 
β=0.12 and p<0.0001).  
Those who are less interested in politics in general are more likely to oppose the 
health care reform in general and for having both public and private options of insurance 
(general favorability scale, β=-0.09 and p=0.10; and Questions 3, β=-0.13 and p=0.08). 
 
Demographic Variables 
Women are found to be more likely to oppose financing the reform by cutting 
Medicare cost as indicated by the significant coefficient in the regressions for Question 6 
and the scale (β=0.32 and p-value = 0.01; β=0.30 and p-value <0.0001). They are more 
likely to think that the reform is harmful to the economy than men (Question 9, β=0.20 
and p-value = 0.02). No other gender differences are found.  
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 Race is not found to be significantly related to the opinion questions about the 
health care reform except for Question 9 regarding whether the reform would be 
beneficial to the economy. It seems that minorities are less likely to think that the reform 
will be beneficial to the economy than the whites (β=0.07 and p=0.05). 
Higher education is only associated with lower general favorability of the reform 
but no other opinion questions about the reform (Question 1, β=-0.08 and p-value = 0.02).  
Older participants are found to be more likely to oppose cutting Medicare cost to finance 
the reform (Question 6, β=0.22 and p<0.0001; and the corresponding scale, β=0.17 and 
p<0.0001), more likely to favor increasing tax on higher income Americans to finance the 
reform (Question 7), and having both public and private insurance options (Question 3, 
β=-0.05 and p=0.09). Participants with more income are found to be more likely to 
oppose the reform than those who have a lower income (general favorability, β=0.04 and 
p=0.06; Question 1, β=0.05 and p=0.02; Question 2, β=0.07 and p=0.02; and Question 7, 
β=0.10 and p=0.01). 
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Results from Experiment 3: Opinions on Alternative Energy Research 
 
Results from the Panel Data 
About 101 subjects in the experiment of health care reform participated in both 
the pre-test and post-test. Results from the regression analysis using data collected from 
this group of panel subjects are presented in Table A-25 through A-27 in Appendix V.  
 
Short-term News Exposure and Information Card Reception 
No main effect of short-term news exposure is found on the opinion questions and 
scales for the energy issue. However, those who received information cards tend to score 
higher on the support for alternative energy scale (β=1.25, p=0.04). That is, they are less 
likely to support alternative energy than those who did not receive the cards. They are 
also more likely to say that government incentives for alternative energy should be 
decreased (Question 3, β=1.10, p=0.01). 
 
Long-term Information and General Political Knowledge Acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about alternative and traditional energy is not 
significantly related to the opinions related to this issue. General political knowledge has 
a significant impact on the support for alternative energy scale (β=-0.66, p=0.05). Those 
who are more knowledgeable tend to score lower on the scale. That is, they are less likely 
to support this type of energy.  
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following and Discussion 
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Media exposure is related to opinions about whether traditional energy sources 
will run out soon (Question 1, β=0.11, p=0.08). Those who have more news exposure are 
more likely to think that traditional energy will sustain long compared to those who 
receive less news from various media outlets. More media exposure is also related to 
thinking alternative energy is beneficial to the economy (Question 6, β=0.18, p=0.04). 
Those who think the energy issue more salient are also more likely to think that 
traditional energy will sustain long (Question 1, β=0.09, p=0.08). 
Those who reported that they follow the news about alternative energy more 
closely are more likely to think that alternative energy is beneficial to the environment 
than those who did not follow as much (Question 5, β=0.15, p=0.06).  
Those who said that they participated in discussions about alternative energy are 
more likely to score lower on the support for traditional energy scale (β=0.49, p=0.07). 
That is, they are more likely to show support for traditional energy. They are more likely 
to say that the government should decrease the incentives to develop alternative energy 
(Question 3, β=0.37, p=0.01) and increase incentives for traditional energy (Question 4, 
β=-0.30, p=0.10). 
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
Those who think that the news story about alternative energy influences one’s 
own opinion more are more likely to think that alternative energy is beneficial to the 
environment than older respondents (Question 5, β=-0.15, p=0.01). They are also more 
likely to think that alternative energy is better sources of energy (Question 2, β=-0.22, 
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p=0.11). In addition, they are more likely to say that the government should decrease 
incentives to develop traditional energy (Question 4, β=-0.21, p=0.10). 
 Those who think that the information cards are relevant are more likely to say that 
the government should increase the incentives to develop alternative energy (Question 3, 
β=-0.21, p=0.05). They are more likely to score lower on the support for alternative 
energy scale (β=-0.28, p=0.08). That is, they are more likely to support alternative energy.  
 
Political Predispositions 
Republicans are more likely to say that the government should increase the 
incentives to develop alternative energy (Question 3, β=-0.12, p=0.08). Republicans are 
also more likely to think that alternative energy is beneficial to the environment than 
Democrats (Question 5, β=-0.11, p=0.10).  
Liberals in the political ideology spectrum and those who are more interested in 
politics tend to feel the same way (Question 3, β=0.08, p=0.10 for ideology and Question 
3, β=0.07, p=0.02 for political interest). Conservatives are more likely to think that 
traditional energy sources will run out soon (Question 1, β=-0.11, p<0.0001).  
 
Demographic Variables 
At the significance level of 0.10, age is related to the opinion regarding whether 
the government should increase or decrease incentives to develop alternative energy. 
Older respondents are more likely to say that such incentives should be increased 
(Question 3, β=-0.08, p=0.10). Younger respondents, on the other hand, are more likely 
to think that alternative energy is beneficial to the environment than older respondents 
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(Question 5, β=0.12, p=0.01). White respondents are more likely to feel that way as 
compared to other races (Question 5, β=0.10, p=0.05). 
Male respondents are more likely to think that alternative energy will be 
beneficial to the economy than female respondents (Question 6, β=0.31, p=0.01). Those 
respondents who have more income are less likely to support increasing gas tax to 
finance alternative energy research (Question 7, β=0.14, p=0.07).  
 
Results from the Post-test Sample 
Univariate Effects 
Viewing News Stories 
Table 5-13 presents the mean values for information, general political knowledge, 
and dependent variables by the three news story conditions in this experiment of 
alternative energy research. The three news story conditions have either a story in support 
of such research, a story against such research, or no story about alternative energy. 
Similar scores for specific information and general political knowledge are 
expected and found for the participants who viewed three different versions of news 
stories. The three information scores range from 0.60 to 0.63. The scores for political 
knowledge range from 0.75 to 0.78. No pairwise differences are found to be statistically 
significant among the information scores or among the political knowledge scores. These 
findings are comparable to the findings in the previous two experiments about the North 
Korean nuclear threat and health care reform.  
For the dependent variables and the two factors extracted from them, it is 
hypothesized that viewing a news story in support of alternative energy research would 
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increase the favorability and support of alternative energy (Hypothesis 1). If a news story 
framing alternative energy in a negative way is shown to the respondents, they would feel 
less favorable or supportive of the related production and research (Hypothesis 1).  
Data presented in Table 5-13 and 5-14 indicate that the responses to the scale 
measuring support for alternative energy is strongest among those who viewed a negative 
story about this issue. Note that lower scores on the scale indicate more support. The 
difference between those who viewed a positive story and those who viewed a negative 
story is 0.30 and is significant at 0.05 level (mean values are 0.17 and -0.13, respectively 
on a scale of -1.40 to 3.41).  
It is also found that those who viewed a positive story are less likely to think that 
alternative energy will be beneficial to the environment or the economy. In Table 5-14, 
the difference between those who viewed a positive story and a negative story of this 
issue is 0.15 and significant at the 0.05 level. The difference between those who viewed a 
positive story and those who did not view any story of this issue is 0.17 and significant at 
the 0.05 level. As a positive number for the differences indicates that those who viewed 
the positive story have higher scores for these two opinion questions, those respondents 
are more likely to think negatively about alternative energy. 
The responses to the scale of support for traditional energy as well as other 
individual opinion questions about this issue (Question 1 through 4 and Question 7) are 
similar. However, there is a still a consistent pattern wherein those who viewed the 
positive story about alternative energy tend to have less support of this issue than those 
who viewed a negative news story. 
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These results seem to move in the opposite direction as to what Hypothesis 1 
predicts. A closer look at the news videos shown to the experimental groups indicate that 
this may have something to do with details of the news content and how alternative 
energy is portrayed. The positive story about alternative energy has an overall supportive 
news reporting angle on the topic. However, close to the end of the story, there is a 
question or a concern discussed about the cost of such solar alternative energy being high. 
The study participants may very well be reacting to this message, even though the 
majority of the news content is about the advantages of this type of energy. In that regard, 
the news story does not have null effects on opinions. Instead, audience members are 
quite sensitive to certain aspects about which the issue gets framed (Graber, 1987; Nelson, 
Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Petrocik, 1996).  
The negative story is used because it seems to portray that alternative energy only 
contributes a small portion of the total energy consumption in the U.S. In addition, after 
the energy crisis when this type of energy started to get reduced funding or was 
discontinued, the energy consumption in this country does not seem to demonstrate a 
huge problem. However, the audience may be picking up the urgency message from the 
story. The long lines of cars waiting to get gas in the 1970s did not act as a soothing 
message for the abundance of traditional energy. Instead, it may lead the audience to 
worry about the potential of experiencing anything similar. This may further lead them to 






Table 5-13. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and Knowledge by News Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different News Groups 
Respondents Who 
Viewed a Story in 








Those Who did not 




Information Scale (0-1) 0.60 0.63 0.63 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.75 0.79 0.78 
(0.31) (0.29) (0.28) 
Support for Alternative Energy(-1.40 to 3.41) 0.17 -0.13 -0.04 
(1.09) (0.95) (0.93) 
Support for Traditional Energy (-2.16 to 2.32) 0.00 -0.07 0.07 
(0.99) (1.02) (1.00) 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run out soon or will sustain 
long (1=Run out soon, 2=Sustain long) 
1.55 1.52 1.50 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Q.2---Alternative energy a better source (1=Yes, 2=Same 
as traditional energy and 3=No) 
1.62 1.46 1.57 
(0.74) (0.69) (0.78) 
Q.3---Government increase/decrease incentive to develop 
alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No change 
and 3=Decrease) 
1.51 1.39 1.44 
(0.69) (0.63) (0.58) 
Q.4---Government increase/decrease incentive to develop 
alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No change 
and 3=Decrease) 
1.79 1.74 1.87 
(0.69) (0.70) (0.74) 
Q.5---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to 
environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 
1.33 1.18 1.26 
(0.56) (0.41) (0.50 
Q.6---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 
1.52 1.36 1.35 
(0.71) (0.55) (0.57) 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support alternative energy 
research (1=Definitely support through 4=Definitely not 
support) 
2.66 2.54 2.72 






Table 5-14. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Media News Stories 




Mean Difference between 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Story in Support of 
Alternative Energy Research 
 and Those Who did not View 
Such a Story 
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Story against Alternative 
Energy Research and Those 
Who did not View Any 
Such Story  
Respondents Who Viewed a 
Story in Support of 
Alternative Energy 
Research and Those Who 
Viewed a Story against It 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.03 -0.004 -0.03 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.03 0.02 -0.04 
Support for Alternative Energy(-1.45 to 3.26) 0.21 0.08 0.30** 
Support for Incentives for Traditional Energy(-1.84 to 
2.42) 0.07 -0.07 0.14 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run out soon or will 
sustain long (1=Run out soon, 2=Sustain long) 0.02 0.05 0.03 
Q.2---Alternative energy a better source (1=Yes, 
2=Same as traditional energy and 3=No)  0.05 -0.11 0.16 
Q.3---Government increase/decrease incentive to 
develop alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) 0.07 -0.05 0.12 
Q.4---Government increase/decrease incentive to 
develop alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) -0.07 -0.12 0.05 
Q.5---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to 
environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 0.07 -0.08 0.15** 
Q.6---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to 
economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 0.17** 0.02 0.15 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support alternative energy 
research (1=Definitely support through 4=Definitely 
not support) 0.06 -0.18 0.12 
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Table 5-15. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and 
Knowledge by Information Card Groups 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different 
Information Card Groups 
Information Cards 
(N=213) 
No Information Cards 
(N=211) 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.65 0.59 
(0.27) (0.26) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.79 0.76 
(0.28) (0.31) 
Support for Alternative Energy(-1.45 to 3.26) -0.02 0.02 
(1.00 (1.00) 
Support for Incentives for Traditional 
Energy(-1.84 to 2.42) 
-0.07 0.07 
(1.01) (0.98) 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run out soon or 




Q.2---Alternative energy a better source 




Q.3---Government increase/decrease incentive 
to develop alternative energy research 
(1=Increase, 2=No change and 3=Decrease) 
1.42 1.47 
(0.64) (0.63) 
Q.4---Government increase/decrease incentive 
to develop alternative energy research 
(1=Increase, 2=No change and 3=Decrease) 
1.79 1.82 
(0.70) (0.72) 
Q.5---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to 
environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 
1.27 1.25 
(0.51) (0.47) 
Q.6---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to 
economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 
1.39 1.43 
(0.59) (0.65) 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support alternative 
energy research (1=Definitely support 





Table 5-16. ANOVA Results for post-test respondents: Effect of Information Cards 
(Short Term Informational Effects)  
    **Significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Viewing Information Cards 
The univariate effect of information cards in the study of alternative energy research is 
again similar to those in the study of North Korean nuclear threat and health care reform. 
That is, information cards do not have any impact on the specific opinions about the 
alternative energy research (Table 5-15 and 5-16). Nor do information cards make any 
difference on the level of general political knowledge. They are only found to have 
effects on specific information measures. The average score on the information scale 
constructed based on the five specific information questions is higher for those who 
received the information cards than for those who did not receive them (0.65 versus 0.59, 




Mean Difference between 
Respondents Who Received 
Information Cards and 
Those Who did not 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.06** 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.03 
Support for Alternative Energy(-1.45 to 3.26) -0.04 
Support for Incentives for Traditional Energy(-1.84 to 2.42) 0.14 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run out soon or will sustain long 
(1=Run out soon, 2=Sustain long) -0.10 
Q.2---Alternative energy a better source (1=Yes, 2=Same as 
traditional energy and 3=No)  -0.07 
Q.3---Government increase/decrease incentive to develop 
alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No change and 
3=Decrease) -0.06 
Q.4---Government increase/decrease incentive to develop 
alternative energy research (1=Increase, 2=No change and 
3=Decrease) -0.03 
Q.5---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) 0.03 
Q.6---Alternative energy beneficial/harmful to economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 3=Harmful) -0.04 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support alternative energy research 
(1=Definitely support through 4=Definitely not support) 0.03 
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Interaction Effect from News Stories and Information Cards  
Using the same method to test the univariate interaction effect from news stories 
and information cards as in the previous two experiments found that the magnitude of the 
mean differences between any two of the three news groups is similar for all the 
dependent variables for those who received and did not receive information cards about 
alternative energy research (Table 5-17 and Table 5-18). This pattern is indicated by the 
fact that the 90% confidence intervals for each pair of the differences overlap with each 
other in Table 5-18.  
As Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific information would weaken the effects from 
exposing to alternative energy research news, the univariate results about the interaction 
effect in this study do not support these two hypotheses.  
However, there seems to be a pattern, even though not statistically significant, 
that those who viewed a story supposedly in support of alternative energy research lean 
toward opposing alternative energy. This pattern is stronger among those who received 
the information cards. That is, they are even less likely to follow the main perspective of 
the news story to support alternative energy as compared to those who viewed the same 
story yet did not receive the information cards. Such a pattern can be seen for the 
alternative energy support scale, Question 3, 5, and Question 6. For Question 7, regarding 
increasing the gas tax to support alternative energy research, it seems that those who did 
not receive the information cards are less likely to oppose this proposal than those who 
did not receive the information cards. In summary, when viewing the news story reduces 
the support for alternative energy, the issue specific information acquired tends to have a 
mixed tendency to moderate such effect, depending on the opinion questions asked.  
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Among those who viewed a story that is supposedly against alternative energy, 
the participants who received the information cards are more likely to favor, i.e. less 
likely to oppose alternative energy than those who did not receive the cards on some 
dependent variable questions, such as Question 4, 5, 6, and 7. This means that for some 
of the opinion questions asked, the moderating effect of information tends to be in the 
opposite direction as what Hypothesis 2 predicts, even though such a pattern is not 
statistically significant.  
When looking at the difference between those who viewed a story in support of 
alternative energy and those who viewed a story against it, those who received the 
specific information cards tend to be less favorable of, or more opposing to it compared 
to those who did not receive the cards (alternative energy support scale, Question 2 and 
7). For Question 6, it seems that among those who viewed a positive story about this 
issue, those who did not receive the information cards are more likely to think alternative 
energy is harmful for the economy.  
Overall, these observed trends in the magnitude of news effects between those 
received and those who did not receive information cards are only marginal as the 90% 
confidence intervals overlap each other. However, it seems that reading the information 
cards has a mixed pattern of influence on viewing a news story about alternative energy, 
depending on the opinion questions asked. Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific information 
would weaken the effects from exposing to relevant issue coverage in the news. These 
trends provide some but not overall marginal support for the interaction effect that 
Hypothesis 2 predicts, although such support is certainly not statistically significant. This 
trend is in line with the pattern in Experiment 1 and 2 together, as in Experiment 1, we 
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find a trend that contradicts what Hypothesis 2 predicts. While in Experiment 2, there is a 







Table 5-17. Mean and Standard Deviation for Dependent Variables, Information, and Knowledge by Experimental Groups 
 
Variables 
Mean and SD (in Parenthesis) for Different Experimental Groups 
Information Cards No Information Cards 
































Information Scale (0-1) 0.64 0.63 0.67 0.56 0.62 0.59 
(0.27) (0.29) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.76 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.76 0.78 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.34) (0.3) (0.29) 
Support for Alternative Energy(-
1.45 to 3.26) 
0.07 -0.12 -0.01 0.28 -0.14 -0.07 
(0.97) (1.02) (1.01) (1.19) (0.89) (0.86) 
Support for Incentives for 
Traditional Energy(-1.84 to 2.42) 
0.00 -0.20 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.16 
(0.99) (1.00 (1.05) (0.99) (1.03) (0.94) 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run out 
soon or will sustain long (1=Run out 
soon, 2=Sustain long) 
1.51 1.48 1.42 1.59 1.56 1.58 
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.44) 
Q.2---Alternative energy a better 
source (1=Yes, 2=Same as traditional 
energy and 3=No)  
1.65 1.39 1.51 1.60 1.53 1.63 
(0.78) (0.67) (0.77) (0.71) (0.72) (0.78) 
Q.3---Government increase/decrease 
incentive to develop alternative 
energy research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) 
1.44 1.42 1.39 1.59 1.36 1.48 
(0.69) (0.67) (0.55) (0.69) (0.59) (0.61) 
Q.4---Government increase/decrease 
incentive to develop alternative 
energy research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) 
1.77 1.69 1.90 1.81 1.8 1.83 
(0.66) (0.69) (0.74) (0.73) (0.71) (0.74) 
Q.5---Alternative energy 
beneficial/harmful to environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 
3=Harmful) 
1.31 1.20 1.31 1.36 1.17 1.21 









beneficial/harmful to economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 
3=Harmful) 
1.39 1.35 1.42 1.64 1.37 1.27 
(0.60) (0.56) (0.62) (0.80) (0.54) (0.51) 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support 
alternative energy research 
(1=Definitely support through 
4=Definitely not support) 
2.76 2.47 2.74 2.56 2.61 2.70 











Mean Difference between  
Information Cards No Information Cards 
Respondents Who 




 and Those Who 
did not View Such 
a Story 
Respondents 





Those Who did 
not View Any 
Such Story  
Respondents 







Viewed a Story 
against It 
Respondents Who 




 and Those Who 
did not View Such 
a Story 
Respondents 





Those Who did 
not View Any 
Such Story  
Respondents 










Information Scale (0-1) 
-0.04 
(-0.15, 0.08) 
-0.04     
(-0.15, 0.07) 
0.003    
(-0.11, 0.12) 
-0.03     
(-0.14, 0.09) 
0.031     
(-0.08, 0.15) 
-0.06    
(-0.17, 0.06) 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 
-0.01 
  (-0.14, 0.12) 
0.05     
(-0.08,  0.18) 
-0.06     
(-0.19, 0.07) 
-0.05     
(-0.18, 0.08) 
-0.02     
(-0.15, 0.11) 
-0.03     
(-0.16, 0.10) 
Support for Alternative Energy(-
1.45 to 3.26) 
0.08     
(-0.35, 0.52) 
-0.11     
(-0.54, 0.33) 
0.19     
(-0.24, 0.62) 
0.35     
(-0.08  0.79) 
-0.06     
(-0.50, 0.37) 
0.42     
(-0.02, 0.85) 
Support for Incentives for 
Traditional Energy(-1.84 to 2.42) 
0.02     
(-0.41, 0.46) 
-0.18     
(-0.61, 0.26) 
0.20     
(-0.24, 0.63) 
-0.16     
(-0.60, 0.27) 
-0.10     
(-0.54, 0.34) 
-0.06     
(-0.50, 0.38) 
Q.1---Traditional energy will run 
out soon or will sustain long 
(1=Run out soon, 2=Sustain long) 
0.10    
( -0.10, 0.30) 
0.06     
(-0.16, 0.26) 
0.04     
(-0.16, 0.23) 
0.01     
(-0.19, 0.21) 
0.03     
(-0.17, 0.23) 
-0.02     
(-0.22, 0.18) 
Q.2---Alternative energy a better 
source (1=Yes, 2=Same as 
traditional energy and 3=No)  
0.14     
(-0.18, 0.46) 
-0.11     
(-0.43, 0.21) 
0.25     
(-0.07, 0.58) 
-0.03     
(-0.36, 0.29) 
-0.11     
(-0.43  0.22) 
0.07     
(-0.25, 0.40) 
Q.3---Government 
increase/decrease incentive to 
develop alternative energy 
research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) 
0.04     
(-0.23, 0.32) 
0.03     
(-0.25, 0.31) 
0.01     
(-0.27, 0.29) 
0.11     
(-0.17, 0.39) 
-0.12     
(-0.40, 0.16) 
0.23     
(-0.05, 0.51) 
Q.4---Government 
increase/decrease incentive to 
-0.13     
(-0.44, 0.18) 
-0.21     
(-0.52  0.10) 
0.08     
(-0.23, 0.40) 
-0.01     
(-0.33  0.29) 
-0.03     
(-0.34, 0.28) 








*Significant at 0.10 level. 
Note: 90% Confidence interval in parenthesis. 
 
develop alternative energy 
research (1=Increase, 2=No 
change and 3=Decrease) 
Q.5---Alternative energy 
beneficial/harmful to environment  
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 
3=Harmful) 
<0.001     
(-0.21, 0.21) 
-0.11     
(-0.33, 0.10) 
0.11     
(-0.10, 0.33) 
0.15     
(-0.07, 0.36) 
-0.04     
(-0.26, 0.18) 
0.19     
(-0.03, 0.40) 
Q.6---Alternative energy 
beneficial/harmful to economy 
(1=Beneficial 2=Neither and 
3=Harmful) 
-0.03   
(-0.30, 0.24) 
-0.07     
(-0.34, 0.20) 
0.04     
(-0.22, 0.31) 
0.38*      
(0.11, 0.64) 
0.10     
(-0.16, 0.37) 
0.27*      
(0.002, 0.54) 
Q.7---Increase gas tax to support 
alternative energy research 
(1=Definitely support through 
4=Definitely not support) 
0.02     
(-0.41, 0.45) 
-0.27     
(-0.69, 0.16) 
0.29     
(-0.14, 0.72) 
-0.14     
(-0.57, 0.29) 
-0.10     
(-0.53, 0.33) 





Short-term News Exposure and Information Card Reception 
Regression models were fitted on dependent variable questions and the scale 
separately. The results are shown in Table A-28 through A-30 in Appendix V. Viewing a 
news story about alternative energy is found to influence the opinions of the participants 
on this issue. However, it is found that viewing the story in support of alternative energy 
actually would decrease the general support for this type of energy (support for 
alternative energy scale, β=0.15 and p-value=0.03). It would also make the participants 
less likely to say that the government should increase incentives to develop alternative 
energy (Question 3, β=0.09 and p-value=0.06), and less likely to say that alternative 
energy is beneficial to the environment or the economy (Question 5, β=0.08 and p-
value=0.03; Question 6, β=0.10 and p-value=0.03). 
Subjects who viewed the information cards demonstrate consistent, although not 
always significant, lower favorability or support of alternative energy. Such an effect is 
significant on the alternative energy support scale (β=0.69 and p-value=0.01), opinions of 
whether alternative energy is beneficial to the environment (Question 5, β=0.63 and p-
value <0.0001), and of increasing the gas tax to support the related research (Question 7, 
β=0.79 and p-value <0.0001). Given the news content examined more closely in the 
univariate analysis, this set of findings is reasonable.  
Significant interaction effect of the news story and information cards is only 
found for the opinion of whether the gas tax should be increased to support alternative 
energy research (Question 7, β=0.21 and p-value=0.06), but not for all of the other 
opinion questions. The positive sign of the coefficient suggests that among those who 
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viewed the positive news about alternative energy, those who read the information cards 
show less support for such a proposal compared to those who did not read the cards. That 
is, those with information cards are more likely to show a larger effect from the news. 
Similarly, among those who viewed the negative news about the reform, those who read 
the information cards are less likely to oppose such a proposal. This effect contradicts 
Hypothesis 2 that specific information tends to mitigate the effect of the news story. The 
effect from the news story tends to be strengthened among those who have more specific 
information.  
This finding is consistent with that in the first experiment on the North Korean 
nuclear threat. It’s also true that the moderating effect of information is not significant 
across all of the opinion questions asked in the study. This indicates that the context of 
the opinion questions is relevant as well in discussing the moderating role of specific 
information.  
 
Long-term Information and General Political Knowledge Acquired 
Longer-term information acquired about the alternative energy leads to more 
support of this energy source (alternative energy scale, β=-0.62 and p-value <0.0001), 
more likely to think that such energy is a better source (Question 2, β=-0.27 and p-
value=0.07), that the government should increase the support to develop it (Question 3, 
β=-0.41 and p-value <0.0001), and that alternative energy is beneficial to the 
environment (Question 8, β=-0.41 and p-value <0.0001).  
Those who have higher levels of general political knowledge are also found more 
likely to say that the government should decrease the support for traditional energy 
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(Question 4, β=-0.25 and p-value=0.09), and that alternative energy is beneficial to the 
environment (Question 5, β=-0.31 and p-value<0.0001); They are also more likely to say 
that the traditional energy would sustain long rather than running out soon (Question 1, 
β=0.20 and p-value=0.02). 
 
Issue Salience, Media Exposure, Issues News Following and Discussion 
Issue salience tends to increase the support for traditional energy sources and at 
the same time decrease the support for alternative energy sources. The positive 
coefficient for the issue salience scale in the regression for alternative energy support 
scale indicates that those who think this issue is more salient are less likely to support 
alternative energy (β=0.44 and p-value <0.0001). At the same time, the positive 
coefficient for this variable in the regression for traditional energy support indicates that 
those who feel that this issue is more salient are more likely to support traditional energy 
(β=0.20 and p-value <0.0001). This is because on the traditional energy scale, higher 
scores mean more support.   
Similarly, those who feel that this issue is more salient are more likely to think 
that traditional energy will sustain long (Question 1, β=0.10 and p-value <0.0001), that 
alternative energy is more similar to even not as good as traditional energy (Question 2, 
β=0.27 and p-value <0.0001). They are also more likely to say that the government 
should decrease the incentive to support alternative energy research (Question 3, β=0.22 
and p-value <0.0001) and increase incentives to support traditional energy research 
(Question 4, β=0.12 and p-value <0.0001). They are also less likely to feel that 
alternative energy is beneficial (Question 5, β=0.17 and p-value <0.0001) to the 
 
 110 
environment or the economy (Question 6, β=0.24 and p-value <0.0001). In addition, they 
are less likely to support increasing gas tax for alternative energy research (Question 7, 
β=0.18 and p-value <0.0001)  
Again, general media exposure does not significantly influence respondents’ 
opinions on this issue, which is similar to the findings in the previous two experiments. 
Nor does the extent of following the news coverage or participation in discussion of this 
issue make any difference on the issue opinions.  
 
Self-evaluation of Information Cards and News Story’s Impact 
Self-evaluation of whether the news story about alternative energy affects one’s 
own opinion is only significantly related to the support of this type of energy (alternative 
energy support scale, β=-0.15 and p=0.02). The negative sign of the coefficient indicate 
that those who think the news story has more effect on their own opinions tend to support 
alternative energy more. On the other hand, whether or not the participants think that the 
story would affect other people’s opinions about alternative energy is not found to have a 
significant yet opposite impact on the general support scale (β=0.15 and p=0.02). This 
suggests that the more likely one thinks the news story has an impact on other people’s 
opinions, the less support he or she feels for alternative energy research. Such a pattern 
for the impact of a news story on one’s own opinion and others’ opinions is also found 
for the support of government incentives to develop alternative energy research (Question 
3, β=-0.12 and p=0.02; β=0.11 and p=0.01) and for the support of an increase in the gas 
tax to subsidize the research (Question 7, β=-0.25 and p <0.0001; β=0.19 and p=0.01). 
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Those who think that the information cards are informative to the issue of 
alternative energy research are more likely to support this energy in general (alternative 
energy support scale, β=-0.09 and p=0.04). They are more likely to think that traditional 
energy will run out soon (Question 1, β=-0.20 and p=0.04) and to support this type of 
energy (Question 3, β=-0.11 and p=0.06). They are also more likely to think that 
alternative energy is beneficial to the environment and support increasing the gas tax for 
alternative energy research (Question 5, β=-0.13 and p<0.0001; Question 7, β=-0.20 and 
p=0.04). 
Those who think that the information cards are relevant to the issue of alternative 
energy are also found to be more likely to think it is beneficial to the environment 
(Question 5, β=-0.07 and p<0.08).  
 
Political Predispositions 
Republicans are more likely to support alternative energy (the scale, β=-0.08 and 
p=0.10; and Question 4, β=-0.07 and p=0.04). They are also more likely to think that 
alternative energy is beneficial to the environment (Question 5, β=-0.07 and p=0.01).   
Political ideology has a consistently significant impact on the opinions about 
alternative energy. The more liberal a respondent is, the more favorable he or she feels 
about alternative energy (general alternative energy support scale, β=0.20 and p<0.0001; 
traditional energy support scale, β=0.09 and p=0.06). They are more likely to think that 
traditional energy will run out soon (Question 1, β=0.07 and p <0.0001), that alternative 
energy is a better source of energy (Question 3, β=0.13 and p <0.0001). They are also 
more likely to feel that alternative energy is beneficial (Question 5, β=0.05 and p-value = 
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0.01) to the environment or the economy (Question 6, β=0.10 and p-value <0.0001). In 
addition, they are less likely to support increasing the gas tax for alternative energy 
research (Question 7, β=0.18 and p-value <0.0001)  
Those who are more interested in politics in general are more likely to be less 
supportive of alternative energy (general favorability scale, β=-0.17 and p=0.01), and are 
less likely to think alternative energy is better than traditional energy (Questions 2, β=-
0.19 and p<0.0001). In addition, they are less likely to think that alternative energy 
research is beneficial to the environment (Question 5, β=-0.07 and p=0.07) or the 
economy (Question 6, β=-0.12 and p=0.01). 
 
Demographic Variables 
Gender is not found to be significantly related to opinions about alternative 
energy. Whites are the most likely to support alternative energy as compared to other 
races (general alternative energy support scale, β=0.06 and p=0.07). They are also most 
likely to think that traditional energy is going to run out soon (Question 1, β=0.05 and 
p=0.01) and that alternative energy is a better source of energy (Question 2, β=0.06 and 
p=0.01). 
Higher education is significantly related to lower support for traditional energy 
(traditional energy scale, β=-0.12 and p=0.02) and to thinking that the government should 
decrease incentives for it (Question 4, β=-0.09 and p=0.02). Older participants are found 
to be more likely to support traditional energy (traditional energy scale, β=0.11 and p 
<0.0001). They are also more likely to think that traditional energy will last long rather 
than running out soon (Question 1, β=0.05 and p <0.0001) and that alternative energy is 
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not better than the traditional one (Question 2, β=0.06 and p=0.01). Wealthier 
participants are more likely to support the government to increase incentives for 
alternative energy research (Question 4, β=0.05 and p=0.05). 
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Summary of Results from the Three Experiments 
 The results from the panel data analysis and the analysis of data collected from 
the post-test sample of the three experiments in this dissertation are briefly summarized 
in the Summary Table of Results in Appendix V. These results provide the following 
general observations about news media effects, issue-specific information effects, and the 
impact of their interactions on issue opinions. Effects of other covariates in the three 
experiments, such as general media exposure, political predisposition, and demographic 
variables are also summarized in this table for easy reference. 
 First of all, short-term exposure to issue news coverage is found to affect issue 
opinions in the three experiments. Even though such effects are not significant on all of 
the opinion questions asked in each study, there is a pattern that suggests exposure to 
news stories that have positive issue positions tend to lead the audience to feel more 
positive about the issue. Those who view news stories of negative issue positions are 
more likely to have opinions leaning toward the issue positions in the news as well. This 
is true for at least a few opinion questions in both the North Korean nuclear study and the 
Health Care Reform study, either through the univariate analysis, the multivariate 
regression analysis, or the panel analysis. Thus, we find some empirical support for 
Hypothesis 1 that exposure to issue coverage in the news has some association with the 
issue position an individual has.  
News effects in the alternative energy study seem to be exceptions at first glance. 
It seems that the issue positions in the news and the opinion positions held by the 
participants after viewing the news are in the opposite direction. A closer look at the 
news story presented in the study reveals that the effects from the news stories are 
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actually in line with certain specific aspects or frames in the news. Thus, what Hypothesis 
1 predicts about news effect of stories about alternative energy research is also supported.  
 Secondly, short-term issue-specific information, provided by information cards in 
each study, does not have influence on issue opinions through univariate analysis. This 
conclusion is true in all three studies. In the multivariate and panel analysis, short-term 
information still does not have a significant effect on the attitudes about the North Korean 
nuclear threat. However, information cards have some effect on the opinions about health 
care reform and alternative energy.  
This is not an intended effect of the study design. It could be due to the fact that 
the information cards in the North Korean nuclear study are not only factual but also not 
directly related to opinions about the nuclear threat. The information cards in the other 
two studies, however, contain some arguments about both sides of the issues, which may 
lead to some direct effects on the issue opinions. Preferably, such a design of the 
information cards should be avoided in future studies, so that information cards only 
provide factual issue information without directly affecting opinions.  
Longer-term issue-specific information acquired over time and during the current 
experiment is associated with issue opinions of the North Korean nuclear threat and 
alternative energy. There is also such a trend in the health care reform study, even though 
not statistically significant.  
 In the North Korean nuclear study, specific information acquired over the long 
run makes the participants feel that the country is more of a threat. In the health care 
reform study, those with more specific information tend to think that health care reform is 
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beneficial to the American people. In the alternative energy study, those who have more 
specific information are more likely to be supportive of this type of energy.  
These observed effects of specific information are after controlling for general 
political knowledge. They strongly suggest that political knowledge is only part of the 
story that needs to be told about issue opinion formation and change. Specific 
information has additional power in explaining and predicting public opinions. 
Sometimes, information and knowledge influence opinions in a similar way. For example, 
those with more information or more knowledge are both more likely to feel that North 
Korea is more of a threat. In other circumstances, such as in the alternative energy study, 
information and knowledge even have quite different impacts on the same opinion 
construct. Those who are more informed are more likely to support alternative energy, 
while those who are more knowledgeable feel the opposite way.  
 Thirdly, as for the interaction effects from short-term news exposure and issue-
specific information, i.e. the moderating effect of information on news exposure, it is 
discovered that the evidence for the hypotheses in this dissertation is mixed, depending 
on the issue and the opinion question. No significant interaction effect is found in the 
univariate or panel data analysis in the three experiments. 
In the multivariate analysis, the interaction effect on the opinion of whether North 
Korea poses a threat to other countries (Question 4) is in the opposite direction of what 
Hypothesis 1b and 2b predict. After viewing the stories, those who are provided with 
more specific information have more agreement with the respective issue position in the 
news. This is also the case for Question 8, whether peace talks are a possible solution to 
this issue. The findings contradict Hypothesis 1b and 2b. Those who viewed a threat story 
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and received information cards are even less likely to feel that peace talks are a solution 
than those who viewed the same story but did not receive any cards, thus contradicting 
Hypothesis 1. Similarly, of those who viewed a threat eased story, individuals who 
received information cards are also more likely to feel that peace talks are a solution than 
those who did not receive any additional information, thus contradicting Hypothesis 2.  
 In the Health Care Reform study, Hypothesis 2 regarding the moderating role of 
information, is confirmed for favorability of a system that everyone in the U.S. has health 
insurance coverage (Question 2). 
For the findings in the alternative energy study, a significant interaction effect of 
news story and information cards is only found for the opinion of whether the gas tax 
should be increased to support alternative energy research (Question 7), but not for the 
other opinion questions. This effect also contradicts Hypothesis 1 that specific 
information tends to mitigate the effect of the news story. Those who have more specific 




Chapter 6  
CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION 
 There is little doubt that the social, political, and cultural implications of media 
communication have great significance in both daily discussions and academic research. 
The main scientific goal of mass communication studies is to investigate and demonstrate 
whether, when, and how such communication influences the attitudes, opinions or 
behavior of its audience.  
 In the specific area of political communication, the news media, identified 
sometimes as the fourth estate (Schultz, 1998) in a democratic political system, tend to 
have at least some influence on how much the public learns about politics (Chaffee, 
1997). The scientific evidence with regard to the impact of media messages on opinions 
and attitudes, on the other hand, is less consistent (McGuire, 1986; Byrant and 
Zillmerman, 1994).  
At the same time, attitudes and opinions matter in all aspects of personal, social, 
and political life. Elections of public officials are simply the behavioral expressions of 
which candidates the public or the voters prefer (Lavine, 2001; Shah, Watts, Domke, Fan, 
& Fibison, 1999). Public opinion matters in many cases of policy making (Burstein, 
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2003). In the commercial realm, whether or not consumers like a certain product or 
service determines, to a great extent, the viability of a business entity.  
 The advent and development of modern mass media have certainly brought 
particular experiences for attitudes and opinions. It is natural and significant for scholars 
and lay persons to think about and theorize whether and how such experiences can affect 
the formation and change of attitudes and opinions. The sheer amount and proportion of 
studies in mass communication research and related fields on this topic (Neuman & 
Guggenheim, 2009) suggest that this intriguing research question is probably one of the 
most important questions of the field.  
This dissertation tries to build upon this line of research literature by linking the 
opinion formation and change process and the influence of the mass media through the 
construct of issue information, i.e., how much the public knows about a specific political 
topic. It tests the moderating effect of such information on the media’s impact on 
opinions using three public issues: the North Korean nuclear threat, health care reform, 
and alternative energy research.  
The constructs proposed and tested in previous literature, such as political 
knowledge, issue obtrusiveness or proximity, and impersonal influence have provided 
insights for the varying magnitude of media effects either at the individual difference 
level or at the issue level. The theory and empirical tests in this dissertation aim to 
provide a unifying theoretical explanation for media effects at both levels, so that we can 
improve our understanding and predictions about media effects.  
Three experiments conducted in this dissertation test the theory proposed in this 
study about the moderating role of issue specific information on media effects, using the 
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issue of the North Korean nuclear program, health care reform, and alternative energy 
research, respectively. In each experiment, both exposure to news stories about the issue 
and how much specific information the study participants have were manipulated. About 
420 subjects completed the post-test questionnaire in each experiment. Among these 
participants, about 100 also filled out the pre-test questionnaire for each study. Another 
group of 90 or so subjects only completed the pre-test portion of each study. Within each 
experiment, participants were randomly assigned to the experimental and the control 
groups. The degree of agreement with issue opinion positions presented in the news for 
post-test only subjects or the change of agreement for panel subjects is compared among 
the experimental groups after manipulation in each experiment.  
The findings as detailed in the previous chapter provide the following general 
observations about news media effects, issue-specific information effects, and the impact 
of their interactions on issue opinions. First of all, short-term exposure to issue news 
coverage affects issue opinions. Even though such effects are not significant on all of the 
opinion questions asked in each study, there is a pattern that exposure to news stories 
tends to lead the opinions of the audience in the same or opposite direction as compared 
to the relevant issue position in the news. In experimental settings where the exposure to 
news content is more certain than in natural settings and where the news message can be 
designed to be one directional, we can clearly observe some short term news effects. This 
finding is consistent with what the previous literature on media effects has found (e.g. 
(Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1982; Iyengar & Simon, 1993). It also provides some 
evidence to contradict that the media may have very little effect (Klapper, 1960; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). As some scholars have pointed out, the mystery 
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of media effects that no direct effects are observed simply suggests that sometimes the 
instrument we use to measure them is not appropriate or precise enough.  
Secondly, the findings about the direct impact of short-term issue-specific 
information on issue opinions are mixed. Even though this study does not intend to 
design the information cards as to have direct impact on opinions, information 
nevertheless has such effects, especially when the information cards have some 
arguments for either side of the issues. In designing future studies, such arguments are 
preferably avoided in the specific information provided so that tests can be more precise 
about whether factual issue information would affect opinions.  
The findings in this dissertation with regard to issue-specific information acquired 
over time, within or outside of the study context, suggest that it is not a construct that can 
be easily dismissed from future research on attitudes and opinions. In fact, unlike what is 
suggested by a few studies (e.g. Zaller, 1992l; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) that general 
knowledge or awareness well captures the effect of specific information, findings in this 
dissertation show that specific information acquired tends to influence the opinions held 
by individuals, even after controlling for general political knowledge. Sometimes, such 
influence is in the same direction as general knowledge. Sometimes, it is in the opposite 
direction. This finding is also in line with what Iyengar (1986) finds about the relation 
between political knowledge and information as not always consistent.  
It may be the case that general political knowledge or awareness measures are 
simpler to use in the sense that they can be measured using the same set of questions to 
predict issue opinions no matter what issue is involved. Information measurement, on the 
other hand, has to be issue specific or at least issue domain specific. This may pose a 
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challenge as to how to use the information construct as one has to come up with specific 
measures whenever the issue or issue domain changes. However, the potential difficulty 
in measurement does not warrant the dismissal of this construct in theory building about 
media effects. The empirical findings in this study also suggest that specific information 
can refine our prediction about news effects in addition to general political knowledge.  
 Thirdly, as for the interaction effects from short-term news exposure and issue-
specific information, i.e. the moderating effect of information, the results presented here 
show that the evidence for the hypotheses in this dissertation is rather mixed after 
controlling for the relevant covariates. The direction and size of such moderating effect 
depend upon the issue, how the issue is framed in the news, and the specific opinion 
questions asked.  
For example, the interaction effect on the opinion of whether North Korea poses a 
threat to other countries (Question 4 in Experiment 1) is in the opposite direction of what 
Hypothesis 1b and 2b predict. After viewing the stories, those who are provided with 
more specific information about North Korea have more agreement with the respective 
issue position in the news. Similarly for Question 8, whether peace talks are a possible 
solution to this issue, the findings also contradict Hypothesis 1b and 2b. Those who 
viewed a threat story and received information cards are even less likely to feel that peace 
talks are a solution than those who viewed the same story but did not receive any cards. 
Of those who viewed a threat eased story, individuals who received information cards are 
also more likely to feel that peace talks are a solution than those did not receive any 
additional information.  
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 In the Health Care Reform study, Hypothesis 2 regarding the moderating role of 
information is confirmed for favorability of a system that everyone in the U.S. has health 
insurance coverage (Question 2), but not for other opinion questions. 
For the findings in the alternative energy study, there is a significant interaction 
effect of news story and information cards on the opinion of whether the gas tax should 
be increased to support alternative energy research (Question 7). However, there is no 
such effect found for the other opinion questions. This effect also contradicts Hypothesis 
2 that specific information tends to mitigate the effect of the news story. Those who have 
more specific information tend to show stronger effect from media communication.  
Overall, the empirical testing demonstrates some support for the theory proposed 
in this dissertation about the moderating impact of specific information on news media 
effects. Even though there are some inconsistencies with regard to the direction, 
magnitude, and how wide spread such effects are, the evidence from this study surely 
supports the argument that specific issue information is a construct that has the potential 
to improve the theory building in media effects and public opinion research. Future 
studies may use news stories about different public issues or even promotional messages 
in political or commercial campaigns. They may also use a different study design such as 
natural experiments. However, this dissertation provides an initial theoretical proposal 
and empirical assessment with promising findings that lay the ground for future research 
that can address some of these issues in the theory building and empirical testing of the 
moderating effects of specific information.  
 Even though this dissertation has significant findings with regard to the impact of 
issue specific information on news effect, it is only the beginning of an effort taken to 
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understand the complicated yet intriguing question of opinion formation and change. The 
foremost limitation of the current study is the level of testing that has been done. The 
theory in this dissertation provides a theoretical and conceptual possibility to explain the 
size of news effect on both the individual level and the issue level. However, this study 
has only tested the individual level differences in information. Testing the issue level 
differences will show with empirical evidence, in addition to the logical arguments 
provided in this dissertation, whether the theory can explain differences in the magnitude 
of media effects on the issue level.  
 Secondly, the moderating impact of information is only tested in experimental 
settings. This has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, experimental 
settings make it possible to manipulate news exposure and information reception. Effects 
from the manipulations may be examined immediately after without too much concern 
about “noise” in the news environment or the decay of effects over time. On the other 
hand, only using this one study design to test the theory raises a few issues, such as  
artificial environment and limited generalizability to the general population.  
On the bright side though, as learning about information or the effect from any 
news story may take more than simply one time of exposure, the results about media 
effects and informational effects are thus possibly conservative. Repetition and intensity 
of the news messages and the issue specific information are probably important factors 
that may influence the process of acquiring information, forming or changing opinions. In 
the context of the experiments conducted in this dissertation, media messages about the 
three topics were only presented once among other news stories, while in the real media 
environment, an issue of similar importance in the public agenda usually receives 
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repetitive coverage and through a wide variety of media outlets. With such repetition, it is 
possible that stronger news effect could be found with a different study design. This may 
facilitate the detection of the moderating impact of issue specific information. A natural 
experiment, for example, that carefully utilizes the difference in media coverage of an 
issue topic in different regions may address the lack of repetition in news exposure.  
 In addition, the empirical testing of this study only uses news stories about public 
issues. Media stimuli are not limited to this type of messages for testing the theory 
proposed. Further testing of the theory in future studies can also use promotional 
messages for issues, political candidates or even commercial products. These messages 
have more pronounced positions on issues, candidates or products than news stories. It is 
interesting and important to test if the moderating effect of specific information would be 
different when strictly one-sided promotional messages are shown to the audience. Such 
tests would greatly increase the explanatory power of the theory for messages 
communicated through the media in general rather than only in the public affairs area.  
 Last but not least, the concept of information is conceptualized in this dissertation 
as the amount of facts that an individual has toward a certain topic in the media. The way 
it is operationalized certainly leaves room for improvement in future studies, especially in 
studies with different designs. Providing information cards to participants in the 
experiments provides some assurance that the participants receive these facts. However, 
there are obvious problems associated with such an operationalization.  
For example, the amount of information provided may not be enough so that we 
can only observe the moderating impact of information conservatively. With only a short 
time period for the participants to learn about these facts, the effect from it may be quite 
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different than the effects from learning and accumulating information in natural settings. 
Natural experiments and survey studies may address these two concerns. In addition, 
consulting expert opinions may be helpful for designing the information cards provided 
for different issues and thus facilitates the theory testing by providing the audience or the 
study participants with more relevant information.  
 It will also be greatly helpful in future studies to ask more questions in order to 
measure issue specific information levels. Indirect measures of information acquired in 
the daily lives of the public may also be included. For example, differences in profession, 
career or social network may have an influence on how much an individual knows about 
certain issues. Measures in these areas can provide a different dimension for the 
measurement of the information construct. The design of such questions is challenging as 
what questions are relevant and necessary to be asked may very well depend on the issues 
discussed in the news media message. For example, if we would like to examine the 
magnitude of effects from exposing to the news about the sub prime mortgage issue, the 
questions asked may be quite different from if we would examine the news effects about 
environmental issues.  
Even though information is provided to the subjects in this dissertation, it is not 
suggested that issue opinions should necessarily be measured through deliberation 
(Fishkin, 1991). The information cards only act as a way to measure and manipulate the 
information condition in the experiments. In future studies, using different designs to test 
the theory proposed in this dissertation, issue opinions can certainly be well measured as 
existed through regular public opinion polls. 
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In closing, I am still very intrigued by how the public would react to a series of 
reports about a new issue or reports about a renewed issue. It seems that only a program 
of well-designed studies can address this question. With answers we draw from multiple 
studies, it may be possible to put together a map that can provide the directions and the 






I. Information Cards 
For Experiment 1 on North Korea Nuclear Threat 
Card 1. Geographic Location and Size of North Korea 
North Korea is located in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula in Eastern 
Asian. It borders with South Korea, China and Russia. The area of North Korea is 
120,540 sq km. The other five countries in the Six-Party Talks are South Korea, Japan, 
Russia, China and the U.S. The following table lists the relative sizes of these five 
countries as compared to North Korea.  
Country 
Geographic Area Compared to 
North Korea 
South Korea 0.8 times 
Japan 3 times 
Russia 142 times 
China 80 times 



















Card 3. Historical Relations between North Korea and other Countries in the Six-Party  
Talks 
 
An independent kingdom for much of its long history, Korea was occupied by 
Japan in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, Japan formally 
annexed the entire peninsula.  
Following World War II, Korea was split into northern and southern halves 
sponsored by the Soviet Union and the U.S. respectively. Even after the fierce fighting 
during the Korean Ward from 1950 to 1953, the Korean peninsula failed to become 
unified for both sides, the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern portion 
and North Korea (DPRK) backed by Soviet Union and China.  
After the war, North Korea adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and 
economic "self-reliance." There is no official diplomatic relations between North Korea 
and Japan since 1945. The U.S. has maintained economic sanctions against North Korea 
for nearly fifty years. On the other hand, North Korea generally maintains a closer 







Male Manpower Fit for 
Military Compared to 
North Korea 
North Korea 1 times 1 times 
South Korea 30 times 2.1 times 
Japan 108 times 4.6 times 
Russia 52 times 6.0 times 
China 176 times 48.0 times 
U.S. 344 times 11.6 times 
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For Experiment 2 on Health Care Reform 
Card 1. Health Care in the U.S. 
In 2007, the U.S. spent $2.26 trillion on health care, or $7,439 per person, up from 
$2.1 trillion, or $7,026 per capita, the previous year. Spending in 2006 represented 16% 
of GDP, an increase of 6.7% over 2004 spending. Growth in spending is projected to 
average 6.7% annually over the period 2007 through 2017.  
However, the U.S. is the leader in medical innovation, with three times higher 
per-capita spending than Europe and producing more new pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, and affiliated biotechnology than any other country. The U.S. also has higher 
survival rates than most other countries for certain conditions, such as some less common 
cancers, but has a higher infant mortality rate than all other developed countries.  
In terms of health insurance costs, they are rising faster than wages or inflation, 
and medical causes were cited by about half of bankruptcy filers in the United States in 
2001. Acording to U.S. Census Bureau, in 2007, 45.7 million people in the U.S. (15.3% 
of the population) were without health insurance for at least part of the year.  
 
Card 2. American’s Affordable Health Choice Act of 2009 
 President Obama’s American’s Affordable Health Choice Act of 2009 proposes to 
achieve three goals. Firstly, it proposes to provide more security to those who have health 
insurance. To achieve this goal, it is proposed that legislations be passed such as capping 
out-of-pocket medical expenses and preventing insurance companies from discriminating 
pr-existing conditions or dropping coverage when people need it most. Secondly, it 
proposes to provide insurance to those who don’t have health insurance, mostly by 
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offering a public insurance option as well as tax credits for those who are uninsured to 
buy affordable coverage. Thirdly, it proposes to lower the cost of health care by reducing 
waste and fraud in the health care system. The cost of this proposed reform is projected to 
be 1.6 trillion dollars in the next 10 years. 
 
Card 3. The Health Care Reform Debate 
Free-market advocates claim that there is direct correlation between government's 
intervention in the health care market and increases in health care costs. Government 
intervention removes the patient as a major participant in the financial and medical 
choices that affect costs. Low reimbursement rates for Medicare and Medicaid have 
increased cost-shifting pressures on hospitals and doctors, who charge higher rates for the 
same services to private payers, which eventually affects health insurance rates.  
On the other hand, advocates for single-payer health care or some form of public 
insurance option, such as Physicians for a National Health Program, the American 
Medical Student Association and the California Nurses Association, believe that the 
profit motive is the biggest threat in health care. It leads to for-profit insurance companies 
applying high deductibles, high co-pays, and refusing to fund pre-existing conditions. 
Rescinding policies or denying care by private insurance corporations after perhaps a 
lifetime of premium payments is, in their view, an abuse of corporate power against 
people who are sometimes too ill to stand up for their rights.  
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For Experiment 3 on Alternative Energy Research 
Card 1. World Energy Resources and Consumptions  
As indicated in the following graph of World Energy Usage Composition of 2006, 
the “traditional” energies still comprises the majority source (85%) of energy 
consumptions, with oil contributing 37%, coal 25% and gas 23%. Nuclear and biomass 
energies make up another 10% of the consumptions, with 6% from nuclear and 4% from 
biomass sources. Energy produced through hydro sources contributes another 3% to the 
world energy consumption. Alternative energies such as solar, wind, geothermal, and 
solar photovoltaic provide for about 2% of energy consumptions.  
 
 
Card 2. Sustainability of Traditional Energy 
The American Petroleum Institute estimated in 1999 the world's oil supply would 
be depleted between 2062 and 2094. In 2004, total world reserves were estimated to be 
1.25 trillion barrels and daily consumption was about 85 million barrels, shifting the 
estimated oil depletion year to 2057, which is close to 50 years from now.   
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However, a prediction of when the fossil fuel based energy will run out is very 
difficult simply because we do not know whether there will be new discoveries of these 
fuels. Nor can we estimate precisely how quickly we will use such fuels in the future.  
 
Card 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative Energy Sources 
 Please read the following table for the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative energy sources.  






High initial cost 
 
Wind Energy 
Moderate initial and 
low operate cost 
Best alternative 
for  homeowners 
Zero pollution 
Highly variable source 






Low cost  
High initial cost 
High dependency on 
location and landscape 
Geothermal 
Energy 
Very high efficiency 
Low initial cost  






For Information Card Control Conditions 
Card 1. Geographic Sizes of G8 (the Group of Eight) countries 
The Group of Eight (G8) is an international forum for the governments of Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Together, these countries represent about 65% of the world economy. The G8 can refer to 
the member states or to the annual summit meeting of the G8 heads of government.  
Country 
Geographic Area Compared to 
the U.S. 
Canada 1.02 times 
France 0.065 times 
Germany 0.036 times 
Italy 0.031 times 
Japan 0.038 times 
Russia 1.74 times 
United Kingdom 0.025 times 
U.S. 1 times 
 





Male Manpower Fit 
for Military Service 
Compared to the U.S. 
Canada 0.092 times 0.12 times 
France 0.15 times 0.20 times 
Germany 0.21 times 0.28 times 
Italy 0.13 times 0.20 times 
Japan 0.32 times 0.33 times 
Russia 0.15 times 0.52 times 
United Kingdom 0.16 times 0.22 times 
U.S. 1 times 1 times 
 
Card 3. History of G8 
The concept of a forum for the world's major industrialized countries emerged 
following the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent global recession. In 1974 the United States 
created the Library Group, an informal gathering of senior financial officials from the 
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United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan and France. In 1975, French 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing invited the heads of government from West Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States to a summit in Rambouillet. The 
six leaders agreed to an annual meeting organized under a rotating presidency, forming 
the Group of Six (G6). The following year, Canada joined the group at the behest of U.S. 
President Gerald Ford, and the group became known as the Group of Seven (G7). The 
Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Russia became the 
successor state. At the initiative of United States President Bill Clinton, Russia formally 
joined the group in 1997, resulting in the Group of Eight (G8). 
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II. Survey Questionnaires 
 For each experiment in this dissertation, there are two sets of questionnaires, pre-
test and post-test. For pre-test in each experiment, there are two versions. The first 
version has the information cards for the relevant issue for the experiment. The second 
version has the information cards for the control condition, i.e. about G8 countries.  
There are six versions of the post-test questionnaire in each experiment. Three of 
them have the information cards about the specific issue, each of which has a different 
link to the three versions of TV news video used in the experiment. The other three 
questionnaires are almost identical with the first three questionnaires except that the 
information cards in them are about G8 countries.  
 The pre- and post-questionnaires also differ in the following ways. The pre-test 
questionnaires do not have news video stimuli embedded. They also don’t have questions 
regarding the effect of the issue news stories on oneself and on others. In addition, 
questions about demographics are only asked in the post-tests but not the pre-tests. 
 In this appendix, only one version of the post-test questionnaire is provided as 
most of the content and questions are the same among all the versions. Please refer to 
Chapter 4 and the above paragraph with regard to the differences in the questionnaires 
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News & Opinions of Current Affairs Survey 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
First, we would like you to read the following three information cards about an issue in the news these 
days. Please read them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the questionnaire, as it is an 
important part of this study. Thank you so much. 
 


















Page 1 - Heading  
We would now like you to view two news stories of current affairs by following the link below. Please 
watch them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the questionnaire, as it is an important part of 
this study.  
It takes a few seconds for the video to load after you click on the link. The entire video is about three and a 
half minutes in duration. Thank you so much. 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
http://www.umich.edu/~yingq/News/v1.html 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Now, please continue to complete a questionnaire for this study. Thank you so much for your time and 
efforts. 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
The U.S. has been thought of as the world leader. In the current time of general world peace and some 
regional conflicts, we’d like to get your feelings about a few countries in the news. We’d like you to rate 
how much of a friend or foe each country is to the U.S. using the feeling thermometer. You can choose any 
number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more friendly you feel they are to the 
US. The lower the number, the colder or less friendly they are. 
 
Page 1 - Question 1 - Open Ended - One Line  
Using the feeling thermometer, where 0 is very unfriendly and 100 is very friendly, how friendly or 
unfriendly do you think Great Britain is to the U.S.? 
 
 
Page 1 - Question 2 - Open Ended - One Line  
Using the feeling thermometer, where 0 is very unfriendly and 100 is very friendly, how friendly or 
unfriendly do you think China is to the U.S.? 
 
 
Page 1 - Question 3 - Open Ended - One Line  
Using the feeling thermometer, where 0 is very unfriendly and 100 is very friendly, how friendly or 
unfriendly do you think North Korea is to the U.S.? 
 
 
Page 1 - Question 4 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement that North Korea poses a nuclear threat to countries such as the 
U.S., South Korea, China, Russia or Japan? 
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 




Page 1 - Question 5 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement that North Korea is a danger to world peace? 
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 6 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think that North Korea has a real intention to use its nuclear power to strike countries such as the 
U.S, South Korea, Japan, China, or Russia, or do you think North Korea is using its nuclear power to 
threaten these countries to get more financial assistance? 
 
 North Korea has a real intention to use its nuclear power to strike any countries. 
 North Korea is using its nuclear power to threaten these countries to get more financial assistance. 
 Both 
 Neither 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 7 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement that North Korea poses a nuclear threat to other countries in 
the world because it will be involved in nuclear arms dealership? 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
Page 1 - Question 8 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





 Hard to say 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 9 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of North Korean nuclear threat, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
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 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 10 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 11 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of North Korean nuclear threat, do you think it affects you personally or it does 
not affect you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 12 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it affects you personally or it does not affect 
you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 13 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of North Korean nuclear threat is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 14 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
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 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 15 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of North Korean nuclear threat is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 16 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 17 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How much, if at all, do you worry about future terrorist attacks against the United States? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 18 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about North Korea nuclear threat just now, how much do you think what’s 
presented in the news would affect your opinion about North Korea? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 19 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about North Korea nuclear threat just now, how much do you think what’s 
presented in the news would affect other people’s opinions about North Korea? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
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 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 20 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how informative 
would you say that they are about the North Korean nuclear issue? 
 
 Greatly informative 
 Somewhat informative 
 Not very informative 
 Not informative at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 21 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how relevant would 
you say that they are to your opinion about the North Korean nuclear issue? 
 
 Greatly relevant 
 Somewhat relevant 
 Not very relevant 
 Not relevant at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 22 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself 
 
 Strongly Democrat 
 Moderately Democrat 
 Strongly Republican 
 Moderately Republican 
 Independent 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 23 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Would you consider yourself 
 
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal 
 Moderate, middle of the road 
 Slightly conservative 
 Conservative 
 Extremely conservative 




Page 1 - Question 24 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How would you describe your interest in politics in general? Would you say you are very much interested 
in politics, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all? 
 
 Very much interested 
 Somewhat interested 
 Hardly interested at all 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 25 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you watch the news on TV? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 26 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you read a daily newspaper? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 27 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you listen to the news on the radio? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 




Page 1 - Question 28 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you read or watch the news on the Internet (online)? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Next, we would like to ask about whether you follow the news about a few issues. Not everyone will 
have followed these news stories. How about you? 
 
Page 1 - Question 29 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about North Korean nuclear issue? 
 
 Very closely 
 Closely 
 Not very closely 
 Do not follow at all 
 
Page 1 - Question 30 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about health care reform? 
 
 Very closely 
 Closely 
 Not very closely 
 Do not follow at all 
 
Page 2 - Question 31 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know in terms of its geographic size, how much larger is the U.S. as compared to North 
Korea? 
 
 The U.S. is 100 times larger than North Korea. 
 The U.S. is 50 times larger than North Korea. 
 The U.S. is 10 times larger than North Korea. 
 The U.S. is 2 times larger than North Korea. 
 The U.S. is about the same size as North Korea. 




Page 2 - Question 32 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know when North Korea started to conduct nuclear tests? Was it 
 
 In the 1980s 
 In the 1990s 
 After the year of 2000 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 33 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know whether North Korea has ever tested any long distance missiles? 
 
 Yes, North Korea has tested long distance missiles. 
 No, North Korea has not tested long distance missiles. 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 34 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know which of the following countries is in the Six-Party Talks trying to resolve the 




 Great Britain 
 India 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 35 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know when the Korean War took place? Was it in 
 
 the 1940s 
 the 1950s 
 the 1960s 
 the 1970s 
 the 1980s 
 the 1990s 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 36 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 








Page 2 - Question 37 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 38 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know who the Vice-President of the United States is? 
 
 Donald Rumsfeld 
 Dick Cheney/Richard Cheney 
 Joe Biden 
 Or it is someone else 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 39 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Whose responsibility is it to determine whether a law is constitutional or not? Is it the President, the 
Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
 
 the President 
 the Congress 
 the Supreme Court 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. House and Senate to override a presidential veto? 
 
 Two thirds 
 Four fifths 
 Five Sixths 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
 
 Democratic Party 
 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which party is more conservative? 
 
 Democrat Party 
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 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 43 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





Page 2 - Question 44 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which of the racial or ethnic groups best describes you? 
 
 White 
 African American/Black 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic 
 American Indian/Native American 
 Other (Specify) 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 45 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 46 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your highest level of education? 
 
 Less than high school (K-12) 
 High school graduate 
 Some college/community college/vocational school 
 College graduate/undergraduate degree 
 Post graduate work/graduate degree 
 Don’t know/ Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 47 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your age? Please select from the following categories: 
 
 18-25 years old 
 26-30 years old 
 31-40 years old 
 41-50 years old 
 51-60 years old 
 60 or more years old 
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 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 48 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is the approximate household income range for your family? 
 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 to less than 40,000 
 40,000 to less than 60,000 
 60,000 to less than 80,000 
 80,000 to less than 100,000 
 100,000 or more 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
Thank You Page 
You have now completed this study. Your responses will be kept confidential. None of them will be 
released in any way that would identify you as an individual. We greatly appreciate your participation in 
this study. If you have questions about this particular study, please contact the lead investigator – a Ph.D. 
candidate at the Department of Communication Studies by phone at 734-764-0420 or by email at 
yingq@umich.edu.  
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News & Opinions of Current Affairs Survey 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
First, we would like you to read the following three information cards about an issue in the news these 
days. Please read them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the questionnaire, as it is an 




















Page 1 - Heading  
We would now like you to view two news stories of current affairs by following the link below. Please 
watch them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the questionnaire, as it is an important part of 
this study.  
It takes a few seconds for the video to load after you click on the link. The entire video is about five 
minutes long. Thank you so much. 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
http://www.umich.edu/~yingq/News/v3.html 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Now, please continue to complete a questionnaire for this study. Thank you so much for your time and 
efforts. 
 
Page 1 - Question 1 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
President Obama is proposing to reform the health care system, do you in general favor or oppose the 




 No opinion 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Do you favor or oppose the following specifics that are in discussions of possible health care reform? 
 
Page 1 - Question 2 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





 No opinion 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 3 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





 No opinion 




Page 1 - Question 4 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think that the U.S. should follow other developed countries to set up a singler payer insurance 




 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Do you favor or oppose the following possible ways to pay for changes to the health care system? 
 
Page 1 - Question 5 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How about requiring employers to pay a fee if they do not provide health insurance for their employees? 
 
 Strongly favor 
 Favor 
 Neither favor nor oppose 
 Oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 6 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How about saving money by cutting back on Medicare costs? 
 
 Strongly favor 
 Favor 
 Neither favor nor oppose 
 Oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 7 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How about increasing income taxes on upper income Americans? 
 
 Strongly favor 
 Favor 
 Neither favor nor oppose 
 Oppose 
 Strongly oppose 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 8 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think that the proposed health care reform would be beneficial to the American people or do you 
think the reform would be harmful to the American people? 
 
 Greatly beneficial 
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 Somewhat beneficial 
 Neither beneficial nor harmful 
 Somewhat harmful 
 Greatly harmful 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 9 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think that the proposed health care reform would be beneficial to the economy or do you think it 
would be harmful to the economy? 
 
 Greatly beneficial 
 Somewhat beneficial 
 Neither beneficial nor harmful 
 Somewhat harmful 
 Greatly harmful 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 10 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 11 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of North Korean nuclear threat, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 12 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it affects you personally or does it not affect 
you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 




Page 1 - Question 13 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of North Korean nuclear threat, do you think it affects you personally or does it 
not affect you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 14 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 15 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of North Korean nuclear threat is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 16 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 17 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of North Korean nuclear threat is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 




Page 1 - Question 18 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about Health Care Reform just now, how much do you think what’s 
presented in the news would affect your opinion about the proposed reform? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 19 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about Health Care Reform just now, how much do you think what’s 
presented in the news would affect other people's opinions about the proposed reform? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 20 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how informative 
would you say that they are about Health Care Reform? 
 
 Greatly informative 
 Somewhat informative 
 Not very informative 
 Not informative at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 21 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how relevant would 
you say that they are to your opinion about Health Care Reform? 
 
 Greatly relevant 
 Somewhat relevant 
 Not very relevant 
 Not relevant at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 22 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? 
 
 Strongly approve 
 Approve 




 Strongly disapprove 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 23 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself 
 
 Strongly Democrat 
 Moderately Democrat 
 Strongly Republican 
 Moderately Republican 
 Independent 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 24 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Would you consider yourself 
 
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal 
 Moderate, middle of the road 
 Slightly conservative 
 Conservative 
 Extremely conservative 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 25 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How would you describe your interest in politics in general? Would you say you are very much interested 
in politics, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all? 
 
 Very much interested 
 Somewhat interested 
 Hardly interested at all 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 26 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you watch the news on TV? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 




Page 1 - Question 27 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you read a daily newspaper? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 28 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you listen to the news on the radio? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 29 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you read or watch the news on the Internet (online)? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Next, we would like to ask about whether you follow the news about a few issues. Not everyone will have 
followed these news stories. How about you? 
 
Page 1 - Question 30 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about health care reform? 
 




 Not very closely 
 Do not follow at all 
 
Page 2 - Question 31 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about North Korean nuclear issue? 
 
 Very closely 
 Closely 
 Not very closely 
 Do not follow at all 
 
Page 2 - Question 32 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know approximately how many Americans do not have health insurance at least for part 
of the year? 
 
 20 million 
 47 million 
 65 million 
 80 million 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 33 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know approximately how much the health care costs of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)? 
 
 About 5% 
 About 15% 
 About 20% 
 About 25% 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 34 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know how much the health care reform would approximately cost? 
 
 0.6 trillion in 10 years 
 1.6 trillion in 10 years 
 3.6 trillion in 10 years 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 35 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which of the following is not one of the key issues that the health care reform is trying to address? 
 
 Establishing a single payer system 
 Full coverage 
 Both private and public health insurance options 
 Reducing health care cost 
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 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 36 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 37 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 38 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 39 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know who the Vice-President of the United States is? 
 
 Donald Rumsfeld 
 Dick Cheney/Richard Cheney 
 Joe Biden 
 Or it is someone else 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Whose responsibility is it to determine whether a law is constitutional or not? Is it the President, the 
Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
 
 the President 
 the Congress 
 the Supreme Court 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  




 Two thirds 
 Four fifths 
 Five Sixths 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
 
 Democratic Party 
 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 43 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which party is more conservative? 
 
 Democratic Party 
 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 44 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





Page 2 - Question 45 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What racial or ethnic groups best describes you? 
 
 White 
 African American/Black 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic 
 American Indian/Native American 
 Other (Specify) 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 46 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your highest level of education? 
 
 Less than high school (K-12) 
 High school graduate 
 Some college/community college/vocational school 
 College graduate/undergraduate degree 
 Post graduate work/graduate degree 




Page 2 - Question 47 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your age? Please select from the following categories: 
 
 18-25 years old 
 26-30 years old 
 31-40 years old 
 41-50 years old 
 51-60 years old 
 60 or more years old 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 48 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is the approximate household income range for your family? 
 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 to less than 40,000 
 40,000 to less than 60,000 
 60,000 to less than 80,000 
 80,000 to less than 100,000 
 100,000 or more 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
Thank You Page 
You have now completed this study. Your responses will be kept confidential. None of them will be 
released in any way that would identify you as an individual. We greatly appreciate your participation in 
this study. If you have questions about this particular study, please contact the lead investigator – a Ph.D. 
candidate at the Department of Communication Studies by phone at 734-764-0420 or by email at 
yingq@umich.edu.  
 
Screen Out Page 
(Standard - Zoomerang branding) 
 
Over Quota Page 
(Standard - Zoomerang branding) 
 
Survey Closed Page 




News & Opinions of Current Affairs Survey III 
 
Created: November 03 2009, 2:33 PM 
Last Modified: November 03 2009, 2:33 PM 
Design Theme: Basic Blue 
Language: English 
Button Options: Labels 
Disable Browser “Back” Button: False 
 
 
News & Opinions of Current Affairs Survey 
Page 1 - Heading  
First, we would like you to read the following three information cards about an issue in the news 
these days. Please read them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the 





















Page 1 - Heading  
We would now like you to view two news stories of current affairs by following the link below. Please 
watch them carefully before proceeding to the next section of the questionnaire, as it is an important part of 
this study.  
 
It takes a few seconds for the video to load after you click on the link. The entire video is three minutes 
long. Thank you so much. 
 





Page 1 - Heading  
Now, please continue to complete a questionnaire for this study. Thank you so much for your time and 
efforts. 
 
Page 1 - Question 1 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Some people worry that traditional energy sources such as oil and natural gas will run out soon. Some 
people think that these traditional energy sources will sustain for a long enough time. What do you think? 
Do you think traditional energy sources such as oil and natural gas will run out soon or do you think they 
will sustain for a long time? 
 
 They will run out very soon. 
 They will sustain for a long time. 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 2 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Overall, do you think that alternative energy resources such as wind or solar energies are better sources of 
energy than traditional energies such as oil and natural gas? 
 
 Alternative energies are better sources of energy. 
 Traditional energies are better sources of energy. 
 They are the same. 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 3 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Would you prefer the government to increase, decrease, or not change the financial support and incentives 
it gives for producing energy from alternative sources, such as solar and wind? 
 
 Increase 
 No change 
 Decrease 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 4 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Would you prefer the government to increase, decrease, or not change the financial support and incentives 
it gives for producing energy from traditional sources, such as coal and oil? 
 
 Increase 
 No change 
 Decrease 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 5 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think investing in alternative energy research would be beneficial or harmful to the environment? 
 
 Beneficial to the environment. 
 Harmful to the environment. 
 Neither beneficial nor harmful. 
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 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 6 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Some people think that investing in alternative energy research would create new job opportunities, and 
thus be beneficial to the economy. Some people think that investing in alternative energy research is very 
costly, thus harmful to the economy. What do you think? Do you think investing in alternative energy 
research would be beneficial or harmful to the economy? 
 
 Beneficial to the economy. 
 Harmful to the economy. 
 Neither beneficial nor harmful. 
 Don’t know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 7 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Would you support an increase in federal gasoline taxes if the increase was earmarked specifically for 
research and development for clean, alternative energy sources? Would you definitely support, probably 
support, probably not support or definitely not support an increase in federal gasoline taxes? 
 
 Definitely support 
 Probably support 
 Probably not support 
 Definitely no 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 8 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of alternative energy research, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 9 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it is interesting or boring? 
 
 Very interesting 
 Somewhat interesting 
 A little boring 
 Very boring 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 10 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of alternative energy research, do you think it affects you personally or does it not 
affect you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
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 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 11 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Thinking about the issue of health care reform, do you think it affects you personally or does it not affect 
you personally? 
 
 It greatly affects me personally 
 It somewhat affects me personally 
 It does not affect me much personally 
 It does not affect me personally at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 12 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of alternative energy research is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 13 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is easy to understand or hard to understand? 
 
 Very easy to understand 
 Easy to understand 
 Hard to understand 
 Very hard to understand 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 14 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of alternative energy research is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 15 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you think the issue of health care reform is important or unimportant? 
 
 Very important 
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 Somewhat important 
 Not important 
 Not important at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 16 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about alternative energy just now, how much do you think what’s presented 
in the news would affect your opinion about alternative energy research? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 17 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Having watched a news story about alternative energy just now, how much do you think what’s presented 
in the news would affect other people's opinions about alternative energy research? 
 
 Very much 
 Somewhat 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 18 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how informative 
would you say that they are about alternative energy? 
 
 Greatly informative 
 Somewhat informative 
 Not very informative 
 Not informative at all 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 19 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
With regard to the three information cards that you read at the beginning of this survey, how relevant would 
you say that they are to your opinion about alternative energy? 
 
 Greatly informative 
 Somewhat informative 
 Not very informative 
 Not informative at all 




Page 1 - Question 20 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself 
 
 Strongly Democrat 
 Moderately Democrat 
 Strongly Republican 
 Moderately Republican 
 Independent 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 21 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Would you consider yourself 
 
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal 
 Moderate, middle of the road 
 Slightly conservative 
 Conservative 
 Extremely conservative 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 22 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How would you describe your interest in politics in general? Would you say you are very much interested 
in politics, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all? 
 
 Very much interested 
 Somewhat interested 
 Hardly interested at all 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 23 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you watch the news on TV? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 24 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 25 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you listen to the news on the radio? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 26 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How many days in the PAST WEEK did you read or watch the news on the Internet (online)? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 Six days 
 Every day 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Heading  
Next, we would like to ask about whether you follow the news about a few issues. Not everyone will have 
followed these news stories. How about you? 
 
Page 1 - Question 27 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about alternative energy research? 
 
 Very closely 
 Closely 
 Not very closely 




Page 1 - Question 28 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How closely would you say that you follow the news about health care reform? 
 
 Very closely 
 Closely 
 Not very closely 
 Do not follow at all 
 
Page 1 - Question 29 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  




 Solar energy 
 Natural gas 
 Wind energy 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 1 - Question 30 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
In your opinion, approximately how many years will the traditional energy sources such as coal and oil 
sustain our energy consumption? 
 
 10 Years 
 50 Years 
 100 Years 
 150 Years 
 200 years 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 31 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which one of the following is usually considered alternative or renewable energy? 
 
 Natural gas 
 Coal 
 Solar energy 
 Nuclear energy 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 32 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which of the following is an advantage of traditional fossil fuel based energies compared to alternative 
energy? 
 
 Relatively easier to be stored for future use 
 More environmental friendly 
 Higher initial cost 




Page 2 - Question 33 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Currently, about what percentage of world energy consumption is provided by alternative energy? 
 
 1 percent 
 10 percent 
 30 percent 
 50 percent 
 80 percent 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 34 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 35 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Did you participate in any discussions with someone close to you such as your family members, friends or 




 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 36 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know who the Vice-President of the United States is? 
 
 Donald Rumsfeld 
 Dick Cheney/Richard Cheney 
 Joe Biden 
 Or it is someone else 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 37 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Whose responsibility is it to determine whether a law is constitutional or not? Is it the President, the 
Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
 
 the President 
 the Congress 
 the Supreme Court 




Page 2 - Question 38 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. House and Senate to override a presidential veto? 
 
 Two thirds 
 Four fifths 
 Five Sixths 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 39 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
 
 Democratic Party 
 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
Which party is more conservative? 
 
 Democrat Party 
 Republican Party 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  





Page 2 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? 
 
 White 
 African American/Black 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic 
 American Indian/Native American 
 Other (Specify) 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 43 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your highest level of education? 
 
 Less than high school (K-12) 
 High school grad 
 Some college/community college/vocational school 
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 College graduate/undergraduate degree 
 Post graduate work/graduate degree 
 Don’t know/ Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 44 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is your age? Please select from the following categories: 
 
 18-25 years old 
 26-30 years old 
 31-40 years old 
 41-50 years old 
 51-60 years old 
 60 or more years old 
 Don't know/Refused 
 
Page 2 - Question 45 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)  
What is the approximate household income range for your family? 
 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 to less than 40,000 
 40,000 to less than 60,000 
 60,000 to less than 80,000 
 80,000 to less than 100,000 
 100,000 or more 
 Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
Thank You Page 
You have now completed this study. Your responses will be kept confidential. None of them will be 
released in any way that would identify you as an individual. We greatly appreciate your participation in 
this study. If you have questions about this particular study, please contact the lead investigator – a Ph.D. 
candidate at the Department of Communication Studies by phone at 734-764-0420 or by email at 
yingq@umich.edu.  
 
Screen Out Page 
(Standard - Zoomerang branding) 
 
Over Quota Page 
(Standard - Zoomerang branding) 
 
Survey Closed Page 
(Standard - Zoomerang branding) 
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III. Missing Data Treatment 
Missing Data Treatment for Post-test Subjects 
As with most studies involving a survey questionnaire, there are some missing 
data from the three experiments. The total number of participants (Ns) for the post-tests 
in Experiment 1 through 3 is 420, 423 and 424, respectively. There is a varying level of 
missing data for each question in the three post-test questionnaires. The number of 
complete answers for each question ranges from 358 to 413 for Experiment 1 
questionnaire, 319 to 420 for Experiment 2 questionnaire, and 356 to 422 for Experiment 
3 questionnaire.  
Although the amount of missing data for each question is not large enough to 
raise serious concerns, the number of missing cases can be added up when many of the 
questions are used in the multiple regression analysis used for hypothesis testing. This 
may greatly reduce the power of this study to detect the effects from news exposure and 
specific information. Thus, it is reasonable and necessary to treat the missing data first.  
Even though the most commonly used missing data treatment is multiple 
imputations, simpler methods, i.e., the mean imputation method and the logical recode of 
missing values, are used in this dissertation as the percentage of missing data is not very 
large. 
The statistics for the raw data, mean imputed data, and logically recoded data for 
the dependent and the independent variable questions for each of the three experiments 
are listed in the tables on this webpage (link to the page) and can also be requested 
through the author. Due to page limit, these tables are not listed here in the dissertation.  
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For all three experiments, both the mean imputation method and the logical 
recode method increase the number of complete answers for each question in the three 
experiments. The mean values using the mean imputation method are the same as the raw 
data. The logical recode method tends to yield slightly higher means as compared to the 
raw and the mean imputed data. However, such differences across all questions are quite 
small. The standard deviations of the raw, mean imputed, and logically recoded measures 
are very close for each question. One pattern is that in a majority of questions, the mean 
imputed measures tend to have the lowest standard deviation. Overall, the two methods 
used for missing data treatment yield similar results. It should be equivalent to use values 
produced by either method. 
For the dependent measures in these three experiments, if there is some mid-point 
in the response scale, the logical recode method is used for the missing values. In 
Experiment 1, such measures are Question 4, 5, and 7, each of which uses a five-point 
Likert scale as the response options, and Question 8, asking whether the nuclear threat 
issue can be resolved by peace talks. The mid-point of “Hard to say” is used for 
categorizing any missing answers. For the dependent variables in Experiment 2 and 3, all 
of the opinion questions have some mid-point, which indicates no preference for either 
direction of the attitude being measured. It seems that logically recoded data tend to have 
slightly better representation of the potentially mixed feelings about health care reform 
and are thus selected.  
For the remaining two dependent measures from Experiment 1, Question 3, the 
feeling thermometer toward North Korea, and Question 6, intention of North Korea to 
use its nuclear capacity, mean imputation is used. For these two questions, there does not 
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seem to be a clear logical mid-point to be employed. Mean imputation, on the other hand, 
does seem reasonable to use.  
For the independent measures in the three experiments, mean imputation is 
utilized for the issue salience measures (Question 9, 11, 13 and 15, Question 10, 12, 14 
and 16, Question 8, 10, 12 and 14 in the three experiments, respectively), media exposure 
questions (Question 25 through 28, Question 26 through 30; Question 23 through 26, 
respectively), future terrorist attacks concerns (Question 17 in Experiment 1), political 
interest (Question 24, 25 and 22, respectively), follow-up of news report and discussions 
about the specific issue in the experiment (Question 29 and 36, Question 30 and 37, 
Question 27 and 34, respectively). For demographic variables such as gender, birth 
country of parents, education, age and income (Question 43, 45 through 48, Question 44 
and 46 through 48, and Question 41, 43 through 45, respectively), mean imputation is 
also used.  
A logical recode is used for party identification, ideology, and race (Question 22, 
23 and 44 in Experiment 1, Question 23, 24 and 44 in Experiment 2 and Question 20, 21 
and 22 in Experiment 3). “Independent” was assigned to missing values in the party ID 
question. “Neither liberal nor conservative” was assigned to missing values in political 
ideology. A racial category other than the provided categories was assigned to missing 
values in the race measure. A logical recode, i.e. “Neither approve or disapprove” is used 
for the Obama job approval (Question 22) in Experiment 2.   
The treatment of missing cases for self-evaluations of effectiveness or relevance 
of news stories and information cards (Question 18 through 21 in Experiment 1 and 2, 
Question 16 through 19 in Experiment 2) is different for various experimental groups in 
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the study. For those respondents randomly assigned to groups in which no news story or 
information cards about the experimental issue were provided, their response to these 
questions are recoded to be zero, indicating the absence of opinions provided for these 
four questions. For those who viewed such news stories or information cards, mean 
imputation was used to replace any missing values in the response.  
 
Missing Data Treatment for Pre-test Only Subjects and Panel Subjects 
Missing data for the pre-tests of pre-test only and panel subjects are also treated 
before the panel data analysis regarding the effects of news and issue specific information 
is conducted. The two methods, mean imputation and logical replacement, are the same 
as what is used in the analysis of data for the post-test subjects. The raw score, the mean 
imputed score, and the logically replaced score of each question in the three experiments 
as well as their respective standard deviations are listed in the tables listed on this 
webpage (link to the page).  
The number of respondents who participated in the pre-test of Experiment 1, 2 
and 3 is 196, 203, and 192 respectively. Among these participants, 91, 95, and 95 
participated only in the pre-test portion of the three experiments. The remaining 
participants (101 in Experiment 1, 108 in Experiment 2, and 97 in Experiment 3) 
continued to participate in the post-test portion of the studies. Thus, the size of the panel 
groups for the three experiments is 101, 108, and 97, respectively.  
The number of complete responses to each of the questions in the pre-test 
questionnaire among pre-test only subjects ranges from 76 to 90 in Experiment 1, 75 to 
93 in Experiment 2, and 78 to 95 in Experiment 3. The number of complete responses for 
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each question in the pre-test questionnaires among panel subjects range from 88 to 98 in 
Experiment 1, 74 to 95 in Experiment 2, and 71 to 89 in Experiment 3.  
It is found that the mean and standard deviation of the three sets of scores are very 
similar and comparable. This is also true for both the pre-test only population and the 
panel subjects. If mean imputation is used for treating missing data for a question in the 
analysis of the post-test data, mean imputation is used again for the corresponding pre-
test question answered by the pre-test only and the panel subjects. This is also the case 
when logically replaced scores are used. Please refer to the above section of Missing Data 
Treatment of Post-test Subjects for specific information about which method is used for 




IV. Descriptive Statistics 
Detailed tables listing descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, 
independent variables, and covariates are available on this webpage (link to the page) and 
can be requested through the author.  
 
Dependent Variable Measures and Scales Constructed 
In Experiment 1 for the North Korean nuclear threat study, there are six questions 
in total that measure the opinions toward North Korea and its nuclear threat. The first 
(Question 3) is the feeling thermometer toward North Korea, with a response scale 
ranging from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the friendlier feeling one has toward North 
Korea. The mean response for this question is 17 points, which indicates unfriendly 
feelings toward this country overall.  
Question 4, 5, and 7 ask whether North Korea poses a nuclear threat, whether it 
poses a danger to world peace, and whether its nuclear threat comes from potential 
involvement in the nuclear arms dealership. The first two of these three questions tap 
respondents’ attitudes toward the nuclear threat issue in general, while the third one asks 
more specifically about a particular aspect from which the threat feeling comes. The 
response categories for these three questions are all 5-point Likert scales, with 1 being 
strongly agreeing with the opinion that North Korea poses a nuclear threat and 5 being 
strongly disagreeing. Thus, the lower the scores on these questions, the more of a threat 
that one would feel about North Korea. The mean responses for these three questions are 
1.89, 1.89, and 1.94, respectively. These values indicate that an average response to these 
questions lies close to feeling North Korea poses a nuclear threat.  
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Question 6 asks about the intention of North Korea’s use of its nuclear capacity. 
The response categories range from posing a real threat, getting financial aid, both or 
neither of these two intentions. The mean response to this question is 2.37, which means 
that the respondents tend to identify North Korea’s intention to be both posing a real 
threat and getting financial aid. When asked about whether such a threat can be resolved 
by peace talks (Question 8), the respondents tend to have a feeling between “no” and 
“hard to say” as the mean score for this question is 1.74.  
As there are multiple questions that measure the same conceptual construct for the 
dependent variable in Experiment 1, scale constructions were conducted to see if these 
measures can be combined in some way. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted. 
Question 4, 5, and 7 tend to form a scale of North Korea Nuclear Threat Opinions, with 
Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.88. The range of normalized values for this scale is from -
1.28 to 3.14, with higher values representing less feelings of nuclear threat posed by 
North Korea (See Table A-1 below).  
The feeling thermometer (Question 3), North Korea’s nuclear intent (Question 6), 
and resolution of this nuclear issue (Question 8) are not highly correlated with the North 
Korea Nuclear Threat Opinions scale. Nor do they form a scale of their own with a high 
Cronbach’s alpha. So these three questions are used separately in the hypothesis testing 
process. This scale pattern of the six questions measuring dependent variables remains 
consistent when tested using the pre-test data of the same study.  
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Table A-1. Scale Construction: Dependent Variables for Post-test  
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields similar factor pattern. One factor is extracted in 
the confirmatory factor analysis with variance explained equal to 2.26. 
**Q3, Q6, and Q8 are used as separate dependent measures in model building. 
 
In Experiment 2 about Heath Care Reform, there are nine questions measuring 
opinions about this reform (See Appendix). Question 1 through 7 ask about general or 
specific favorability toward the reform, such as opinions about universal coverage, 
having both public and private health insurance options, or about favorability toward a 
single payer system. Question 8 and 9 ask the respondents whether they think the reform 
would be beneficial to the American people or the economy.  
When missing data were assigned logically, 38% of the participants generally 
favor the reform, while 43% oppose. About 19% have no opinion on this question 
(Question 1). When asked about favorability of universal coverage (Question 2), 56% of 
the participants are in favor, 27% oppose, and 17% are in the middle. A slight majority 
(56%) of the participants indicated that they would favor a health care system with both 
private and public health insurance, while 22% oppose, and 22% have no opinion on this 
(Question 3). More people think that the U.S. should not follow a few European countries 
to have a single payer system (45% versus 30% who favor such a move). As for requiring 
employers to pay a fee if they do not provide health insurance, 50% either strongly favor 
or favor this. About 39% said they oppose or strongly oppose (Question 5). Considerably 
more respondents said that they oppose or strongly oppose cutting Medicare cost to save 









(Eigenvalue >= 1) Cronbach’s alpha 
North Korea Nuclear Threat  
(-1.28 to 3.14, higher score, 
less agreement) 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis of Q4, 5 and 
7* 1 0.88 
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Question 6). On the contrary, more respondents favor increasing taxes on upper income 
Americans (43%) as compared to 23% who oppose or strongly oppose this option to 
finance the reform. When asked whether the reform would benefit the American people 
(Question 8) and the economy (Question 9), more respondents think that it would benefit 
the American people (23%) than the economy (13%).  
Exploratory factor analysis of the dependent variable questions yielded two 
factors (see Table A-2), favorability of the health care reform in general (Q1-Q5, Q7-Q9) 
and favorability of financing the reform by cutting Medicare costs (Q6). The favorability 
of the health care reform in the general scale has a range of -1.72 to 2.10, with a higher 
score indicating less favorable attitudes. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.89, suggesting that 
the scale has relatively high reliability. The favorability of financing the reform by 
cutting Medicare costs loads almost solely on Question 6. It has a range of -2.57 to 2.12, 
with higher scores also indicating lower favorability.  
Table A-2. Scale Construction: Dependent Variables for Post-test Respondents  
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields 1 factor for the nine dependent variable 
measures. The Cronbach’s alpha for all dependent questions is 0.87 in both wave 1 and wave 2 datasets. 
Both 2 factors extracted and 1 factor extracted based on exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis are 
used for hypothesis testing.  
 
In Experiment 3 about Alternative Energy Research, seven questions were asked 









(Eigenvalue >= 1) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1. General Favorability of Health 
Care Reform (Q1-Q5, Q7-Q9) 




Q9* 2 0.89 
2. Favorability of Health Care 
Reform by Cutting Medicare Costs 
(Q6) 




Q9* 2 N.A. 
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proportion of the participants think that traditional energy will run out soon or be 
sustained for a long time (40% vs. 44%). About 16% have no opinion on this question 
(Question 1).  
When asked about whether alternative energy is a better source as compared to 
traditional energy (Question 2), 62% think it is better while 19% think otherwise. About 
20% think the two sources are the same.  
About 63% of the respondents prefer that the government increase financial 
support for producing alternative energy. Only 8% think that such support should be 
decreased and 29% prefer no change (Question 3). The preference for the government to 
increase support for producing traditional energy only gained support form 17% of the 
respondents, while 37% prefer decreasing such support and 46% prefer no change 
(Question 4).  
A majority of the respondents think that alternative energy research is beneficial 
to the environment (77%, Question 5) and to the economy (66%, Question 6). Only 3% 
or 7% of them think that alternative energy research is harmful to the environment or the 
economy, respectively. The remaining respondents think that it is neither beneficial nor 
harmful (21% and 27%, respectively, for Question 5 and 6).  
When asked if they would support a gas tax increase to support alternative energy 
research and production, 13% of the respondents said they would definitely support it. 
About 29% said they would support. In addition, 48% said they would not support such a 
tax increase (including 24% definitely not support and another 24% not support). Ten 
percent of the respondents have missing values on this question. They were assigned to a 
mid-point value of 2.5. 
 
 190 
Exploratory factor analysis of the dependent variable questions yielded two 
factors (see Table A-3), support for alternative energy (Question 2, 3, 5 to 7) and support 
for traditional energy (Question 1 and 4).  
The support for alternative energy has a range of -1.40 to 3.41, with a higher score 
indicating less support. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83, suggesting that the scale has 
relatively high reliability. The support for traditional energy has a range of -2.16 to 2.32, 
with higher scores also indicating less support and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.68. 
Table A-3. Scale Construction: Dependent Variables for Post-test Respondents  
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset also yields 2 factors for the nine dependent variable 
measures, with Q1 to Q3, Q5 to Q7 loading on the first factor and Q4 loading on the second factor.  
 
Independent Variable Measures and Scales Constructed 
An average respondent feels that the issue discussed in the experiment in which 
he or she participates is somewhat interesting, may somewhat affect him/her personally, 
and is relatively easy to understand and somewhat important. The mean values for the 
four corresponding questions are 1.91, 2.32, 2.35, and 1.52 (Question 9, 11, 13 and 15 in 
Experiment 1); 2.03, 1.77, 2.79, and 1.44 (Question 10, 12, 14 and 16 in Experiment 2); 
and 1.75, 1.91, 2.18, and 1.43 (for Question 8, 10, 12, and 14 in Experiment 3).  
The mean values for following news about the issue in the respective study, 
Question 29 for Experiment 1, Question 30 for Experiment 2, and Question 27 in 









(Eigenvalue >= 1) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1. Support for Alternative Energy 
(Q2, 3, 5-7, -1.40 to 3.41, higher 
score, less support) 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis of Q1-Q7* 2 0.83 
2. Support for Incentives for 
Traditional  
Energy (Q1 and 4, -2.16 to 2.32, 
higher score, more support 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis of Q1-Q7* 2 0.68 
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values for the participation in discussion of each issue in the three experiments is 1.86, 
1.42 and 1.66, respectively, with 1 being some discussion and 2 being no discussion.  
The relative reliance on news media sources for issue specific news (TV, the 
Internet, newspapers or radio) is similar among participants in the three experiments. The 
mean values for the four media exposure questions (Question 25 through 28, Question 26 
through 29, Question 23 through 26 in Experiment 1, 2, and 3) are 5.38, 4.69, 4.11, and 
3.64 in Experiment 1, 5.98, 4.17, 3.86, and 4.31 in Experiment 2 and 5.53, 3.86, 3.60, and 
4.49 in Experiment 3. All of these news source questions are on a scale of 0 to 7, 
representing the number of days with exposure to each of the four types of news media. 
TV still remains the top source of news for an average citizen, followed by news on the 
Internet, then newspapers, and then radio. 
The distribution of party ID and political ideology (Question 22 and 23 in 
Experiment 1, Question 23 and 24 in Experiment 2, and Question 20 and 21 in 
Experiment 3) is as follows. About 10%, 10%, and 12% said that they are strong 
Democrats in these three experiments, respectively. 22%, 20% and 23% said they are 
moderate Democrats.  About 41%, 47%, and 36% are Independent, including those who 
said they are Independent and those who have missing values for this question. The 
percentages of moderate and strong Republicans are 12% and 15% in Experiment 1, 9% 
and 13% in Experiment 2, and 12% and 17% in Experiment 3. 
As for the political ideology of the participants in Experiment 2 and 3 (Question 
24 and 21), 24% and 30% indicated that they are liberals (including extremely liberal, 
liberal and slightly liberal). About 39% and 30% said that they are in the middle category 
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in terms of ideology, including those who were assigned to be in this middle category. 
Thirty-five percent and 40% said that they are conservatives.  
The mean values for political interest (Question 24, 25, and 22 in Experiment 1, 2 
and 3) are 1.86, 1.87, and 1.88, suggesting that an average respondent feels very 
interested or interested in politics in general. The level of reported political interest is 
very similar among the three groups of participants.  
An important control question for the opinions about the North Korean nuclear 
threat asks about respondents’ concerns about future terrorist attacks (Question 17). The 
mean value for this question is 2.03 on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being very much worried 
and 4 being not worried at all. Similarly, presidential job approval (Question 22) is asked 
in Experiment 2 as an important control question. The mean value for this question is 
3.18 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being strongly approve and 5 being strongly disapprove. 
As the mean value is very close to the mid-point on the scale of “Neither approve nor 
disapprove,” the general public is rather divided in their evaluations of the president. 
The demographic characteristics of the participants in the three experiments are 
comparable. About 58% of the respondents in this study are male and 42% are female in 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, the percentages are 52% and 48%. In Experiment 3, the 
percentages are 53% and 47%.  
A majority of the respondents are White (84%, 82%, and 83% in Experiment 1, 2 
and 3 respectively). Three, six and five percent of the respondents in the three studies are 
African Americans, 5%, 2%, and 4% Asian or Pacific Island, 4%, 4%, and 3% Hispanic, 
0.2%, 2%, and 1% American Indian/Native American and 4%, 1%, and 6% other race. In 
Experiment 1, 84% of the respondents’ parents were born in this country.  
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As far as education is concerned, 3%, 2%, and 2% have less than a high school 
education in Experiment 1, 2 and 3 respectively, 15%, 16%, and 19% are high school 
graduates, 34%, 29%, and 32% have some college, 29%, 33%, and 30% are college 
graduates, and 19%, 18%, and 14% have done postgraduate work.  
In terms of age, 11%, 9%, and 13% belong to the age group of 18 to 25 years old, 
9%, 8%, and 11% are from the 26 to 30 years old group, 22%, 18%, and 18% are 
between 31 to 40 years old, 18%, 22%, and 19% belong to the 41 to 50 years old group. 
Fifteen, sixteen and thirteen percent are from 51 to 60 years old, and 25%, 25%, are 60 or 
older in all of the three experiments.  
As for annual household income, 12%, 8%, and 11% reported less than $20,000 
of annual income, 21%, 24%, and 26% said that their income is between $20,000 and less 
than $40,000, 20%, 22%, and 17% said it is between $40,000 and less than $60,000, 19%, 
12% ,and 14% are between $60,000 and $80,000, 12%, 7%, and 6% are between $80,000 
and $100,000, and 16%, 12%, and 15% said they earn $100,000 or more each year. 
As for self-evaluations of effectiveness or relevance of news stories and 
information cards about the specific issue (Question 18 through 21 in Experiment 1 and 2, 
Question 16 through 19 in Experiment 3), those respondents, who are randomly assigned 
to groups in which no news story or information cards about the issue are provided, have 
their response to these questions recoded as zero (indicating no attitude is expressed). For 
those who viewed such news stories or information cards, the mean values for these four 
questions indicate that the news stories and information cards are not considered to have 
strong effects or relevance on opinions (1.79, 2.03, 1.34, and 1.04, respectively, in 
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Experiment 1; 1.67, 2.02, 1.48, and 1.39 in Experiment 2 and 1.77, 1.93, 1.61, and 1.53 in 
Experiment 3) The response categories are 1 (not at all) through 4 (very much).    
Exploratory factor analysis is used to construct the issue salience scale and the 
media exposure scale (see Table A-4, A-5 and A-6). The issue salience scale is 
constructed by extracting one factor from four questions in each experiment (Question 9, 
11, 13, and 15, Question 10, 12, 14 ,and 16, Question 8, 10, 12, and 14 in the three 
Experiments respectively). The Cronbach’s alpha’s for the three issue salience scales are 
0.63, 0.54 and 0.66 for the three experiments, respectively. The ranges are -1.67 to 3.81, -
1.67 to 3.81 and -1.55 to 3.67, respectively, with higher scores representing less issue 
salience overall for the respondents.  
Table A-4. Scale Construction: Independent Variables for Post-test Respondents  
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset suggests that two factors are extracted for these four 
questions. Variance explained for these two factors are 1.86 and 1.03. Q9, 11, and 15 load mostly on the 
first factor, while Q13 loads mostly on the second factor.  
**Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields a similar factor pattern. One factor is extracted 










(Eigenvalue >= 1) Cronbach’s alpha 
Issue Salience 
(-1.90 to 3.25,  
higher score, less 
salient) 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
of Q9, 11, 13, and 15* 1 0.63 
Media Exposure 
(-1.90 to 1.94,  
higher score, 
more exposure) 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
of Q25-Q28** 1 0.61 
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Table A-5. Scale Construction: Independent Variables for Post-test Respondents  
 
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset suggests that two factors are extracted for these four 
questions. Variance explained for these two factors are 1.68 and 1.01. Q10, 12, and 16 load mostly on the 
first factor, while Q14 loads mostly on the second factor.  
**Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields a similar factor pattern. One factor is extracted 
in the confirmatory factor analysis with variance explained equal to 1.68. 
 
Table A-6. Scale Construction: Independent Variables for Post-test Respondents  
*Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields a similar factor pattern. One factor is extracted 
in the confirmatory factor analysis with variance explained equal to 2.60. 
**Confirmatory factor analysis using pre-test dataset yields a similar factor pattern. One factor is extracted 
in the confirmatory factor analysis with variance explained equal to 1.77. 
 
The confirmatory factor analysis using the pre-test dataset of Experiment 1 and 2 
yields a slightly different factor pattern for the issue salience questions. Two factors are 
extracted from the four questions in each study. In Experiment 1, Question 9, 11, and 15 
load heavily on one factor, while Question 13 acts as the other factor. Similarly, Question 
10, 12, and 16 loaded heavily on one factor, while Question 14 acts as the other factor in 
Experiment 2. Question 13 in Experiment 1 and Question 14 in Experiment 2 both ask 
about the ease of understanding the specific issue. Thus, they may be somewhat different 









(Eigenvalue >= 1) Cronbach’s alpha 
Issue Salience 
(-1.67 to 3.81, higher 
score, less salient) 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis of Q10, 12, 
14, and 16* 1 0.54 
Media Exposure 
(-2.06 to 1.88, higher 
score, more exposure) 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis of Q26-









(Eigenvalue >= 1) Cronbach’s alpha 
Issue Salience 
(-1.55 to 3.67) 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
of Q8, 10, 12 and 14* 1 0.66 
    
Media 
Exposure 
(-1.87 to 2.01) 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
of Q23-Q26** 1 0.56 
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alpha for the scale constructed using Question 9, 11, and 15 is only 0.68, not much higher 
than the scale constructed using the four questions. The confirmatory factor analysis 
using the pre-test dataset of Experiment 3 yielded one factor from the four issue salience 
questions, similar to the exploratory factor analysis conducted above. Thus, in the 
following analysis, the one factor issue salience scale is applied.  
One factor was extracted for media exposure questions in each of the three 
experiments (Question 25 through 28, Question 26 through 30; Question 23 through 26, 
respectively). The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.61, 0.57, and 0.56 respectively for the scales 
formed. The confirmatory factor analysis using the pre-test dataset yielded the same 
factor pattern. The ranges of values for these scale are -1.90 to 1.94, -2.06 to 1.88, and -
1.87 to 2.01, with higher values indicating more exposure to the four types of news media 
overall.  
In each of the three experiments, the information and political knowledge scales 
were constructed by taking the average of the number of correct answers to the five 
specific information questions and general knowledge questions , respectively (see Table 
A-7, A-8, and A-9). The information scale has a range of 0 to 1, with 1 being correct in 
all five information questions and 0 being incorrect in all of the five questions. The mean 
values for the information scales in the three experiments are 0.47, 0.44, and 0.62. These 
mean values suggest that an average respondent knows the correct answers to roughly 2 
to 3 questions out of the 5 questions about one of the three issues. Respondents are 
somewhat more informed about the alternative energy issue than the North Korean 
nuclear threat or health care reform, suggesting that there may be some issue differences 
in specific information levels. On the same scale of 0 to 1, the mean value for political 
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knowledge is 0.78, 0.75, and 0.77, all of which are higher than the mean values of the 
information scale. It shows that an average respondent could score four out of the five 
knowledge questions correctly. The political knowledge level in the respondents who 
participated in the three different studies is about the same.  
In addition, the three knowledge scales from the three experiments have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76, 0.77, and 0.75 as compared to those for the three information 
scales of 0.51, 0.52, and 0.47. This indicates that the scale construction for political 
knowledge is relatively well tested with previous research (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), 
while information questions for forming the scales still need additional testing for 
improving reliability and validity.  
Table A-7. Scale Construction: Moderators for Post-test Respondents: Information and 
Political Knowledge  
*Answers to these factual questions were recoded to be 1 if they are correct, 0 if incorrect first.  
 
Table A-8. Scale Construction: Moderators for Post-test Respondents: Information and 
Political Knowledge  







(SE) Cronbach’s alpha 
Information  
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
informed) 
Average of  
Q31-Q35* 0.47 (0.28) 0.51 
    
Knowledge 
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
knowledge) 
Average of  







(SE) Cronbach’s alpha 
Information  
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
informed) 
Average of  
Q32-Q36* 0.44 (0.27) 0.53 
    
Knowledge 
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
knowledge) 
Average of  
Q39-Q43* 0.75 (0.31) 0.77 
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Table A-9. Scale Construction: Moderators for Post-test Respondents: Information and 
Political Knowledge  
*Answers to these factual questions were recoded to be 1 if they are correct, 0 if incorrect first.  
 
The information scale and the knowledge scale have a statistically significant 
correlation of 0.50 at the alpha level of 0.05 for the North Korean nuclear threat (See 
Table A-10). This correlation pattern is also consistent across the other two studies in this 
dissertation research, with 0.43 for the Health Care Reform study and 0.49 for the 
Alternative Energy study. Both correlations are also significant at the 0.05 level. Given 
the similarity of these three issues in terms of their salience in the news media, it would 
still require more extensive testing using issues that are less salient in the media to be 
conclusive about whether or not general political knowledge and specific information are 
consistently correlated.   















(SE) Cronbach’s alpha 
Information  
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
informed) 
Average of  
Q29-Q33* 0.62 (0.26) 0.47 
    
Knowledge 
(0 to 1, higher score, more 
knowledge) 
Average of  





Correlation between  
Information and Knowledge 
North Korea Nuclear Threat 0.50** 
Health Care Reform 0.43** 
Alternative Energy 0.49** 
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Comparison of Pre-test Only and Panel Subjects 
There are 192, 203, and 192 subjects who completed the pre-test of Experiment 1, 
2, and 3. Only 101, 108, and 97 of those who completed the pre-test of these three 
experiments finished the post-test of the respective study. About 47% to 49% of the 
subjects chose to drop out of the study in which they completed the pre-test. A 
comparison of pre-test only and panel subjects was conducted to see if there are 
significant differences in these two groups in each of the experiments. The means and 
standard deviations of the responses to the pre-test questionnaires for these two groups of 
subjects are listed in Table E1MD-3 and E1MD-4 for Experiment 1, Table E2MD-3, and 
E2MD-4 for Experiment 2, and Table E3MD-3 and E3MD-4 and Experiment 3 (see 
Tables on this webpage (link to the page)).  
  The mean values for the dependent variables (Question 3 through 8 in Experiment 
1, Question 1 through 9 in Experiment 2 and Question 1 through 7 in Experiment 3) are 
very close for the pre-test only subjects and the panel subjects (Table E1MD-3, E2MD-3 
and E3MD-3). In Experiment 1, the difference in the means of Question 3, the feeling 
thermometer, for these two groups of subjects is 1.56 on a scale of 0 to 100, a very small 
difference. For Question 4 through 8, the mean differences are smaller than 0.10 on 
scales of 1 to 3, 1 to 4 or 1 to 5.  
In Experiment 2 and 3, the magnitude of differences in the means of the 
dependent questions ranges from 0 to 0.27, and 0.03 to 0.24. The largest mean difference 
in Experiment 2, 0.27, is between responses to Question 5, the agreement to requiring the 
employer to pay a fee if they do not provide health insurance, by the pre-test only 
subjects and the panel subjects. The response category of this question is a five-point 
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Likert scale. Given the standard deviations for the two means are 1.14 and 1.16, a 
difference of 0.27 is not very large. In Experiment 3, the largest mean difference, 0.34, is 
between responses to Question 7, whether or not the respondent would support increasing 
the gas tax to subsidize alternative energy research. The response category of this 
question is on a four-point scale. Again, given the standard deviations for the two means 
are 1.05 and 1.04, a difference of 0.27 is not very large.  
Pre-test only subjects are also very comparable to panel subjects in terms of their 
responses to issue salience questions (Question 9, 11, 13 and 15, Table E1MD-4; 
Question 10, 12, 14, and 16, Table E2MD-4; Question 8, 10, 12, and 14, Table E3MD-4), 
worrying about future terrorist attacks (Question 17, Table E1MD-4), presidential job 
approval (Question 20, Table E2MD-4), political predispositions (Question 20, 21, and 
22, Table E1MD-4; Question 21, 22 and 23, Table E2MD-4; Question 18, 19, and 20, 
Table E3MD-4), and following the news and participation in discussion about the issue in 
the respective experiments (Question 28 and 36, Table E1MD-4; Question 30 and 37, 
Table E2MD-4; Question 25 and 32, Table E3MD-4).  
As for self-reported media exposure, these two groups of subjects are comparable 
for the amount of TV news exposure (Question 23) in Experiment 1, the amount of news 
exposure from newspaper, radio, and the Internet (Question 25, 26, and 27) in 
Experiment 2, and the amount of news exposure from TV, radio and the Internet 
(Question 21, 23, and 24) in Experiment 3. However, panel subjects seem to have 
somewhat more news exposure from radio, newspaper and the Internet (Question 24 
through 26) in Experiment 1. The largest difference, 1.08 on a scale of 1 to 7, was found 
for receiving news from the Internet (Question 26). In Experiment 2, panel subjects seem 
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to get more TV news exposure (Question 24, Table E2MD-4). A mean difference of 0.69, 
on a scale of 1 to 7, is found for watching TV news. In Experiment 3, pre-test only 
subjects seem to get more newspaper exposure (Question 22, Table E3MD-4). A mean 
difference of 0.58, on a scale of 0 to 7, is found for watching TV news.  
As demographic questions, such as gender, race, education, and income, were not 
asked during the pre-test in all three experiments, it is not possible to compare the 
demographics of the two groups of subjects.  
 
Comparison of Pre-test and Post-test Responses for Panel Subjects 
The differences between the pre-test and post-test responses for panel subjects are 
calculated and presented in Table E1MD-5 and E1MD-6 for Experiment 1, Table E2MD-
5 and E2MD-6 for Experiment 2, and Table E3MD-5 and E3MD-6 for Experiment 3. The 
magnitude of change in the dependent variables is relatively small on all of the dependent 
questions in the three studies. None of the changes reached statistical significance at the 
0.10 level.  
The responses to the independent variables during the pre-test and the post-test do 
not differ too much from each other either, with the largest mean difference being 0.32, -
0.32 and -0.15 on a scale of 0 to 7 with the standard deviation being 1.89, 1.83, and 2.07 
for Experiment 1, 2 and 3, respectively (Question 24, 29 and 24, the number of days 
reading a newspaper). This suggests that the independent measures are not subject to 







V. Tables of Results 
Study 1: North Korea Nuclear Threat (Wave 2) 
Table A-11. Regression Results for Panel Respondents  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
North Korea Nuclear 
Threat Scale 
(-1.28 to 3.14, higher 











Intension to use 
nuclear capacity? 
(1=pose threat 2=both 






nuclear issue resolved 
by peace talks? 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score in dependent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept 1.19 1.04 0.26 -24.32 25.4 0.34 -1.55 1.03 0.14 -0.54 0.78 0.49 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a Threat Story, -
1=North Korea No Longer a Threat 
Story, 0=No North Korea Story) -0.05 0.16 0.76 -8.01 3.92 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.81 -0.09 0.12 0.46 
Information Card on North Korea 
Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) -0.28 0.93 0.76 6.63 22.6 0.77 -0.5 0.92 0.59 -0.05 0.7 0.95 
Interaction -0.09 0.24 0.70 4.58 5.77 0.43 -0.03 0.23 0.90 -0.04 0.18 0.83 
Difference in Information Scale (0-1) 0.38 0.45 0.39 -11.94 10.91 0.28 -0.3 0.44 0.50 -0.25 0.34 0.46 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.28 0.43 0.51 16.61 10.47 0.12 0.02 0.43 0.97 0.42 0.32 0.20 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 to 1.94) -0.11 0.14 0.46 1.16 3.49 0.74 0.17 0.14 0.25 -0.05 0.11 0.65 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 3.25) 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.05 3.8 0.99 0.07 0.15 0.64 -0.07 0.12 0.53 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist attack in 
general (1=Very much through 4=Not at 
all) -0.36 0.16 0.03 2.15 4.01 0.59 -0.08 0.16 0.61 0.08 0.12 0.51 
Q.29---how closely one follows news about 
NK (1=Very closely through 4=Does not 







Q.36---Participation in discussion about 
NK (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.18 0.28 0.51 8.98 6.87 0.20 0.49 0.28 0.08 0.06 0.21 0.76 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s 
own opinion (0 for news control groups, 1 
for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.14 0.2 0.48 3.13 4.84 0.52 -0.06 0.2 0.75 0.36 0.15 0.02 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ 
opinion  (0 for news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.09 0.18 0.64 -4.2 4.47 0.35 0.04 0.18 0.84 -0.37 0.14 0.01 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards 
informative (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 0.06 0.29 0.84 -12.87 6.95 0.07 -0.02 0.28 0.93 0.07 0.21 0.73 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards 
relevant (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.03 0.25 0.90 12.94 5.98 0.03 0.2 0.24 0.41 -0.03 0.18 0.88 
Q.22---Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly 
Democrat through 5=Strongly 
Republican) 0.13 0.1 0.21 -0.32 2.47 0.90 0.15 0.1 0.14 -0.09 0.08 0.24 
Q.23---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal 
through 7=Extremely conservative) -0.02 0.08 0.76 3.64 1.83 0.05 0 0.07 0.96 0.03 0.06 0.64 
Q.24---Political interest (1=Very much 
interested through 3=Hardly interested at 
all) -0.24 0.19 0.20 -1.21 4.55 0.79 0.28 0.19 0.13 0 0.14 0.98 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.08 0.24 0.74 -1.29 5.74 0.82 -0.02 0.23 0.94 0.14 0.18 0.42 
Q.44—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) -0.01 0.09 0.91 -1.3 2.12 0.54 -0.1 0.09 0.26 -0.04 0.07 0.55 
Q.45---Parents born in the country or not 
(1=Yes and 2=No) 0.31 0.3 0.31 2.79 7.42 0.71 0.39 0.3 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.75 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high 
school through 5=Post graduate work) 0.01 0.12 0.91 -1.55 2.9 0.60 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.45 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or 
older) -0.07 0.07 0.36 -1.1 1.77 0.54 -0.05 0.07 0.46 -0.03 0.05 0.57 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 
through 6=100,000 or more) 0.06 0.07 0.39 -0.2 1.7 0.91 -0.2 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.62 







Table A-12. Regression Results for Panel Respondents: Continued 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
















Q.7---NK threat due to 







ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score in dependent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept 0.99 0.82 0.23 -0.01 0.99 0.99 1.47 0.89 0.10 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a Threat Story, -1=North Korea 
No Longer a Threat Story, 0=No North Korea Story) -0.02 0.13 0.90 -0.08 0.15 0.60 -0.01 0.14 0.95 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) -0.26 0.73 0.72 -0.18 0.88 0.84 -0.23 0.79 0.77 
Interaction -0.13 0.19 0.48 -0.06 0.23 0.80 0 0.2 1.00 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.2 0.35 0.57 0.3 0.43 0.48 0.33 0.38 0.40 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.13 0.34 0.71 -0.26 0.41 0.53 -0.2 0.37 0.59 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 to 1.94) -0.19 0.11 0.09 -0.02 0.14 0.91 0 0.12 0.99 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 3.25) 0.05 0.12 0.66 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.19 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist attack in general (1=Very 
much through 4=Not at all) -0.43 0.13 0.00 -0.18 0.16 0.27 -0.13 0.14 0.38 
Q.29---how closely one follows news about NK (1=Very 
closely through 4=Does not follow at all) 0.01 0.13 0.93 -0.04 0.16 0.78 -0.03 0.14 0.84 
Q.36---Participation in discussion about NK (1=Yes and 
0=No) -0.11 0.22 0.62 -0.2 0.27 0.47 -0.11 0.24 0.66 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 
for news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.26 0.16 0.09 -0.11 0.19 0.56 0.08 0.17 0.65 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for 
news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.54 -0.12 0.16 0.46 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 







Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 0.12 0.19 0.54 0.01 0.23 0.98 -0.21 0.21 0.31 
Q.22---Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat 
through 5=Strongly Republican) 0.05 0.08 0.50 0.11 0.1 0.24 0.09 0.09 0.28 
Q.23---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) 0 0.06 0.95 0.02 0.07 0.76 -0.07 0.06 0.28 
Q.24---Political interest (1=Very much interested 
through 3=Hardly interested at all) -0.1 0.15 0.49 -0.2 0.18 0.27 -0.2 0.16 0.22 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.08 0.19 0.65 0.27 0.22 0.24 -0.19 0.2 0.34 
Q.44—Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) -0.01 0.07 0.83 -0.05 0.08 0.54 0.05 0.07 0.48 
Q.45---Parents born in the country or not (1=Yes and 
2=No) 0.13 0.24 0.60 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.46 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 
5=Post graduate work) 0.01 0.09 0.93 0.15 0.11 0.20 -0.13 0.1 0.19 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.04 0.06 0.48 -0.07 0.07 0.32 -0.03 0.06 0.62 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 
or more) 0.06 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.07 0.83 0.06 0.06 0.31 







 Table A-13. Regression Results for post-test respondents  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
North Korea Nuclear 
Threat Scale 












Intension to use nuclear 
capacity? (1=pose 
threat 2=both 3=get 





nuclear issue resolved 
by peace talks? 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 0.79* 0.44 0.08 38.05** 10.04 <0.001 2.31 0.43 <0.001 2.14 0.34 <0.001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a 
Threat Story, -1=North 
Korea No Longer a Threat 
Story, 0=No North Korea 
Story) 0.01 0.07 0.83 -1.97 1.53 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.49 
Information Card on North 
Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.04 0.27 0.89 -2.76 6.08 0.65 0.2 0.26 0.46 -0.25 0.2 0.22 
Interaction -0.08 0.1 0.41 0.45 2.19 0.84 -0.02 0.09 0.87 -0.14** 0.07 0.05 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.23 0.18 0.20 -8.46** 4.12 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.48 -0.20 0.14 0.14 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.59** 0.17 <0.001 -13.77** 3.73 0.00 -0.07 0.16 0.66 -0.04 0.13 0.77 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 
to 1.94) -0.03 0.05 0.57 -1.41 1.12 0.21 -0.04 0.05 0.37 -0.02 0.04 0.53 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 
3.25) 0.46** 0.05 <0.001 4.6** 1.17 0.00 0.25* 0.05 <0.001 0.01 0.04 0.88 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist 
attack in general (1=Very 
much through 4=Not at all) 0.17** 0.06 <0.001 0.47 1.31 0.72 0.07 0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.04 0.74 
Q.29---how closely one 
follows news about NK 
(1=Very closely through 
4=Does not follow at all) 0.04 0.07 0.53 -1.04 1.49 0.49 0.04 0.06 0.55 0.02 0.05 0.68 
Q.36---Participation in 








Q.18 Recoded---news story 
affects one’s own opinion (0 
for news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.06 0.07 0.40 1.06 1.5 0.48 -0.07 0.06 0.28 0.08* 0.05 0.10 
Q.19 Recoded---news story 
affects others’ opinion  (0 for 
news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.04 0.06 0.52 -0.38 1.43 0.79 0.06 0.06 0.30 -0.10** 0.05 0.03 
Q.20--- Recoded Information 
cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 
for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.03 0.09 0.75 -0.46 2.06 0.82 -0.07 0.09 0.43 0.05 0.07 0.47 
Q.21--- Recoded Information 
cards relevant (0 for 
information control groups, 1 
for not at all, to 4 for very 




Republican) 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.84 0.96 0.38 <0.001 0.04 0.94 0.03 0.03 0.35 
Q.23---Ideology 
(1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) -0.09** 0.03 0.01 -0.32 0.73 0.66 -0.01 0.03 0.77 -0.07** 0.02 <0.001 
Q.24---Political interest 
(1=Very much interested 
through 3=Hardly interested 
at all) -0.20** 0.07 0.01 -3.29** 1.65 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.17 -0.04 0.06 0.52 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 
2=Female) -0.02 0.09 0.78 0.12 1.98 0.95 -0.15* 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.92 
Q.44—Race (1=White, 
2=African American/Black, 
etc) 0.02 0.04 0.64 0.04 0.8 0.96 -0.04 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.62 







country or not (1=Yes and 
2=No) 
Q.46---Education (1=Less 
than high school through 
5=Post graduate work) 0.08** 0.04 0.05 -0.46 0.96 0.63 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.05** 0.03 0.09 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 
6=60 or older) -0.04 0.03 0.15 -1.24** 0.64 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.25 -0.02 0.02 0.43 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 
20,000 through 6=100,000 or 
more) 0.02 0.03 0.53 0.18 0.64 0.77 0.03 0.03 0.29 -0.04** 0.02 0.05 







Table A-14. Regression Results Continued for Post-test Respondents - Continued  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
















Q.7---NK threat due to 







ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 2.69** 0.4 <0.001 2.50* 0.4 <0.001 2.51** 0.39 <0.001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a Threat Story, -1=North Korea 
No Longer a Threat Story, 0=No North Korea Story) 0.07 0.06 0.23 <0.001 0.06 0.99 -0.04 0.06 0.46 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) -0.03 0.24 0.89 0.08 0.24 0.74 0.04 0.24 0.86 
Interaction -0.17** 0.09 0.05 <0.001 0.09 1.00 -0.01 0.08 0.92 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.11 0.16 0.51 -0.18 0.16 0.27 -0.24 0.16 0.13 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.41** 0.15 0.01 -0.59** 0.15 <0.001 -0.35** 0.14 0.02 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 to 1.94) -0.05 0.04 0.26 -0.03 0.04 0.48 0.02 0.04 0.66 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 3.25) 0.35** 0.05 <0.001 0.35** 0.05 <0.001 0.33** 0.05 <0.001 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist attack in general (1=Very 
much through 4=Not at all) 0.13** 0.05 0.01 0.15** 0.05 <0.001 0.11** 0.05 0.04 
Q.29---how closely one follows news about NK (1=Very 
closely through 4=Does not follow at all) 0.05 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.06 0.27 -0.02 0.06 0.68 
Q.36---Participation in discussion about NK (1=Yes and 
0=No) -0.08 0.12 0.50 -0.16 0.12 0.17 -0.03 0.11 0.77 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 
for news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.02 0.06 0.80 -0.12** 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.92 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for 
news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.01 0.06 0.93 0.11** 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.66 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 0.04 0.08 0.65 -0.04 0.08 0.65 -0.07 0.08 0.39 







information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 
Q.22---Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat 
through 5=Strongly Republican) <0.001 0.04 0.94 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.29 
Q.23---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) -0.05* 0.03 0.07 -0.08* 0.03 <0.001 -0.06** 0.03 0.03 
Q.24---Political interest (1=Very much interested 
through 3=Hardly interested at all) -0.17** 0.07 0.01 -0.20** 0.06 <0.001 -0.07 0.06 0.26 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.07 0.08 0.38 -0.01 0.08 0.89 0.03 0.08 0.73 
Q.44—Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) -0.01 0.03 0.85 0.01 0.03 0.64 0.03 0.03 0.35 
Q.45---Parents born in the country or not (1=Yes and 
2=No) -0.09 0.1 0.40 0.04 0.1 0.69 0.04 0.1 0.71 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 
5=Post graduate work) 0.08** 0.04 0.05 0.09** 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.66 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.03 0.03 0.29 -0.03 0.03 0.31 -0.04 0.02 0.11 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 
or more) -0.02 0.03 0.55 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.02 0.25 







Table A-15. Regression Results for post-test respondents: Reduced Model  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
North Korea Nuclear 
Threat Scale 
(-1.28 to 3.14, higher 











Intension to use 
nuclear capacity? 
(1=pose threat 2=both 






nuclear issue resolved 
by peace talks? 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 0.67* 0.36 0.06 39.91** 8.2 <0.001 2.17** 0.35 <0.001 2.16** 0.28 <0.001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a Threat 
Story, -1=North Korea No Longer 
a Threat Story, 0=No North Korea 
Story) 0.01 0.07 0.87 -1.90 1.53 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.05 0.50 
Information Card on North Korea 
Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.04 0.08 0.62 1.08 1.86 0.56 0.01 0.08 0.91 0.02 0.06 0.80 
Interaction -0.07 0.10 0.44 0.54 2.17 0.80 -0.02 0.09 0.87 -0.14* 0.07 0.06 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.25 0.18 0.17 -8.10** 4.06 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.50 -0.22* 0.14 0.10 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.59** 0.16 <0.001 -14.35** 3.68 <0.001 -0.07 0.16 0.66 -0.04 0.12 0.76 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 to 
1.94) -0.03 0.05 0.58 -1.37 1.05 0.19 -0.04 0.05 0.36 -0.02 0.04 0.50 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 3.25) 0.46** 0.05 <0.001 4.36** 1.08 <0.001 0.25** 0.05 <0.001 <0.001 0.04 0.92 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist 
attack in general (1=Very much 
through 4=Not at all) 0.17** 0.06 <0.001 0.34 1.3 0.79 0.08 0.06 0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.70 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects 
one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 
for very much) -0.05 0.07 0.42 1.16 1.47 0.43 -0.07 0.06 0.24 0.10** 0.05 0.05 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects 
others’ opinion  (0 for news control 









(1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) 0.04 0.04 0.37 0.76 0.95 0.43 0 0.04 0.95 0.03 0.03 0.35 
Q.23---Ideology (1=Extremely 
liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) -0.09** 0.03 0.01 -0.3 0.72 0.68 -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.07** 0.02 <0.001 
Q.24---Political interest (1=Very 
much interested through 3=Hardly 
interested at all) -0.20** 0.07 0.01 -3.36** 1.63 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.19 -0.04 0.05 0.41 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 
2=Female) -0.01 0.09 0.86 -0.28 1.94 0.88 -0.13 0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.88 
Q.44—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) 0.02 0.04 0.59 0.01 0.79 0.99 -0.04 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.55 
Q.45---Parents born in the country 
or not (1=Yes and 2=No) -0.01 0.12 0.91 0.79 2.6 0.76 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.12 0.09 0.16 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than 
high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) 0.08** 0.04 0.05 -0.33 0.95 0.73 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.05* 0.03 0.09 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 
or older) -0.04 0.03 0.15 -1.22** 0.63 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.24 -0.02 0.02 0.45 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 
through 6=100,000 or more) 0.02 0.03 0.55 0.15 0.63 0.81 0.03 0.03 0.26 -0.04** 0.02 0.04 







Table A-16. Regression Results Continued for Post-test Respondents: Reduced Model -Continued 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
















Q.7---NK threat due to 







ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 2.69** 0.33 <0.001 2.36** 0.32 <0.001 2.38** 0.32 <0.001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=North Korea Posing a Threat Story, -1=North Korea 
No Longer a Threat Story, 0=No North Korea Story) 0.07 0.06 0.24 <0.001 0.06 0.94 -0.04 0.06 0.46 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.06 0.07 0.45 -0.04 0.07 0.60 
Interaction -0.16* 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.95 -0.01 0.08 0.92 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.14 0.16 0.40 -0.2 0.16 0.20 -0.23 0.16 0.15 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.40** 0.15 0.01 -0.58** 0.15 <0.001 -0.37** 0.14 0.01 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.90 to 1.94) -0.05 0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.04 0.47 0.03 0.04 0.50 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.90 to 3.25) 0.36** 0.04 <0.001 0.36** 0.04 <0.001 0.33** 0.04 <0.001 
Q.17---Worry about terrorist attack in general (1=Very 
much through 4=Not at all) 0.13** 0.05 0.01 0.16** 0.05 <0.001 0.10** 0.05 0.04 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 
for news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.01 0.06 0.90 -0.12** 0.06 0.05 <0.001 0.06 0.95 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for 
news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) <0.001 0.06 1.00 0.11** 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.67 
Q.22---Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat 
through 5=Strongly Republican) <0.001 0.04 0.98 0.05 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.25 
Q.23---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) -0.05* 0.03 0.06 -0.08** 0.03 <0.001 -0.06** 0.03 0.03 
Q.24---Political interest (1=Very much interested 
through 3=Hardly interested at all) -0.17** 0.06 0.01 -0.20** 0.06 <0.001 -0.07 0.06 0.27 
Q.43—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.06 0.08 0.44 0 0.08 0.95 0.02 0.08 0.76 







Q.45---Parents born in the country or not (1=Yes and 
2=No) -0.09 0.1 0.38 0.03 0.1 0.77 0.03 0.1 0.73 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 
5=Post graduate work) 0.07** 0.04 0.05 0.09** 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.56 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.03 0.02 0.30 -0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.04* 0.02 0.09 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 
or more) -0.02 0.03 0.52 0.03 0.02 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.25 








Study 2: Health Care Reform (Wave 2) 











Favorability by Cutting 





 ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score independent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept 0.33 0.64 0.61 -0.6 1.07 0.57 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the reform, 0=No health care 
reform story) -0.16 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.74 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) -0.02 0.52 0.96 -0.4 0.86 0.65 
Interaction 0.04 0.15 0.80 -0.15 0.25 0.55 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.15 0.26 0.56 0.08 0.42 0.86 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.18 0.26 0.49 0.12 0.43 0.77 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.06 0.08 0.46 0.03 0.13 0.81 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.09 0.08 0.26 -0.27 0.14 0.05 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely through 4=Does not 
follow at all) -0.02 0.06 0.74 0.35 0.11 0.00 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.11 0.11 0.33 -0.15 0.18 0.40 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.27 0.17 0.11 0.33 0.27 0.23 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.01 0.1 0.88 0.02 0.16 0.91 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information control groups, 1 
for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.02 0.09 0.80 -0.14 0.15 0.34 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.2 0.18 0.26 -0.8 0.29 0.01 
Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 5=Strongly disapprove) -0.19 0.2 0.35 1.04 0.33 0.00 
Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 5=Strongly Republican) 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.13 0.11 0.24 







Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 3=Hardly interested at all) -0.01 0.13 0.95 0.15 0.21 0.47 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.14 0.14 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.22 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0.05 0.06 0.40 -0.11 0.11 0.29 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post graduate work) -0.06 0.07 0.43 0.02 0.12 0.85 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.03 0.05 0.48 -0.12 0.08 0.14 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.01 0.05 0.85 -0.02 0.08 0.76 








Table A-18. Regression Results for Panel Respondents - Continued 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Q.1 Recoded ---Generally 
favor or oppose the 
Health Care Reform 





Q.2 Recoded ---Favor 
or oppose universal 
coverage (1=Favor, 





Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or 
oppose a system that has 
both public and private 
health insurance 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score in dependent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept -0.01 0.69 0.99 -0.08 0.87 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.32 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the 
reform, 0=No health care reform story) -0.08 0.11 0.50 -0.13 0.14 0.37 -0.06 0.14 0.66 
Information Card on Health Care Reform  
(0=without card 1=with card) -0.16 0.56 0.78 -0.31 0.7 0.66 -0.23 0.7 0.75 
Interaction -0.09 0.16 0.57 0.13 0.2 0.53 -0.09 0.2 0.66 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.47 0.28 0.09 -0.19 0.34 0.58 -0.13 0.35 0.71 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.2 0.28 0.46 0.02 0.35 0.95 0.3 0.35 0.38 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) -0.05 0.08 0.51 0.12 0.1 0.24 0.05 0.1 0.62 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0 0.09 0.96 0.13 0.11 0.25 0.21 0.11 0.06 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) 0.12 0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.09 0.20 -0.17 0.09 0.06 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.06 0.12 0.64 0.12 0.15 0.43 0.11 0.15 0.46 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.06 0.18 0.75 -0.05 0.22 0.82 -0.63 0.22 0.01 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.01 0.11 0.91 -0.04 0.13 0.79 0.08 0.13 0.56 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.07 0.1 0.48 -0.01 0.12 0.95 -0.04 0.12 0.72 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.09 0.19 0.65 0.41 0.24 0.09 0.39 0.24 0.11 








Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) 0.09 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.06 
Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) -0.05 0.06 0.35 -0.11 0.07 0.12 0 0.07 0.95 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 
3=Hardly interested at all) -0.16 0.14 0.24 -0.05 0.17 0.77 0.02 0.17 0.93 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.1 0.15 0.49 -0.01 0.19 0.95 -0.03 0.19 0.87 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0 0.07 1.00 0.04 0.09 0.67 0.1 0.09 0.27 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) -0.06 0.08 0.47 -0.1 0.1 0.28 -0.18 0.1 0.07 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.03 0.05 0.58 0.01 0.07 0.93 0.03 0.07 0.64 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.02 0.05 0.64 0.09 0.06 0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.69 












should follow to have a 
single payer system  





employer to pay a fee 








Q.6---Saving money by 








ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score in dependent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept 0 0.31 1.00 0.02 0.97 0.99 -0.13 1.22 0.92 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the reform, 
0=No health care reform story) 0.07 0.05 0.19 -0.16 0.16 0.33 -0.05 0.2 0.81 
Information Card on Health Care Reform 
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.12 0.25 0.64 -1.57 0.78 0.05 -0.89 0.98 0.37 
Interaction -0.04 0.07 0.56 -0.13 0.22 0.55 -0.16 0.28 0.57 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.07 0.12 0.56 0.26 0.39 0.50 -0.04 0.49 0.94 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.09 0.12 0.46 -0.05 0.39 0.90 0.42 0.49 0.40 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.61 0.14 0.15 0.34 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.53 -0.19 0.16 0.24 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) 0 0.03 0.95 0.22 0.1 0.02 0.25 0.12 0.04 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.03 0.05 0.61 0.09 0.17 0.58 -0.12 0.21 0.55 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.07 0.08 0.38 -0.41 0.25 0.10 0.01 0.31 0.98 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.03 0.05 0.52 -0.06 0.15 0.67 0.13 0.19 0.48 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.13 0.95 -0.29 0.17 0.09 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 







Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 
5=Strongly disapprove) 0.04 0.1 0.65 0.29 0.3 0.34 1.12 0.38 0.00 
Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) -0.01 0.03 0.86 0.07 0.1 0.50 -0.07 0.12 0.59 
Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.15 0.08 0.07 -0.08 0.1 0.45 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 3=Hardly 
interested at all) 0.01 0.06 0.86 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.3 0.24 0.22 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.13 0.07 0.06 -0.19 0.21 0.37 0.32 0.26 0.23 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) -0.03 0.03 0.34 -0.01 0.1 0.91 -0.16 0.12 0.20 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post graduate 
work) 0.02 0.03 0.52 0.07 0.11 0.54 -0.08 0.13 0.54 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.02 0.07 0.82 -0.11 0.09 0.23 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) -0.02 0.02 0.36 -0.03 0.07 0.64 -0.02 0.09 0.79 








































ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score in dependent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept -0.45 1.05 0.67 0.63 1.11 0.57 -0.23 0.84 0.78 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the reform, 
0=No health care reform story) -0.23 0.17 0.20 -0.24 0.18 0.20 -0.33 0.14 0.02 
Information Card on Health Care Reform 
(0=without card 1=with card) 2.49 0.84 0.00 0.25 0.89 0.78 -0.82 0.67 0.23 
Interaction 0.22 0.24 0.36 0.13 0.26 0.60 0.12 0.19 0.53 
Difference in Information Scale (0-1) -0.5 0.42 0.23 -0.13 0.44 0.77 0.17 0.33 0.62 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.49 0.42 0.25 -0.33 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.21 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.09 0.13 0.49 -0.03 0.13 0.79 0.06 0.1 0.56 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.06 0.14 0.65 -0.11 0.14 0.44 -0.23 0.11 0.04 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) -0.11 0.1 0.30 0.11 0.11 0.32 0.24 0.08 0.01 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.06 0.18 0.73 -0.06 0.19 0.77 0.14 0.14 0.31 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.03 0.27 0.90 -0.07 0.28 0.80 -0.2 0.21 0.36 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.03 0.16 0.83 0.03 0.17 0.88 0.03 0.13 0.80 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.07 0.14 0.61 -0.04 0.15 0.77 -0.09 0.12 0.44 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 







Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 
5=Strongly disapprove) -0.18 0.32 0.58 -0.09 0.34 0.78 0.22 0.26 0.38 
Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) -0.03 0.11 0.75 0.06 0.11 0.59 0.07 0.08 0.42 
Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 0.12 0.09 0.17 -0.01 0.09 0.91 -0.05 0.07 0.47 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 3=Hardly 
interested at all) 0.16 0.21 0.44 0.02 0.22 0.91 0.21 0.17 0.22 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.11 0.23 0.64 -0.24 0.24 0.33 -0.31 0.18 0.09 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0 0.1 0.97 0.05 0.11 0.65 0.04 0.08 0.67 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post graduate 
work) 0.05 0.12 0.65 -0.12 0.12 0.32 -0.16 0.09 0.08 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.1 0.08 0.22 -0.02 0.08 0.81 -0.04 0.06 0.52 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) -0.03 0.08 0.72 -0.01 0.08 0.94 0.02 0.06 0.70 











Table A-21. Regression Results for post-test respondents: Full Model  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
General Favorability  
(-1.72 to 2.10) 
Favorability by Cutting 
Medicare Cost (-2.57 to 
2.12) 
Favorability of Health 
Care Reform (one 
factor only for all DV 
questions 
ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept -1.54** 0.29 <0.0001 -1.83** 0.45 <0.0001 -1.83** 0.28 <0.0001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the reform, 
0=No health care reform story) 
-0.05 0.05 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.27 -0.04 0.05 0.44 
Information Cards on health care reform  
(0=without card 1=with card) 
0.49** 0.24 0.04 <0.01 0.37 1.00 0.48** 0.23 0.04 
Interaction 0.05 0.07 0.49 -0.13 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.70 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.06 0.13 0.68 -0.11 0.21 0.59 0.04 0.13 0.78 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.23* 0.12 0.06 0.52** 0.19 0.01 -0.14 0.12 0.23 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.01 0.04 0.69 -0.04 0.06 0.49 0.01 0.03 0.82 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.10** 0.04 <0.0001 -0.07 0.05 0.21 0.09** 0.03 0.01 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) 
-0.11** 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.74 -0.10** 0.05 0.03 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.01 0.07 0.88 -0.04 0.11 0.71 -0.02 0.07 0.80 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.06 0.04 0.17 -0.06 0.06 0.34 -0.07* 0.04 0.09 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
0.02 0.04 0.55 0.05 0.06 0.42 0.03 0.04 0.39 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.03 0.09 0.72 -0.30** 0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.32 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.12* 0.07 0.09 0.30** 0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.32 
Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 
5=Strongly disapprove) 
0.45** 0.03 <0.0001 0.15** 0.04 <0.0001 0.47** 0.03 <0.0001 
Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) 
0.05* 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.85 0.05* 0.03 0.08 








Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 3=Hardly 
interested at all) 
-0.09* 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.19 -0.07 0.05 0.18 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) <0.01 0.06 0.98 0.30** 0.1 <0.0001 0.05 0.06 0.38 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0.02 0.02 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.36 0.03 0.02 0.27 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) 
0.01 0.03 0.87 -0.03 0.05 0.54 <0.01 0.03 1.00 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.03 0.02 0.20 0.17** 0.03 <0.0001 <0.01 0.02 0.90 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.04* 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.61 0.04* 0.02 0.07 











Generally favor or 
oppose the Health Care 
Reform (1=Favor, 2=No 
opinion and 3=Oppose) 
Q.2 Recoded ---Favor 
or oppose universal 
coverage (1=Favor, 
2=No opinion and 
3=Oppose) 
Q.3 Recoded ---Favor or 
oppose a system that has 
both public and private 
health insurance 
(1=Favor, 2=No opinion 
and 3=Oppose) 
ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 0.94** 0.30 <0.0001 0.82** 0.36 0.02 1.71** 0.37  <0.0001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the 
reform, 0=No health care reform story) -0.02 0.05 0.64 -0.11* 0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.32 
Information Cards on Health Care Reform  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.13 0.25 0.60 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.61** 0.31 0.05 
Interaction 0.04 0.07 0.62 0.15* 0.09 0.09    0.02 0.09 0.79 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.26* 0.14 0.06 -0.10 0.16 0.53   0.21 0.17 0.21 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.04 0.13 0.75 -0.19 0.15 0.22   -0.43** 0.16 0.01 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) <0.01 0.04 1.00 0.02 0.04 0.58 0.01 0.05 0.82 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.15** 0.04 <0.0001 0.14** 0.04 <0.0001 -0.01 0.05 0.88 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) -0.16** 0.05 <0.0001 -0.10* 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.82 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.08 0.07 0.29 -0.06 0.09 0.53 -0.04 0.09 0.66 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) <0.01 0.04 0.91 -0.02 0.05 0.67 -0.03 0.05 0.59 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.01 0.04 0.89 0.01 0.05 0.90 <0.01 0.05 0.97 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.01 0.09 0.92 -0.05 0.11 0.61 -0.04 0.11 0.72 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) <0.01 0.07 0.96 -0.06 0.09 0.52 -0.18* 0.09 0.06 
Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 
5=Strongly disapprove) 0.40** 0.03 <0.0001 0.24** 0.04 <0.0001 0.14** 0.04 <0.0001 








Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.07** 0.03 0.05 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 
3=Hardly interested at all) -0.03 0.06 0.66 -0.03 0.07 0.68 -0.13* 0.07 0.08 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.02 0.06 0.70 -0.03 0.08 0.66 -0.10 0.08 0.21 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) <0.01 0.03 0.87 0.06* 0.03 0.06 <0.01 0.03 0.89 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) -0.08** 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.70 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.02 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.05* 0.03 0.09 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.07** 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.70 













should follow to have a 
single payer system  
(1=Yes and 2=No) 
Q.5---Require 
employer to pay a fee 








Q.6---Saving money by 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 1.02** 0.17 <0.0001 1.30** 0.5 0.01 1.30** 0.56 0.02 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the 
reform, 0=No health care reform story) 0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.09 0.67 0.05 0.10 0.61 
Information Cards on Health Care Reform 
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.08 0.14 0.56 0.26 0.41 0.53 0.35 0.47 0.45 
Interaction 0.02 0.04 0.72 -0.09 0.12 0.47 -0.11 0.14 0.44 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.15* 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.50 -0.11 0.26 0.66 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.06 0.21 0.78 0.42* 0.24 0.07 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.01 0.02 0.67 -0.02 0.06 0.76 -0.04 0.07 0.56 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.79 -0.07 0.07 0.29 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) -0.05* 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.08 0.62 0.02 0.10 0.85 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.02 0.04 0.65 -0.2 0.12 0.11 -0.09 0.14 0.54 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.01 0.02 0.70 -0.13* 0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.34 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.01 0.02 0.77 0.08 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.47 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.06 0.05 0.27 <0.01 0.15 0.99 -0.44** 0.17 0.01 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.09** 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.51 0.33** 0.14 0.02 
Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 







Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.12** 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.58 
Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 0.04** 0.02 0.01 0.08* 0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.16 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 
3=Hardly interested at all) -0.03 0.03 0.30 -0.11 0.1 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.37 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.03 0.04 0.38 -0.05 0.11 0.62 0.32** 0.12 0.01 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) <0.01 0.01 0.84 0.01 0.04 0.90 0.06 0.05 0.20 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) -0.01 0.02 0.78 0.06 0.06 0.29 -0.04 0.07 0.57 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.22** 0.04 <0.0001 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.01 0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.04 0.74 -0.01 0.04 0.73 






























ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 0.85 0.52 0.11 0.2 0.41 0.63 0.05 0.40 0.91 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=A story in support of the reform, -1= A story against the 
reform, 0=No health care reform story) 
0.05 0.09 0.56 -0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.07 0.39 
Information Cards on Health Care Reform 
(0=without card 1=with card) 
0.85** 0.43 0.05 0.54 0.34 0.11 0.43 0.33 0.19 
Interaction -0.15 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.98 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.59** 0.24 0.01 -0.38** 0.19 0.04 -0.07 0.18 0.69 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.38* 0.22 0.08 -0.08 0.17 0.65 0.15 0.17 0.37 
Media Exposure Scale (-2.06 to 1.88) 0.04 0.06 0.56 -0.02 0.05 0.71 0.01 0.05 0.90 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.67 to 3.81) -0.07 0.06 0.25 0.12** 0.05 0.01 0.13** 0.05 0.01 
Q.30---how closely one follows news about HC (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) 
<0.01 0.09 0.98 -0.14** 0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.18 
Q.37---Participation in discussion about HC (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.01 0.13 0.97 -0.04 0.1 0.73 0.07 0.1 0.45 
Q.18 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for 
news control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.16** 0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.40 -0.08 0.06 0.15 
Q.19 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
0.1 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.50 0.04 0.05 0.43 
Q.20--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.19 0.15 0.22 -0.16 0.12 0.19 -0.14 0.12 0.23 
Q.21--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.11 0.13 0.39 0.02 0.1 0.88 0.03 0.1 0.76 
Q.22---Obama job approval (1=Strongly approve through 
5=Strongly disapprove) 







Q.23- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) 
<0.01 0.06 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.67 0.01 0.04 0.89 
Q.24---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 
0.23** 0.05 <0.0001 0.15** 0.04 <0.0001 0.12 0.04 <0.0001 
Q.25---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 
3=Hardly interested at all) 
-0.13 0.1 0.21 -0.07 0.08 0.39 <0.01 0.08 0.99 
Q.44---Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.03 0.11 0.81 0.17** 0.09 0.05 0.20** 0.08 0.02 
Q.45---Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0.02 0.04 0.68 -0.01 0.03 0.72 0.07** 0.03 0.05 
Q.46---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) 
0.02 0.06 0.79 0.03 0.05 0.48 -0.02 0.05 0.68 
Q.47---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) -0.10** 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.78 0.02 0.03 0.45 
Q.48---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or 
more) 
0.10** 0.04 0.01 <0.01 0.03 0.97 0.02 0.03 0.42 









 Study 3: Alternative Energy (Wave 2) 
Table A-25. Regression Results for panel respondents  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Support for Alternative 




Support for Incentives 
for Traditional Energy  




ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score independent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept -0.24 0.77 0.75 -0.73 1.06 0.49 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= Disadvantages of 
alternative energy, 0=No Story about alternative energy) 0.04 0.14 0.77 0.22 0.19 0.25 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 1.25 0.6 0.04 -0.1 0.82 0.91 
Interaction -0.12 0.19 0.52 -0.13 0.26 0.63 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.21 0.39 0.59 -0.33 0.53 0.54 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.66 0.33 0.05 0.78 0.46 0.09 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) 0.1 0.13 0.45 -0.12 0.17 0.50 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0 0.11 0.98 0.05 0.15 0.75 
Q.27---how closely one follows news about EN (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) 0.04 0.12 0.73 -0.08 0.16 0.65 
Q.34---Participation in discussion about EN (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.12 0.19 0.53 -0.51 0.27 0.06 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.09 0.14 0.52 -0.19 0.19 0.32 
Q.17 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.03 0.13 0.82 0.17 0.18 0.35 
Q.18--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.11 0.19 0.54 -0.09 0.25 0.72 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.28 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.48 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) -0.07 0.1 0.50 0.12 0.14 0.38 








Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 
3=Hardly interested at all) 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.06 0.91 
Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.2 0.25 0.41 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) -0.04 0.08 0.65 0.16 0.11 0.16 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) 0.04 0.11 0.67 -0.23 0.14 0.12 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) 0.02 0.06 0.77 0.11 0.09 0.23 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) 0.1 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.93 













will run out soon or will 
sustain long (1=Run out 





energy a better source 
(1=Yes, 2=Same as 







incentive to develop 
alternative energy 
research (1=Increase, 







incentive to develop 
traditional energy 
research (1=Decrease, 





ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score independent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept 0.54 0.36 0.13 -0.55 0.72 0.45 -0.71 0.52 0.17 0.29 0.71 0.68 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= 
Disadvantages of alternative energy, 
0=No Story about alternative energy) 0.07 0.07 0.28 -0.05 0.13 0.71 -0.02 0.09 0.85 0.2 0.13 0.12 
Information Card on North Korea 
Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.21 0.28 0.45 0.2 0.56 0.72 1.07 0.4 0.01 0.19 0.55 0.73 
Interaction -0.07 0.09 0.41 -0.08 0.18 0.67 0.04 0.13 0.75 -0.2 0.18 0.25 
Information Scale (0-1) 0.36 0.18 0.05 -0.68 0.36 0.07 -0.06 0.26 0.81 0.04 0.36 0.92 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.05 0.15 0.76 -0.36 0.31 0.25 0.03 0.23 0.89 0.07 0.31 0.81 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) 0.14 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.64 -0.08 0.08 0.37 -0.11 0.12 0.36 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.1 0.51 -0.04 0.08 0.64 0.02 0.1 0.83 
Q.27---how closely one follows news 
about EN (1=Very closely through 
4=Does not follow at all) -0.01 0.06 0.79 -0.08 0.11 0.45 -0.1 0.08 0.23 -0.08 0.11 0.49 
Q.34---Participation in discussion about 
EN (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.1 0.09 0.27 -0.28 0.18 0.13 0.37 0.13 0.01 -0.3 0.18 0.10 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects one’s 
own opinion (0 for news control groups, 1 







Q.17 Recoded---news story affects others’ 
opinion  (0 for news control groups, 1 for 
not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.01 0.06 0.83 0.11 0.12 0.36 0.05 0.09 0.59 0.15 0.12 0.22 
Q.18--- Recoded Information cards 
informative (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 0.03 0.09 0.77 -0.04 0.17 0.81 -0.21 0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.17 0.59 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards 
relevant (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.06 0.07 0.41 -0.06 0.15 0.68 -0.21 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.63 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly 
Democrat through 5=Strongly 
Republican) 0.04 0.05 0.41 0.17 0.1 0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.09 0.70 
Q.21---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal 
through 7=Extremely conservative) -0.12 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.52 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.22 
Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much 
interested through 3=Hardly interested 
at all) -0.02 0.02 0.26 0.04 0.04 0.39 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.64 
Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.07 0.08 0.41 0.15 0.17 0.38 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.1 0.17 0.55 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.46 -0.09 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.76 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high 
school through 5=Post graduate work) -0.03 0.05 0.58 0.1 0.1 0.31 0.02 0.07 0.75 -0.07 0.1 0.45 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or 
older) 0.01 0.03 0.62 0.04 0.06 0.49 -0.08 0.04 0.08 0 0.06 0.94 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 
through 6=100,000 or more) -0.03 0.03 0.28 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.04 0.06 0.52 




































ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Pre-test score independent variable 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. 
Intercept -0.56 0.48 0.25 -0.87 0.51 0.09 -0.07 0.89 0.94 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= 
Disadvantages of alternative energy, 0=No 
Story about alternative energy) 
0.13 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.18 -0.02 0.16 0.89 
Information Card on North Korea Stimuli  
(0=without card 1=with card) 
0.29 0.38 0.44 0.32 0.39 0.42 0.76 0.69 0.27 
Interaction -0.06 0.12 0.59 -0.09 0.13 0.50 -0.12 0.22 0.60 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.45 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.78 0.45 0.09 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.21 0.21 0.32 -0.01 0.22 0.95 0.1 0.39 0.80 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) -0.06 0.08 0.45 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.74 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0.04 0.07 0.55 -0.06 0.07 0.38 -0.11 0.13 0.39 
Q.27---how closely one follows news about EN 
(1=Very closely through 4=Does not follow at 
all) 
0.13 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.61 0.09 0.14 0.49 
Q.34---Participation in discussion about EN 
(1=Yes and 0=No) 
-0.2 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.60 -0.35 0.22 0.13 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects one’s own 
opinion (0 for news control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.13 0.09 0.13 0 0.09 0.97 -0.05 0.16 0.76 
Q.17 Recoded---news story affects others’ 
opinion  (0 for news control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) 







Q.18--- Recoded Information cards informative 
(0 for information control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) 
-0.07 0.12 0.54 0.08 0.12 0.50 -0.13 0.21 0.55 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 
for information control groups, 1 for not at all, 
to 4 for very much) 
0 0.1 0.99 -0.13 0.1 0.21 0 0.18 0.99 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly 
Democrat through 5=Strongly Republican) 
-0.09 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.70 0.12 0.12 0.30 
Q.21---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) 
0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.84 -0.11 0.08 0.20 
Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much 
interested through 3=Hardly interested at all) 
0.04 0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.82 -0.01 0.05 0.86 
Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) 0.08 0.11 0.48 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.84 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) 
0.09 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.57 -0.02 0.09 0.87 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high school 
through 5=Post graduate work) 
-0.07 0.07 0.27 -0.11 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.75 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.07 0 0.07 0.99 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 
6=100,000 or more) 
0.02 0.04 0.70 0.04 0.04 0.40 0.13 0.07 0.09 







Table A-28. Regression Results for post-test respondents 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Support for Alternative 
Energy (-1.40 to 3.41) 
Support for Incentives 
for Traditional Energy  
(-2.16 to 2.32) 
ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 0.33 0.37 0.37 -0.59 0.44 0.19 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= Disadvantages of 
alternative energy, 0=No Story about alternative energy) 0.15** 0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.42 
Information Cards on alternative energy research  
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.69** 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.33 0.77 
Interaction -0.04 0.1 0.69 0.15 0.12 0.19 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.62** 0.18 <0.0001 -0.17 0.21 0.43 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.23 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.2 0.73 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) 0.03 0.05 0.57 -0.03 0.06 0.58 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0.44** 0.05 <0.0001 0.20** 0.05 <0.0001 
Q.27---how closely one follows news about EN (1=Very closely 
through 4=Does not follow at all) <0.01 0.06 0.98 0.05 0.08 0.47 
Q.34---Participation in discussion about EN (1=Yes and 0=No) -0.07 0.1 0.49 0.06 0.11 0.59 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects one’s own opinion (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.15** 0.06 0.02 <0.01 0.08 0.99 
Q.17 Recoded---news story affects others’ opinion  (0 for news 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) 0.15** 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.93 
Q.18--- Recoded Information cards informative (0 for 
information control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) -0.22** 0.08 0.01 -0.10 0.1 0.31 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 for information 
control groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very much) <0.01 0.07 1.00 0.03 0.09 0.70 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly Democrat through 
5=Strongly Republican) -0.08* 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.87 
Q.21---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 7=Extremely 
conservative) 0.20** 0.04 <0.0001 0.09* 0.05 0.06 
Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much interested through 







Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.11 0.08 0.19 -0.06 0.1 0.57 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African American/Black, etc) 0.06* 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.14 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high school through 5=Post 
graduate work) 0.03 0.04 0.43 -0.12** 0.05 0.02 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) <0.01 0.03 0.96 0.11** 0.03 <0.0001 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 6=100,000 or more) <0.01 0.03 0.98 0.05 0.03 0.13 











will run out soon or will 
sustain long (1=Run out 
soon, 2=Sustain long) 
Q.2---Alternative 
energy a better source 
(1=Yes, 2=Same as 




incentive to develop 
alternative energy 
research (1=Increase, 




incentive to develop 
traditional energy 
research (1=Decrease, 
2=No change and 
3=Increase) 
ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 1.11** 0.2 <0.0001 1.51** 0.3 <0.0001 1.56** 0.26 <0.0001 1.91** 0.32 <0.0001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= 
Disadvantages of alternative energy, 
0=No Story about alternative energy) 0.01 0.04 0.73 0.03 0.06 0.60 0.09* 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.78 
Information Cards on alternative 
energy research 
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.67 0.10 0.19 0.61 -0.05 0.24 0.82 
Interaction 0.02 0.05 0.68 0.12 0.08 0.14 -0.08 0.07 0.22 0.04 0.08 0.65 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.04 0.09 0.64 -0.27* 0.15 0.07 -0.41** 0.12 <0.0001 -0.19 0.15 0.21 
Political Knowledge (0-1) 0.20** 0.09 0.02 -0.22 0.14 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.47 -0.25* 0.15 0.09 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) <0.01 0.03 0.93 -0.02 0.04 0.67 0.05 0.03 0.17 -0.01 0.04 0.86 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0.10** 0.02 <0.0001 0.27** 0.04 <0.0001 0.22** 0.03 <0.0001 0.12** 0.04 <0.0001 
Q.27---how closely one follows news 
about EN (1=Very closely through 
4=Does not follow at all) 0.01 0.03 0.72 0.04 0.05 0.48 <0.01 0.04 0.98 0.04 0.05 0.45 
Q.34---Participation in discussion 
about EN (1=Yes and 0=No) 0.03 0.05 0.58 -0.01 0.08 0.88 0.01 0.07 0.92 0.01 0.08 0.88 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects 
one’s own opinion (0 for news control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.03 0.03 0.35 -0.03 0.05 0.58 -0.12** 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.49 
Q.17 Recoded---news story affects 







groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) 
Q.18--- Recoded Information cards 
informative (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.09** 0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.07 0.12 -0.11* 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.80 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards 
relevant (0 for information control 
groups, 1 for not at all, to 4 for very 
much) -0.01 0.04 0.88 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.59 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly 
Democrat through 5=Strongly 
Republican) -0.03 0.03 0.35 0.04 0.04 0.33 -0.07** 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.90 
Q.21---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal 
through 7=Extremely conservative) 0.07** 0.02 <0.0001 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.13** 0.03 <0.0001 0.04 0.04 0.32 
Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much 
interested through 3=Hardly interested 
at all) -0.04 0.04 0.35 
-
0.19** 0.06 <0.0001 -0.05 0.05 0.35 -0.04 0.06 0.56 
Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.06 0.04 0.17 -0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.06 0.47 <0.01 0.07 0.98 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) 0.05** 0.02 0.01 0.06** 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.30 <0.01 0.03 0.86 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high 
school through 5=Post graduate work) -0.04 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.83 -0.09** 0.04 0.02 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or 
older) 0.05** 0.01 <0.0001 0.06** 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.70 0.04 0.02 0.11 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 
through 6=100,000 or more) 0.01 0.01 0.38 <0.01 0.02 0.93 <0.01 0.02 0.97 0.05** 0.02 0.05 
























through 4=Definitely not 
support) 
ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
Intercept 1.80** 0.19 <0.0001 1.57** 0.25 <0.001 1.94** 0.41 <0.0001 
News Story Stimuli  
(1=Supporting alternative energy, -1= 
Disadvantages of alternative energy, 0=No 
Story about alternative energy) 0.08** 0.04 0.03 0.10** 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.46 
Information Cards on alternative energy 
research 
(0=without card 1=with card) 0.63** 0.14 <0.0001 0.05 0.19 0.81 0.79** 0.31 0.01 
Interaction -0.01 0.05 0.80 -0.09 0.07 0.17 0.21* 0.11 0.06 
Information Scale (0-1) -0.41** 0.09 <0.0001 -0.13 0.12 0.28 -0.02 0.2 0.93 
Political Knowledge (0-1) -0.31** 0.09 <0.0001 -0.13 0.12 0.28 0.31 0.19 0.11 
Media Exposure Scale (-1.87 to 2.00) 0.03 0.03 0.33 <0.01 0.03 1.00 -0.06 0.06 0.25 
Issue Salience Scale (-1.55 to 3.67) 0.17** 0.02 <0.0001 0.24** 0.03 <0.001 0.18** 0.05 <0.0001 
Q.27---how closely one follows news about EN 
(1=Very closely through 4=Does not follow at 
all) -0.01 0.03 0.73 0.03 0.04 0.47 -0.02 0.07 0.75 
Q.34---Participation in discussion about EN 
(1=Yes and 0=No) -0.01 0.05 0.84 -0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.92 
Q.16 Recoded---news story affects one’s own 
opinion (0 for news control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) -0.03 0.03 0.45 -0.03 0.04 0.48 -0.25** 0.07 <0.0001 
Q.17 Recoded---news story affects others’ 
opinion  (0 for news control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) 0.02 0.03 0.47 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.19** 0.07 0.01 







(0 for information control groups, 1 for not at 
all, to 4 for very much) 
Q.19--- Recoded Information cards relevant (0 
for information control groups, 1 for not at all, 
to 4 for very much) -0.07* 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.63 -0.04 0.08 0.60 
Q.20- Recoded---Party ID (1=Strongly 
Democrat through 5=Strongly Republican) -0.07** 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.81 0.05 0.06 0.42 
Q.21---Ideology (1=Extremely liberal through 
7=Extremely conservative) 0.05** 0.02 0.01 0.10** 0.03 <0.0001 0.18** 0.05 <0.0001 
Q.22---Political interest (1=Very much 
interested through 3=Hardly interested at all) -0.07* 0.04 0.07 -0.12** 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.61 
Q.41—Gender (1=Male and 2=Female) -0.06 0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.06 0.57 0.03 0.09 0.76 
Q.42—Race (1=White, 2=African 
American/Black, etc) 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.50 
Q.43---Education (1=Less than high school 
through 5=Post graduate work) 0.03 0.02 0.24 -0.03 0.03 0.25 -0.07 0.05 0.13 
Q.44---Age (1=18-25 through 6=60 or older) <0.01 0.01 0.83 -0.01 0.02 0.54 -0.01 0.03 0.67 
Q.45---Income (1=Less than 20,000 through 
6=100,000 or more) 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.02 0.02 0.25 -0.04 0.03 0.24 









Table A-31. Summary Table for Results from the Three Experiments 
Independent 




*Feeling thermo: Confirms H.1 and H.2 
*Nuclear threat scale: Confirms H.1, 
contradicts H.2 
*Q7: Confirms H.1, contradicts H.2 No significant effect 
Feeling thermo: Confirms H.1 and 
H.1 
 Health Care Reform No significant effect Q2: Confirms H.1 and H.1 Q6: Confirms H.1 and H.1 
 Alternative energy 
*Alternative energy scale: Contradicts 
H.1 and H.1 
*Q5 & Q6: Contradict H.1 and H.1 
Alternative energy scale, 
Q3, Q5 and Q6: 
Contradict H.1 and H.1 No significant effect 
     
Information 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat Specific information scale only No significant effect No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform Specific information scale only 
General favorability scale, 
Q3 and Q7: More 
information, less likely to 
favor the reform 
Q5: More information, more likely to 
favor employer paying a fee  
Q7: More information, less likely to 
favor increasing tax for pay for the 
reform 
 Alternative energy Specific information scale only 
Alternative energy scale, 
Q5 and Q7: More 
information, Less likely to 
favor alternative energy 
Alternative energy scale and Q3: 
More information, less support 




No significant effect 
Trend: Q4, 5 and nuclear threat scale:  
            Contradict H.2 and H.2 
Q4 and Q8: Contradict 
H.2, H.2 No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform 
No significant effect 
Trend: General favorability scale,  
Q1-3, Q7-9: Confirm H.2 and H.2 Q2: Confirms H.2 and H.2 No significant effect 
 Alternative energy 
No significant effect 
Trend: Alternative energy support scale, 
Q3, 5, 6: Contradict H.2 and H.2 
Q7: Confirm H.2 and H.2 
Q7: Contradicts H.2 and 
H.2 No significant effect 










Nuclear Threat  
Feeling thermo, Q7 and 8: 
More information, more 
feelings of threat 
Feeling thermo, Q8: More 
information, more likely to feel North 
Korea is less friendly and less likely 
to feel that peace talk can be the 
solution 
 Health Care Reform  
Trend only: Q5 and Q6: 
More information, more 
likely to feel the reform 
will be beneficial to 
American people; less 
likely to favor single payer 
system 
Trend only: Q5 and 6: More 
information, more likely to oppose 
that employer paying a fee and more 
likely to favor cutting Medicare cost 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy scale, 
Q2, 3 and 8: more 
information, more support No effect 




Nuclear Threat  
Nuclear threat scale, Q3, 
5, 6, 7: More political 
knowledge, more feelings 
of threat 
Q8: More knowledge, more likely to 
think peace talk is a solution 
 Health Care Reform  
Trend only: Q3, 6 and 7, 
more knowledge, more 
likely to favor increasing 
tax and an insurance 
system with both public 
and private options, and 
less likely to favor cutting 
Medicare cost 
Q6: More knowledge, more likely to 
oppose cutting Medicare cost 
 Alternative energy  
Q1, 4 and 5: More 
knowledge, less support 
for alternative energy 
Alternative energy scale: More 
knowledge, more support for 
alternative energy 
     
Issue Salience 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  
All except Q8: More 
salient, more feelings of 
threat No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q1, 2, 8, and 9: More 
Cut Medicare scale, Q3, Q4, Q9: 







salient, less favorable of 
the scale 
cutting Medicare scale, More 
favorable to public and private 
options, and single payer system, 
more likely to think the reform is 
harmful for the economy. 
 Alternative energy  
All Qs and scales: More 
salient, less support for 
alternative energy and 
more support for 
traditional energy 
Q1: More salient, more likely to think 
traditional energy will sustain long 




Nuclear Threat  No significant effect 
Q4: More exposure leads to more 
feelings of threat 
Q6: More discussion leads to more 
likely to think that North Korea’s real 
intention is to get financial aid 
 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q2, 4 and 8: More 
reported following of the 
reform news, less support 
of the reform 
Q3: More participation in discussion, 
more likely to favor public and 
private insurance options 
 Alternative energy  No significant effect 
Q1 and 6: More exposure, more 
likely to think traditional energy will 
run out soon and alternative energy is 
beneficial to economy 
Q5: More follow-up of news, more 
likely to think alternative energy is 
beneficial to environment 
Q3 and Q4: More discussion, more 
support for traditional energy 





Nuclear Threat  
No significant effect 
 
Informative: No significant effect 
Q3: Relevant leads to feeling North 
Korea more friendly 
 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q3: Information relevant, 
more likely to favor the 
Q2, 6, 7: More informative, more 
likely to favor increasing tax, less 







reform likely to favor universal coverage 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy scale, 
Q1, 3, 5 and 7: 
information cards 
informative, more likely to 
support alternative energy 
Q5: information cards 
relevant, more likely to 
think that alternative 
energy is beneficial to the 
environment 
Informative: No significant effect 
Alternative energy scale, Q3: 
Relevant leads to more support for 
incentives for alternative energy 




Nuclear Threat  
Q5 and 8: News affects 
one’s own opinion: More 
likely to think North 
Korea issue can be 
resolved by peace talks 
and more likely to agree 
that it is a danger to the 
world 
 
Q5 and 8: News affects 
others’ opinions: Less 
likely to think North 
Korea issue can be 
resolved by peace talks 
and less likely to agree 
that it is a danger to the 
world 
Q8: News affects one’s own opinion: 
more likely to think that this issue 
can be resolved by peace talks 
Q8: News affects other’s opinions: 
Less likely to think that this issue can 
be resolved by peace talks 
 Health Care Reform  
Q7: News affects one’s 
own opinion: More likely 
to favor increasing tax to 
finance the reform 
News affects others’ 
opinions: No significant 
effects 
News affects one’s own opinion: No 
significant effect 
Q6: News affects others’ opinions: 
More likely to favor the reform 
 







news affects one’s own 
opinion: More likely to 
support alternative energy 
Alternative energy scale, 
Q3 and 7: Less likely to 
support alternative energy 
opinion: More likely to think 
alternative energy is beneficial to the 
economy, is a better source of energy 
and more likely to decrease 
incentives for traditional energy 
News affects others’ opinions: No 
significant effect 
     
Party ID 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  No significant effect No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q1 and 5: Democrats are 
more likely to favor the 
reform 
Q2: Democrats are more likely to 
support universal coverage 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy support 
scale, Q4, 5: Republicans 
are more likely to support 
alternative energy 
Q3 and 5: Republicans are more 
likely to support alternative energy 




Nuclear Threat  
Nuclear threat scale, Q4, 
5, 7, 8: Conservatives are 
more likely to feel North 
Korea is a threat 
Q3: Conservatives are more likely to 
feel that North Korea is friendly 
 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q3-5 and Q7-9: Liberals 
are more likely to favor 
the reform No significant effect 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy support 
scale, Q1, 3, 5, 6, and 7: 
Liberals are more likely to 
support alternative energy 
Q3: Liberals are more likely to 
support increasing incentives for 
alternative energy 
Q1: Conservatives are more likely to 
think traditional energy will run out 
soon 




Nuclear Threat  
Nuclear threat scale, Q3-6: 
Less interest leads to more 







 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q3: More interest leads to 
more opposing the reform 
Q5: More interest leads to more 
favorability of employer paying a fee 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy support 
scale, Q2, 5, and 6: More 
interest leads to less 
favorability of alternative 
energy 
Q3: More interest leads to more 
support for incentives to develop 
alternative energy 





Nuclear Threat  
Nuclear threat scale, Q4,5, 
6: More worried about 
terrorist attacks, more 
likely to feel North Korea 
poses a threat 
Nuclear threat scale, Q4: More 
worried about terrorist attacks, more 
likely to feel North Korea poses a 
threat 
Presidential 
Approval Health Care Reform  
All Qs and scales: More 
approval of the President, 
more likely to support the 
reform 
Q1, 3, 5, 6, 9 and scales: More 
approval of the President, more likely 
to support the reform 
     
Race 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  No significant effect No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform  
Q9: Whites are more 
likely to think the reform 
is beneficial to the 
economy No significant effect 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy scale, 
Q1 and 2: Whites are more 
likely to support 
alternative energy 
Q5: Whites are more likely to think 
that alternative energy is more 
beneficial to the environment 
     
Gender 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  
Q6: Females are more 
likely to think the 
intention of North Korea 
is to pose nuclear threat No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform  No significant effect 
Q4: Females are more likely to 
oppose single payer system 







alternative energy is beneficial to 
economy 
     
Age 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  
Q3: Older participants 
think that North Korea is 
less friendly No significant effect 
 Health Care Reform  
Q3, 6, 7and cutting 
Medicare cost scale: Older 
participants are more 
likely to favor increasing 
tax and having public and 
private options. They are 
also less likely to support 
cutting Medicare cost. No significant effect 
 Alternative energy  
Traditional energy scale, 
Q1, Q2: Older respondents 
are more likely to support 
traditional energy 
Q3 and 5: Older respondents are 
more likely to support for incentives 
for alternative energy. Younger 
respondents are more likely to think 
alternative energy is beneficial to the 
environment. 
     
Education 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  
Nuclear threat scale, Q4, 
5, 8: Higher education 
leads to less feeling of 
threat from North Korea 
Q6: Higher education leads to think 
that the real intention is to get 
financial aid 
 Health Care Reform  
Q1: Higher education, less 
favorability of the reform 
Q3, 9: Higher education leads to 
more favorability of having both 
public and private options of health 
insurance; more likely to think the 
reform is beneficial to economy 
 Alternative energy  
Alternative energy scale, 
Q4: Higher education, less 
support for alternative 
energy No significant effect 
     
Income 
North Korean 
Nuclear Threat  
Q8: Higher income leads 
to less likely to think 
peace talks are a solution 
Q6: Higher income leads to think 
North Korea is posing a real threat 







 Health Care Reform  
General favorability scale, 
Q1, 2 and 7: Higher 
income, less favorable of 
the reform No significant effect 
 Alternative energy  
Q4: Higher income leads 
to more support for 
increasing incentives for 
alternative energy 
Q7: Higher income leads to less 
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